'Self-representationalism' is a relatively recently explored view on the nature of the occurrent mental states which we are used to calling 'conscious'. Some of its main representatives have recently proved curious about classical phenomenology and thereby got into the neighbourhood of positions of the Heidelberg School (Dieter Henrich and his disciples). Both combat circular or regressive involvements of the so called 'reflection' oder 'higher-order model' of self-consciousness. But while self-representationalists keep sticking to 'representation' as the 'basic core condition' of consciousness, the Heidelbergians consider representation to be the very root of the above-mentioned explanatory paradoxes and recommend recurring to the notion of 'pre-reflectivity'.
The workshop's main aim was to make representatives of both schools acquainted with each other and to begin a fruitful dialogue. This intention was entirely satisfied. The other aim was interdisciplinary: How can the assumption of there being a pre-reflective self-awareness be rendered consistent with the reality of ego-disorders and mental impairments, above all the phenomenon of thought-insertion in psychosis? Do troubles like these interfere with core prereflective self-consciousness or do they only emerge when primary experiences are being processed by reflection?
Volker Beehr (Düsseldorf, GER), Marc Borner (Berlin, GER), Katja Crone (Mannheim, GER), Frank Hofmann (Walferdange, LUX), Terence Horgan (Tucson, USA), Tomis Kapitan (DeKalb, USA), Uriah Kriegel (Paris, FRA), Gregory Landini (Iowa City, USA), Stefan Lang (Halle (Saale), GER), Konrath Mauth (Stuttgart, GER), Maik Niemeck (Halle (Saale), GER), Anne Pankow (Berlin, GER), Gerhard Preyer (Frankfurt am Main, GER), Wolfgang Prinz (Leipzig, GER), Stefan Schlosser (Ditzingen, GER), Peter Schulte (Bielefeld, GER), Gianfranco Soldati (Fribourg, SUI), Jürgen Stolzenberg (Halle (Saale), GER), Anna Strasser (Berlin, GER), Kenneth Williford (Arlington, USA), Dan Zahavi (Kopenhagen, DEN)