The workshop dealt mainly with the conception of intentionality as a precondition of moral and legal responsibility. It allowed for abundant discussion between philosophers and legal scholars. For responsibility ascriptions in ethics as well as in penal science, the concept of "intentional action" plays a dominant role. It is not clear, however, what is meant by saying that an action is intentional and why this should be so important for an evaluation of the action. In particular, one might wonder whether intentions should be construed as mental states. The latter question was at the very focus of the workshop. Envisaging an interdisciplinary debate was a first step to overcome the traditional shortcoming that parallel discussions take place in different disciplines almost without mutual stimulation and impact, despite the fact that problems of responsibility ascription prevail in all normative disciplines.
Stephen Butterfill (Coventry, GBR), Antje du Bois-Pedain (Cambridge, GBR), Antony Duff (Stirling, GBR), Frank A. Hindriks (Groningen, NED), Erling Johannes Husabø (Bergen, NOR), Jan C. Joerden (Frankfurt (Oder), GER), Geert Keil (Berlin, GER), Michael Lindemann (Bielefeld, GER), Bertram F. Malle (Providence, USA), Sandra Marshall (Minneapolis, USA), Erasmus Mayr (Erlangen, GER), Katarzyna Paprzycka (Warschau, POL), Gabriel Pérez Barberá (Buenos Aires, ARG), Wolfgang Prinz (Leipzig, GER), Katrine Rong Holter (Bergen, NOR), Constantine Sandis (Hatfield, GBR), Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg (Bonn, GER), Alejandra Verde (Buenos Aires, ARG), Benjamin Vogel (Freiburg i.Br., GER), Johanna Wagner (Bielefeld, GER), Joachim Wündisch (Düsseldorf, GER)