

Walmsley, J. (1988). The Sonnenschein v. Jespersen controversy.

From: Fries, U. and M. Heusser (edd.)(1988). *Meaning and Beyond. Ernst Leisi zum 70. Geburtstag*. Tübingen: Narr, 253-81.

The Sonnenschein v. Jespersen Controversy

John Walmsley

Edward Adolf Sonnenschein¹ died on 2nd September 1929. The *Times* obituary, published the next day, paid tribute to his life's work at the University of Birmingham, where he had been Professor of Greek and Latin for thirty-five years until his retirement in 1918—as the initiator of the *Parallel Grammar Series* (the individual volumes of which were described as 'models of their kind')—and as the author of *The Soul of Grammar* (1927), the aim of which was "... to show the organic unity of ancient and modern languages, and to bring into clear relief the grammatical features common to various Aryan tongues, old and new..." The latter publication was singled out for particular praise as being "... the only practical manual on comparative syntax as yet available to English-speaking scholars..."

Although, according to the *Dictionary of National Biography* (D.N.B.),² *The Soul of Grammar* and *The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive* summed up much of his grammatical thinking, Sonnenschein was also actively interested in other fields. He was, for instance, the initiator of societies devoted to bringing about grammatical reform, and to furthering the teaching of classics. Outside his special field—(Latin and Greek)—he is probably best remembered as the originator of a scheme for the reform of grammatical terminology—effectively in English, but also dealing in fact with the terminology of the five major languages then taught in English and Welsh schools.³ Outwardly, this work would seem to have been crowned with success. Not only did the

¹ I am indebted to Dick Hudson, Professor Peter Matthews, and particularly to Tom Bloor and Chris Stray for suggestions for improvements to this paper. Needless to say, its remaining shortcomings are all my own.

² Sedgwick (1930: 796-8).

³ *On the Terminology of Grammar. Being the Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology*. Rev. ed. 1911. London: John Murray.

report *On the Terminology of Grammar* receive official approval from a number of professional bodies concerned with language teaching, but it was buttressed by Sonnenschein's own highly successful *New English Grammar* written, obviously, in accordance with his own principles.

Within this context it might appear as though *The Soul of Grammar*—the 'last fruit' of Sonnenschein's retirement, as the *Classical Review* put it—represented the distillation of all his experience as a grammarian, recollected in tranquility, for the benefit of future generations.⁴ It comes as something of a surprise, then, to learn that the real purpose of *The Soul of Grammar* was, in Sonnenschein's own words, to "demolish the arch-enemy Jespersen" (Sedgwick 1930: 797). The D.N.B. adds helpfully in brackets ('Otto Jespersen, of Copenhagen'), and goes on to say that the book was widely accepted by competent judges as having achieved its purpose.

Fifty years since Sonnenschein died, it is interesting to see how the picture has changed. Today, every linguist is familiar with the name of Jespersen; fewer, I suspect, with that of Sonnenschein. More important, linguists of widely divergent persuasions find it worth their while to inform themselves as to what Jespersen had to say on a variety of linguistic topics. The same cannot be said for Sonnenschein. The five decades which have elapsed since Sonnenschein's death have seen Jespersen's name rise in general esteem, while Sonnenschein's has suffered something of an eclipse. It would not be true to say that Sonnenschein's name has been lost entirely to linguistic history, but where it does occur, it is mentioned more in the spirit of exhaustive research—one of the last stones, as it were, which the conscientious researcher dare not leave unturned.

Why is it, then, that far from having been annihilated by the weapon intended to demolish it for ever, Jespersen's work thrives? And what was it that so roused Sonnenschein's ire?

In his contribution to the 1967 symposium on Universals in Linguistic Theory—(subsequently published as *The Case for Case*, 1968)—Fillmore surveyed briefly the work of both Jespersen and Sonnenschein: "We have probably all enjoyed sneering, with Jespersen, at his favorite 'bad guy' Sonnenschein, who, unable to decide between

⁴ *Classical Review* 43, (1929: 161).

Latin and Old English, allowed Modern English *teach* to be described as either taking a dative and an accusative, because that was the pattern for Old English *tæcan*, or as taking two accusatives, in the manner of Latin *doceo* and German *lehren* ..." (Fillmore 1968: 5). The criticism Fillmore here makes of Sonnenschein is that it is not admissible to postulate a set of cases—or a particular case—in one language on the basis of the case system of a different language—or, as Fillmore puts it, "looking for one man's case system in another man's language is not a good example of the study of case" (Fillmore 1968: 5). This view might lead one to expect to find Fillmore more in sympathy with the views of Jespersen, for whom case was strictly language specific. However, Fillmore, in developing his semantic theory of case, also puts a considerable distance between himself and Jespersen.

Summarizing his own position, Fillmore writes of "an array consisting of a V plus a number of NP's holding special labeled relations (cases) to the sentence" (Fillmore 1968: 32). Elsewhere, Fillmore comments: "... if there are recognizable intrasentence relationships of the types discussed in studies of case systems (whether they are reflected in case affixes or not), ... if these same relationships can be shown to be comparable across languages, and ... if there is some predictive or explanatory use to which assumptions concerning the universality of these relations can be put, then surely there can be no meaningful objection to using the word *case*, in a clearly understood deep structure sense, to identify these relationships" (Fillmore 1968: 20). This sounds like an appeal to potential opponents to accept that case can be defined in terms other than those of overt, surface-structure criteria. If so, the appeal went unheeded. In the final published version of his paper, Fillmore acknowledged that his scheme had been criticized as having been "too strongly motivated by semantic considerations; ... it has been argued that syntactic analyses should be based on syntactic data alone ..." (Fillmore 1968: 88).

Critics who argued from this standpoint are firmly in the Jespersen camp. Indeed, Fillmore had acknowledged this position in his survey of previous treatments of case: "There is among scholars a strong feeling that the term should be used only where clear case morphemes are discoverable in the inflexions of nouns. To Jespersen, it is wrong to speak of 'analytic' cases, even when there is no 'local'

meaning in the preposition phrases, because cases are one thing and preposition-plus-object constructions are another ..." (Fillmore 1968: 19). However, Fillmore tries to weaken Jespersen's argument by placing it in the context of the latter's evolutionary theories on progress in language: "Jespersen's position is coloured a little by his belief that the caselessness of English represents a state of progress for which we should be grateful" (Fillmore 1968: 19-20).

Thus far, Sonnenschein's methods appear to be beneath serious discussion, while Jespersen's determination to limit the use of the word 'case' to overt, surface-structure phenomena places him in a different tradition from the one Fillmore is developing.

A generation earlier than Fillmore, in the era of structural linguistics, Eugene Nida had also examined the works of Sonnenschein and Jespersen when preparing his own *Synopsis of English Syntax*.⁵

One virtue of Nida's work lay in the fact that by adopting an extreme methodological position he gave his theory clear contours, thus making it more easily falsifiable. The salient features of this position were that it attempted strict objectivity—(independence of mental or notional categories), that it was entirely synchronic—(eschewing historical evidence) and that it was language specific—(it claimed to make no use of insights from other languages). From this outline alone, one can begin to see where Jespersen and Sonnenschein would have to appear in the constellation. On the first point, Jespersen's syntactic definitions are based on formal differences, though he is also very much concerned with notional categories, whereas Sonnenschein makes both formal and functional criteria the basis for his definitions. Jespersen's approach is decidedly synchronic, while Sonnenschein's is avowedly historical. Finally, Jespersen would allow only language-specific data into the description of a given language, while also looking for notional categories of general, universal or philosophical grammar; Sonnenschein, on the other hand, thought it self-defeating to suppress one's knowledge of other, related languages in framing the grammar of any single, individual language.

Nida's standpoint gave him the advantage of a clearly defined position from which to assess the work of earlier grammarians. His

⁵ This appeared originally as Nida's 1943 Ph.D. thesis.

demands for descriptive objectivity, for instance—(that the linguist or grammarian should take account of what he called 'the larger patterns' of the language)—and for the exclusion of any kind of extraneous material, (whether diachronic or from other languages)—became the yardsticks against which other linguists were measured. Jespersen's insights, claimed Nida, were vitiated by his lack of descriptive objectivity: "Jespersen has seen more clearly than others the significance of the larger patterns, though he does not always follow out the implications of his system, and is at times handicapped by a notional analysis of these patterns" (Nida 1960: 37). This apparent failure to distinguish between formal categories on the one hand, and functional, semantic or notional categories on the other, was a weakness which in Nida's eyes flawed the work of both Sonnenschein and Jespersen to a similar degree: "The dominant value of the notional approach is recommended as a basic rule by Sonnenschein who insists that if one 'takes care of the sense, the sounds will take care of themselves'⁶ ... Jespersen ... declares that 'in syntax meaning is everything'⁷ ..." (Nida 1960: 28). Thus Jespersen, according to Nida, was led into "rather serious distortion and complication of the formal and functional values. For example, the setting up of "nexus" substantives, and dividing expression [*sic*] such as *the doctor's arrival* from *the man's house*, because the first is equivalent in meaning to a "nexus" construction, *the doctor arrives*, is largely unwarranted since there are no paralleling formal or functional differences" (Nida 1960: 28). Sonnenschein's treatment of English was, in Nida's eyes, even worse, since his notionalism, unlike Jespersen's, was compounded by an expressed readiness to take diachronic evidence from other languages into consideration. Nida commented, Sonnenschein "actually insists that all the Indo-European categories are still active in English. Of course all that he is saying is that anything expressed in one language may be expressed in another, for though his categories show some similarity of meaning, there is certainly no correlation as to formal manner of presentation. Actually Sonnenschein employs a historical, comparative, and notional view of language in confusing the descriptive presentation"

⁶ Sonnenschein (1916, Pt. II: 38).

⁷ Jespersen (1904-42, Vol. IV: 291).

(Nida 1960: 23). The kind of wrong result which Nida chooses to quote as the type of thing such an approach can lead to, is Sonnenschein's postulation of a dative case for Present Day English. This of course puts Nida in touch with Fillmore's critique of Sonnenschein for similar reasons.

One last feature of Nida's structuralist position deserves mention: his emphasis on pure description. This places him at the opposite pole—(in what might be perceived as one phase in a historical cycle)—to those who look for the underlying *ratio* of language: "As in the case of Jespersen, few grammarians are willing to describe only what they find, but they seem to believe that a descriptive grammar should be explanatory and interpretive, indicating not only what constructions occur but also why such constructions have certain forms. It is this attempt to answer the why's of syntax which has given rise to so many useless and erroneous speculations" (Nida 1960: 30).

To sum up, in Nida's eyes the work of both Sonnenschein and Jespersen was seriously flawed, due to its strongly notional character. Despite differences of opinion with respect to synchronic and diachronic approaches, and concerning the use to be made of evidence from comparative linguistics, this fundamental position—their notionalism—Sonnenschein and Jespersen were believed to hold in common. But if this were the case, what were the causes of the intellectual antagonism between them? And how could the other points of difference suffice to make Jespersen, in Sonnenschein's eyes, the 'arch-enemy'? In order to answer this question it is useful to consider briefly the context in which Sonnenschein perceived Jespersen's work—in other words, Sonnenschein's own aspirations and the motivation which lay behind them.

A considerable period of Sonnenschein's life was devoted to the reform of grammatical terminology. This work fell into two clearly defined phases, the first prior to 1900, the second covering the first two decades of the twentieth century.

"The first step was taken by a paper" [*sic*] it was reported, "read by Prof. Sonnenschein before the Teacher's Association of Mason's College, Birmingham." In this paper, Sonnenschein called attention to the need among other things for greater simplicity in dealing both with

"the puerilities of accident and the senilities of syntax."⁸ After the paper had been heard, a motion advocating the formation of a Grammatical Society was carried, with the aims both of promoting the cause of simplicity and uniformity of terminology in the teaching of the 'school' languages, and of encouraging grammatical research among teachers. Thus the Birmingham Grammatical Society was born.

Sonnenschein lost little time in putting his ideas into practice. In this, he was fortunate to be able to call upon the services (through his brother William) of the publishing house of Swan, Sonnenschein and Co. His ideas took concrete shape in the form of the Parallel Grammar Series, individual volumes of which appeared between 1888 and 1903. They included grammars of Latin, Greek, English, French and German, all written according to the principles advocated by Sonnenschein: uniformity of classification and terminology, uniformity of scope, and uniformity of size and type. This statement, however, fails to give a true picture of the scale of the enterprise, for the grammar of each language was supplemented in many cases by a *Reader* and *Writer*—three for French, for example, and four for German—together with other ancillary works. Further, in addition to the five 'school' languages, by 1898 a *Dano-Norwegian Reader* had appeared together with grammars of Spanish and Welsh. Altogether, the programme covering the eight languages mentioned comprised at least twenty-seven different volumes. Sonnenschein personally contributed the Latin and Greek grammars and the *First German Reader and Writer*, and he was co-author of the English grammar. It was in this series, too, that the *Advanced English Syntax* of C. T. Onions, a former pupil of Sonnenschein, made its first appearance. The completion of the series was officially announced in 1899.

The second phase of Sonnenschein's reforming activities took its origin from another society which he was instrumental in founding—the Classical Association. As the *Report* of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology said, it was at a meeting of the Classical Association in 1908 that the proposal which ultimately led to the report was put forward. By 1909 a Joint Committee drawn from representatives of eight associations concerned with the teaching of

⁸ *Journal of Education* (1886: 169):

languages had been formed, and Professor Sonnenschein elected Chairman and Professor Rippmann Honorary Treasurer. This Committee, consisting of twenty-four members, presented its recommendations after exactly twenty-four meetings, in December 1910. Subsequently two further meetings were held, and the recommendations were finally published in the form in which they are known today—*On the Terminology of Grammar*.

There can be no doubt that this movement caught the spirit of the times. Indeed, a more general tendency towards standardization seems to have been sweeping across the western world at this time, of which linguistic standardization was but a more specialized manifestation. Whereas in some aspects of his work—in Latin and Greek, and in comparative philology for instance—Sonnenschein belonged to schools of thought whose impetus and influence were fading, with his call for standardization he found himself in the vanguard of an international movement. The United States, equally suffering under the impression of wildly proliferating and disharmonious terminology, appointed a Joint Committee in December 1911 with objectives similar to those of its English counterpart. Germany and Austria attacked the problem in the same way as the English and Americans did, by setting up committees. In France, however, the problems were solved at a stroke by the Ministère de l'Instruction publique, who on July 25th, 1910 issued a decree listing approximately ninety grammatical items, together with a directive that for the purposes of public examinations up to and including the *baccalauréat*, knowledge of grammar beyond the terms given in the list was not to be tested. There are indications that Sonnenschein rather envied the French their incisiveness, but having been told that "the (then) Board of Education ... would never contemplate the laborious and delicate task of framing a grammatical terminology for use in all schools," (*PCA* 1911: 21) and having come to the conclusion that "there is no body in this country in a position to formulate a scheme for Grammatical Terminology and to impose it upon all teachers," he saw a committee composed of representatives appointed by interested bodies as the only viable alternative.

This, then, was the backcloth against which the Sonnenschein-Jespersen controversy was played out. As befits disagreement within the scientific community, the proprieties of polite discourse were observed:

each appeared to acknowledge the other's work, at the same time leaving a loophole open, for freedom to dissent. Sonnenschein stated quite openly and generously: "... I have taken some of my examples from books published abroad, such as the *Modern English Syntaxes* by Prof. Jespersen and Dr. G. Wendt" (Sonnenschein 1916, Pt. II: 6), while Jespersen described Sonnenschein's *New English Grammar* (NEG) as "... in many ways an excellent book, though I shall sometimes have occasion to take exception to it ..." (Jespersen 1924: 59 fn. 2).

The first signs of threatening discord had in fact appeared in 1909, with the publication in Heidelberg of Jespersen's *Modern English Grammar*—that is, before the Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology. Although Jespersen's publication was to be the first of seven volumes (the last of which only appeared after his own death, and almost twenty years after Sonnenschein's), there seemed to be no reason to suspect that it could threaten the success of the Committee's *Report*. After all the *Report* was to be adopted—or at least 'approved' (*PCA* 1911: 34)—by eight powerful associations (though with a number of uncomfortable moments) and endorsed by a number of government bodies, including the Leathes Committee.⁹ Nevertheless, as Jespersen's work became more widely known, pressure on the Committee to adjust their terminology in the light of these new grammatical developments increased.

There is no sign of this in Sonnenschein's *New English Grammar*. There, Jespersen's name is scarcely mentioned. However, when in 1921 Sonnenschein's scheme of grammatical terminology appeared to find official support for its use in schools, Professor Moore-Smith wrote to the *Times Literary Supplement* suggesting that the scheme should be amended in the light of Jespersen's work (*TLS* 8th June 1922). The following year, Professor Allen Mawer argued at the annual meeting of the English Association that the evolution of English had itself made changes in grammatical terms and conceptions unavoidable. For this reason, Mawer felt unable to follow the English Committee in recommending without qualification the adoption of the Joint Committee's terminology.

⁹ *Report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to enquire into the position of Modern Languages in the Educational System of Great Britain* (1918, § 201: 55).

The discussion which ensued was conducted in part in the columns of the *Times Literary Supplement* throughout June, 1922. In his letter of June 15th, Sonnenschein maintained the attack he had started on Jespersen's terminology: "Jespersen's 'Modern English Grammar' ... is a mine of interesting observations and quotations; but it fairly bristles with terms which would drive any class of schoolboys or schoolgirls crazy..."¹⁰; "Jespersen's system is a terminology for the cave, not for the market-place ... It turns every English sentence into a nest of puzzles, and would be sure to lead to a reaction against all teaching of English grammar in schools, as a subject which is too much of an 'open question' ..." Jespersen replied, "surely no one ever dreamt of introducing all this into the schoolroom" (*TLS* 29th June 1922). He was concerned, he said, with "a scientific understanding of the structure of the English language."

This difference in purpose between Sonnenschein and Jespersen clearly played a major role in the controversy. It would scarcely be true, however, to say that either misunderstood the other's position in this respect. The question was, rather, how far it is appropriate to import without modification the latest terminological developments into the classroom, and how far it is legitimate to rewrite a science, as it were, to make it accessible to schoolchildren. Nevertheless, further support for Jespersen's position was provided by McKerrow, also in 1922 but after Mawer's address to the English Association. McKerrow argued from a purely synchronic standpoint, and lamented the failure of English grammar to free itself from the shackles of Latin. More important, he did this within the framework of the two main problems around which the arguments of Sonnenschein and Jespersen crystallised—case, and mood.

One is justified in making these the touchstones of any comparison, not least because there is evidence that the protagonists, too, recognized them as the main *casus belli*. Sonnenschein's *Soul of Grammar* consists entirely of two lengthy, largely parallel chapters—I: ON CASES AND

¹⁰ The kind of terms which Sonnenschein took objection to included Jespersen's division of words into three (notional) form classes—*principals, adjuncts and subjuncts*—together with such subdivisions as *direct and indirect adjuncts, shifted subjunct-adjuncts, partial adjuncts, compositional adjuncts*. etc. (cf. *TLS* 15th June 1922 and *PCA* 1923: 41).

CASE-PHRASES, II: ON MOODS AND TENSES. Further, the second of them begins with the words, "The problems to be faced in connexion with moods and tenses are fundamentally the same as those which have been discussed above in connection with case" (Sonnenschein 1927: 51). McKerrow's view of case was that, "The days are over now when people solemnly declined English nouns with all the cases of the Latin, and when, for example, 'cat' had a vocative 'O cat,' a genitive, 'of a, or the, cat,' a dative, 'to a or the, cat' and so on ..." (McKerrow 1922: 150)—a bold statement when one considers that (for Sonnenschein, at least) the battle was far from lost, and when some associations still had to come to a decision as to whether to recommend the terminology of the *Report* to their members or not.

It was in the *Philosophy of Grammar* in 1924 that Jespersen put forward the criticism of Sonnenschein's treatment of case referred to by Fillmore. In essence, Jespersen's criticism was that in the absence of formal markers, there are no consistent criteria by which a decision could be made in present day English—as Sonnenschein wished—between an accusative and a dative case. Jespersen further attacked Sonnenschein's practice of attempting to draw on historical evidence in order to maintain the distinction. At one point in his *New English Grammar* (NEG), for instance, Sonnenschein concluded, "... though we cannot distinguish accusatives and datives by their *form* in modern English, yet there is good reason for thinking that the case used after all prepositions at the present day is the accusative" (Sonnenschein 1916: § 489). He did not add that in the absence of such formal differences the distinction was devoid of consequences. In making the point that the assignment of words to one or the other case must hence be "perfectly arbitrary" (Jespersen 1924: 176), Jespersen drew attention to a weakness which Sonnenschein had built into his system and which, it could be argued, proved to be fatal, or nearly so: "The rules have to be learned by rote by the pupils, for they cannot be understood" (Jespersen 1924: 176).

Despite—or perhaps because of—the way in which the loss of Old English nominal inflexions has in part been compensated for by constraints on word order, Jespersen felt unable to pass over the question of a 'positional dative' without comment. "If," he wrote "in 'the man gave his son a book' *son* is in the positional dative, we must

recognize a positional dative in all the following instances in which it would be impossible to revert the order of the two substantives:

I asked the boy a few questions.

I heard the boy his lesson.

I took the boy long walks.

I painted the wall a different colour.

I called the boy bad names.

I called the boy a scoundrel.

If we are to speak of separate datives and accusatives in English, I for one do not know where in this list the dative goes out and the accusative comes in, and I find no guidance in those grammars that speak of these two cases" (Jespersen 1924: 174). Unfortunately for Jespersen, to some native speakers of English, not all the above sentences constitute equally acceptable data—a point which was later to be taken up by Callaway.

Turning to mood, Jespersen took Sonnenschein to task for asserting that 'mood' denoted meaning rather than form—a notional definition in line with Sonnenschein's other definitions. Jespersen's view of mood was that it should be "defined as a grammatical form, or the function of such a form ..." (MEG VII, §18.1). He also showed, however, that Sonnenschein's treatment of mood was full of contradictions or near-contradictions: according to Sonnenschein the subjunctive was "not so much used at the present day as it was in Old English ..." (NEG § 214), but five paragraphs later, "the ... subjunctive is very common in several kinds of subordinate clause" (NEG § 219). Further, "most subjunctives cannot be distinguished from indicatives by their *form*. Nevertheless the *meaning* of the subjunctive is quite different from that of the indicative, and this enables us to recognize subjunctives" (NEG § 214). Unfortunately, Sonnenschein injudiciously went on to quote a passage from R. L. Stevenson—"I do not know *whether* the Master be a stranger to London, *or whether* he is a man of odd notions ..." On the difference between 'I do not know whether the Master *be* a stranger' and '... *is* a stranger' Sonnenschein was reduced to saying: "This 'be' may be a form of indicative ... But it may be a subjunctive used without any other difference of meaning from an indicative ..." (Sonnenschein 1916, Pt. III: 22). While drawing attention to contradictions of this sort, Jespersen added that not only was the

meaning of the subjunctive nowhere defined by Sonnenschein, but it would be an illusion to believe that it would be possible to construct an adequate definition (Jespersen 1924: 317).

The disagreements between Sonnenschein and Jespersen were not confined to questions of categorization and definition. They extended, as has been shown, to differences of opinion on terminology. In this connexion Jespersen wrote, "There is really no necessity for such terms as the 'Future Perfect in the Past' for *would have written*, which has nothing whatever to do with future time, and which still retains some trace of the original meaning of volition in its first element" (Jespersen 1924: 281-2). But the term 'Future Perfect in the Past' was one of Sonnenschein's—he actually spoke of "our pet term 'future in the past' ..." (PCA 1923: 40). Jespersen argued that with such an extensive use of auxiliaries as occurs in English there was no point in coining special terms for all possible syntagmatic possibilities. "Why should the combinations *would go* and *would have gone* have special terms rather than *might go* and *might have gone*, or *dared go* etc.?" he asked (Jespersen 1924: 281). Nevertheless, Mr. Rushbrooke, one of the members of the Joint Committee, was able to report to the Classical Association in 1911 that, "... that term ['future in the past'—J.W.] is already adopted by French grammarians. Representation came from one or two Associations on that point. However, its use has been found practically useful in France" (PCA 1911: 43)—thus unwittingly giving support to Jespersen's claim that the only real reason for giving special names to some of these syntagms and not to others was because "these forms serve to translate simple tense forms of certain other languages ..." (Jespersen 1924: 281).

The next step in the controversy was taken by Callaway. He published a paper in 1927 which took up Jespersen's discussion of the 'positional dative.' Using Jespersen's data, he disputed the necessity of recognizing a 'positional dative' in all the examples quoted simply on the grounds that *son*— in 'the man gave his son a book'—was 'in the positional dative.' Callaway continued, "... if one intends by that phrase to indicate that position alone determined the case irrespective of function, then we have no such thing as a positional dative. Personally I should prefer to call *son* a functional dative which in Old English with most nouns in a similar function was in form as in function a dative of

the indirect object, but which in Modern English nouns, owing to the apocope of the usual dative ending *-e* of Old English, has become flexionless, and is in form identical with the subjective nominative" (Callaway 1927: 240).

On the basis of the lack of overt formal differences and clear criteria by which a so-called 'positional dative' could be identified, Jespersen had concluded that "we may safely assert that there is no separate dative, and no separate accusative in modern English" (Jespersen 1924: 174). Callaway countered, however, by claiming that to adopt this view would be to deprive linguists of a useful term: "Why should identity of form, though accompanied by clear differentiation of function, preclude the use of the names *dative* and *accusative* here in Modern English when identity of form, though accompanied by clear differentiation of function, in a large class of nouns in Latin does not preclude the use of the names *nominative* and *accusative* for neuter nouns when functioning as subject or as object [on p. 245 Callaway cites Latin *templum* - J.W.] or of the names *dative* and *ablative* for the nouns formally identical in those two cases when functioning as indirect object or as an expression of means?" (loc. cit.)—and, "... the Germanic dative has till this day maintained what its name, its history, and tradition have indicated as one of its chief functions, that of indicating the indirect object. The category of indirect object is ineradicable; the commonest name for the case indicating the indirect object in our family of languages has been the word *dative*. Why discontinue the time-honored name?" (op. cit.: 243). Finally, turning to the alternative classification of 'things that cases stand for' proposed by Jespersen (1924: 185f), Callaway drew attention to Jespersen's postulation of a 'case of the indirect object,' and concluded that "Professor Jespersen himself introduces, though under different names, the categories that he decries in others" (Callaway 1927: 251).

The Soul of Grammar made its appearance in the same year as Callaway's article. Interestingly, the title of Sonnenschein's book was taken from the closing section of Jespersen's own *Philosophy of Grammar*. Jespersen's final chapter—no more than 'Conclusions' in the contents—is divided into three sections: *Conflicts*, *Terminology*, and *The Soul of Grammar*. In this last section Jespersen set out his aims in writing the book and his views on the philosophy of grammar and its

teaching. Sonnenschein's book was thus to embody his position to aspects of Jespersen's work with which he disagreed. Sonnenschein drew together in *The Soul of Grammar* all the arguments he had been able to devise in support of his procedures. In the first chapter, 'ON CASES AND CASE-PHRASES', he pointed out that meaning or function had played a significant role in the definition of case throughout linguistic history. The Stoics had used the word (πρωσις—*ptōsis*) in this wider sense of the term. When arranging their grammars, "they classified and named the forms according to their meanings and uses in sentences" (Sonnenschein 1927: 2). That meaning-relations must play a role in decisions concerning English grammar is evident from examples such as CAN. It is not possible to assign CAN unambiguously to the class of nouns or verbs without seeing how it stands in relation to such paradigms as:

CAN : CAN'T CAN : CANNED ONE CAN : TWO CANS

Sonnenschein pointed out that—no less for Latin than for English—differences in case always entail a difference in meaning even where there is no difference in form, and also that "the number of cases-[for any declension of Latin—J.W.] is always in excess of the number of forms" (Sonnenschein 1927: 3). Thus the paradigm of the fifth declension Latin noun *res* exhibits twelve different 'cases' but only six different forms. For classical grammarians, at least, then, a difference in case did not necessarily entail a difference in form; the same form could take on different meanings in different sentences (Sonnenschein *loc. cit.*) and the same case was frequently marked by different forms (*ibid.*:15). The Ramist view, according to which "... the number of cases in a given language can never be more than the number of actual *endings*, since any classification by semantic criteria alone would result in an infinitude of cases" (Padley 1985: 250—emphasis in the original—J.W.), was thus shown to be untenable, at least in that formulation. Jespersen had pointed out scathingly that "no one would have dreamt of postulating a Latin ablative case if it had not in many instances been different in form from the dative" (Jespersen 1924: 177). But even this Sonnenschein was able to prove wrong: "Quintilian, in his *Institutes of Oratory* (I.4.26) makes or quotes the acute remark

that an intelligent teacher should enquire whether a seventh case ought not to be recognized in Latin, and a sixth in Greek:—'For when I say *hasta percussi*, I am not using an ablative proper (*non utor ablativi natura*), and when I express the same idea in Greek I am not using a dative proper.'¹¹ Here Quintilian or his authority ... had noticed that in the Latin ablative and the Greek dative another case (the instrumental) was concealed. This passage is also interesting as showing that the names of the cases were to a Roman grammarian functional, not morphological, terms" (Sonnenschein 1927: 17).

It would be incorrect, however, to assume from this that Sonnenschein was prepared to admit an unlimited number of (notional) cases into his description of a language. In his view, the upper limit was set by the maximum number of cases in the Indo-European parent language, from which a number of overt distinctions had in the course of history been syncretically lost.

In the course of the debate, Sonnenschein showed himself fully aware of the positions which could be taken up against him, and displayed considerable ingenuity in refuting them—indeed, his arguments can scarcely be faulted. Nevertheless, another round was fired off in the same year when the third volume of Jespersen's *Modern English Grammar* made its appearance. In particular, Jespersen took up the *form : meaning* problem once more, and related it to the example of *templum*—(quoted by Callaway)—in which it is accepted that there are distinct nominative and accusative cases even though they are not marked morphologically. "The analogy from Latin *templum* ..." wrote Jespersen, "cannot be invoked in the way it is done in this [i.e. Callaway's—J.W.] article. We recognize *templum* in one sentence as a nominative and in another as an accusative, because the same language in innumerable words distinguishes the forms of the two cases; but we cannot say that *sun* in one sentence is an accusative, and in another a dative, for there is not a single word in the whole of the English language which has separate forms for the two cases" (Jespersen 1927: 280). Similarly, Jespersen rejected Callaway's proposals concerning the 'positional dative' by quoting the examples:

¹¹ By 'ablative proper' Quintilian doubtless intended 'direction from a place.' The use of *hasta* here—'with (or by) a spear'—is clearly instrumental.

as against

I'll tell it you

I'll tell you it,

in which—even assuming that *you* were accepted as being 'in the dative case'—one would be compelled to distinguish between a 'preposed positional dative' on the one hand, and a 'postposed positional dative' on the other. Finally, Jespersen answered the criticism that he had himself introduced—though under different names—the categories that he decried in others. With this argument, says Jespersen, Callaway "overlooks the fact that I am speaking of 'notional' as distinct from 'grammatical' or 'syntactic' categories—a distinction which pervades the whole of my grammatical philosophy ..." (*loc. cit.*).

Jespersen's *Modern English Grammar* Vol. III proved to be the final blow in the contest—if not in the sense that it 'demolished' his opponent, then at least in the sense that no further blows followed from either side. Sonnenschein died in 1929—although, if competent judges accepted that with *The Soul of Grammar* he had succeeded in defeating his arch-enemy, there was nothing more to be added anyway.

It has already been suggested that Sonnenschein and Jespersen differed in their opinions over a wide range of points, and that case served merely as a particularly sensitive instance round which other, broader, issues clustered. From this blow-by-blow account of the controversy, therefore, it would be well to review briefly in a more systematic—(as opposed to chronological)—manner, the major points of controversy. As has been shown, case can be defined in more than one way. On one wing, there is a more modern tradition of defining case exclusively in functional terms, which can be traced back directly to Wundt. This view perceives cases as underlying relations which may find expression on the surface of the language both as inflexions and through prepositional phrases. Fillmore (1968) clearly belongs in this tradition, and his more immediate predecessor was Deutschbein. Linguists more in the Ramist tradition, following in the wake of Jespersen—who, while in no sense negating the importance of deeper functional relations, reserve the term 'case' for overt, formal oppositions—represent the opposite wing. Sonnenschein, making use of both formal and functional criteria for his definition of case, repudiated

both these positions, and explained why. The 'Ramist' position failed to take account of the fact that "a form may stand in a relation to another member of a sentence without itself showing that relation—the relation being shown by agencies other than form—... (and) ... there has been a not unnatural temptation to assume that the forms of the cases in highly inflected languages must have been *originally* distinct from one another, however much they may have come to coincide at a later date. But this assumption is not really warranted by what is known of the early stages in the history of the Indo-European languages, as can easily be proved" (Sonnenschein 1927: 14). The Wundtian position, on the other hand, suffered in Sonnenschein's view from the defect that "according to this definition there are in every language, in addition to the cases that consist of a single word, at least as many 'cases' as there are prepositions—nay more; for many of the prepositions are capable of indicating more than one relation. But this involves a revolution in the meaning of the term 'case'; for the preposition (πρόθεσις—*prothesis, praepositio*) has always been treated by grammarians as a separate part of speech..." (Sonnenschein 1927: 9).

In a sense, the difference was more one of terminology than of substance—how was 'case' to be defined? All were agreed that underlying relations of some kind exist. The difference turned on whether case was to be defined purely formally or purely functionally, or formally *and* functionally, by including prepositions or excluding them.

While Sonnenschein believed that the kind of abstract system which he tried to set up for case, mood and tense offered a viable basis for the terminology of Indo-European languages, Jespersen disagreed. Sonnenschein had argued that the Committee's solution offered "practical as well as scientific advantages, and it brings English at once into line with Latin, Greek, and German" (*TES* 6th January 1914). Jespersen insisted, however, that the individual language set the boundaries of description, and that *before* such comparisons could be made, each language had to be described on its own terms.

In the same way as he was strictly opposed to facts from other languages, whether related or not, being imported into a description, Jespersen was opposed to a parallel use being made of historical information from the same language. Sonnenschein, however, expressly

favoured this: "... reform depends on a recognition of the fact that English is a member of the Indo-European family of languages, on the belief that harm is done to the study of English, both from the practical and from the scientific point of view, by wresting it from its historical associations" (Sonnenschein 1916, Pt. II: 3). When the Joint Committee was taken to task by Nesfield and Skeat for multiplying the number of cases in modern English "beyond those hitherto recognized as sufficient—the nominative, the possessive, and the objective," one of Sonnenschein's counter-arguments was that the term 'objective' was 'historically misleading.' He wrote: "... when Professor Skeat denounces the Committee for recommending that all prepositions be said to take the accusative in modern English, he shows forgetfulness of historical English grammar."

One of the disadvantages of Sonnenschein's line of argument was that it exposed him to criticism from a spectrum of alternative positions. It comes as no surprise to find that Skeat was not in sympathy with the terminology proposed by the Joint Committee because he, like Jespersen, believed that it forced an alien (Latin) taxonomy on to English. For this reason, Skeat supported Nesfield's scheme of cases. However, this view of the Committee's proposals, Sonnenschein assured his readers, was purely a 'misconception' on Skeat's part for, "... while the *names* of the cases are Latin, the *things* for which those names stand are just as much Teutonic as they are Latin ..." It comes as more of a surprise to learn that the Committee's *Report* had been strongly criticized by Professor Arnold at the 1911 meeting of the Classical Association from the opposite direction, because, as he put it, "all the important problems in Latin are ignored and left in a state of nebulous fog" (*PCA* 1911: 30). More interestingly still, one member conceded at the same meeting that some of those who had signed the *Report* were in fact "entirely in sympathy with Professor Arnold" but had deferred to the majority, which thought the distinctions he was attacking were "of great importance in English Grammar" (*PCA* 1911: 32-33). This principle 'of not rocking the boat'—was one which Sonnenschein was later to exploit to the full.

Arnold had taken particular exception to Sonnenschein's propensity to treat the 'facts' of language as being beyond dispute: what the Committee was proposing was said to be no more than "a standard

terminology for the fundamental facts of grammar" (*Terminology* 1911: 7). Arnold, however, questioned the status of some of the 'facts' which the Committee was postulating—for instance that every sentence had a subject: "That is one of the so-called 'fundamental facts' which to my mind are not facts" (*PCA* 1911: 29). One of Sonnenschein's expressions of the facts on English case is contained in his *New English Grammar* (1916):

TABLE OF THE CASE OF A NOUN

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
Nominative	rat	rats
Vocative	rat	rats
Accusative	rat	rats
Genitive	rat's	rats'
Dative	rat	rats

(Sonnenschein 1916, Pt. II: 43)

It would be wrong to assume that differences of the kind sketched in so far suffice to give a complete description of the Sonnenschein-Jespersen controversy. From one point of view, they were but symptoms of deeper movements. The controversy possessed, for instance, a philosophical dimension, though neither Sonnenschein nor Jespersen labelled it precisely as such—namely, over such questions as how grammar should be pursued, and to what end. Nida took Sonnenschein and Jespersen equally to task for trying to 'explain'—as opposed to merely describing—language. In looking for the *ratio* of a language in this way, both Sonnenschein and Jespersen had put themselves firmly and consciously in a long tradition of universal grammar (cf. Sonnenschein's *Preface to The Soul of Grammar*). It is interesting to note that, while himself coming from within the structuralist tradition, Chomsky was able to identify its shortcomings so clearly and align himself, in slightly different language, with the traditional grammarians. It comes out in the distinction he draws between observational and descriptive adequacy: "Traditional grammar ... was explicitly concerned with the level of descriptive adequacy... This difference between traditional and modern points of view is made particularly clear in modern critiques of traditional grammars. Thus

Nida, in his valuable study (1943) of English syntax within the immediate constituent framework, criticizes Jespersen sharply for his 'serious distortion and complication of the formal and functional values' in assigning to 'the doctor's arrival,' but not 'the doctor's house,' a structural description that indicates that the Subject-Verb relation appears in the former but not in the latter phrase. But clearly Jespersen's account is correct on the level of descriptive adequacy, and the fact that the data-processing operations of modern linguistics fail to provide the correct information indicates only that they are based on an erroneous conception of linguistic structure, or that observational adequacy is being taken as the only relevant concern" (Chomsky 1964: 924-25).

In addition to their attachment to the tradition of universal grammar, a second feature which Sonnenschein and Jespersen had in common, though they interpreted it in different ways, was their notionalism. It was Sonnenschein's use of notional (functional, relational) criteria to define case which Jespersen found unacceptable. Yet it was Jespersen who consciously and explicitly attempted in the *Philosophy of Grammar* to present a detailed and coherent presentation of notional grammar. Although Nida and other linguists decried notionalism for its lack of objectivity, Jespersen's careful distinction in his treatment of the secondary grammatical categories between universal notions and the world on the one hand, and their formal expression in different languages on the other, have proved most fruitful for modern linguists. Lyons (1966) showed that in Jespersen's treatment of the primary syntactic categories in terms of their combinability with each other, may be seen a kind of Categorical Grammar in embryo.

Within this historical context, Sonnenschein and Jespersen were alike in seeing themselves as, in one way or another, breaking with tradition. Sonnenschein's originality lay in trying to break with the teaching tradition on the grounds of its unsatisfactory terminology. (It is significant in this connexion that his father, Adolf, had himself been an educational reformer and headmaster of a girl's school). Sonnenschein's position with respect to the question of how he thought grammar ought to be done has been sufficiently demonstrated in his treatment of case. But his answer to the question of the ends for which

grammar ought to be pursued put him in the mainstream of a tradition which even in his day seemed to be dying out. This tradition was openly prescriptive: Grammar "calls attention to the usage of the *best* writers and speakers, and directs pupils to imitate them ... It is not always easy to decide which are the best usages of a language ... But grammar can generally say which are the best usages of a particular time ..." (Sonnenschein 1916, Pt.III: 99). Furthermore, this tradition saw the study of grammar as a sort of platform for the study of other languages: "... the scientific study of English has also a practical use. For English is akin to all the other languages that we study at school—German, Latin, French, and Greek. They have all the same parts of speech, and the way in which sentences are built up in them are in the main the same. So that to understand the structure of the English language carries us a good way towards understanding the structure of these foreign languages" (Sonnenschein *op. cit.*: 100). Sonnenschein's work also exhibits features of what Lyons has called 'the classical fallacy'—a preponderating 'concern with literature,' and the view that "... the 'purity' of a language is maintained by the usage of the educated, and 'corrupted' by the illiterate..." (Lyons 1968: 9). According to Sonnenschein "... some important features of English live at the present day more in poetry and literary prose than in ordinary parlance" (Sonnenschein 1916, Pt.III: 6). And further—"although we can all speak and write English, we do not always speak or write it correctly" (Sonnenschein *op. cit.*: 100).

To Jespersen, these views on the function of grammar were anathema. In his own *Soul of Grammar* he had outlined his view of how teaching might be changed for the better: "less half-understood or unintelligible precept [*sic*], fewer 'don't's,' fewer definitions, and infinitely more observation of actual living facts" (Jespersen 1924: 346).

Taken as a whole, Jespersen's views were the more in tune with modern developments. This alone, however, could surely scarcely have sufficed to turn him into anybody's 'arch-enemy.'

One deeper reason for the vehemence of Sonnenschein's reaction seems to have lain in the situation of grammar as Sonnenschein saw it at the time in schools. Not only was the position of (English) grammar threatened, but towards the end of the nineteenth century, the teaching

of Latin itself had been coming under increasing pressure. Was Sonnenschein's programme not a way of securing the teaching of grammar, and thus strengthening the position of Latin, by binding it—together with that of the other languages taught in schools—into a uniform terminology? What members of the Classical Association were debating at their 1911 meeting, in other words, was the underlying question of the best direction for their subject to take in order to secure its own future. Thomas May commented, "Shorthand and other subjects are rapidly taking the place of the Classics. Serious attempts are being made to exclude Latin and Greek from the curriculum and examinations of our learned professions. We ought not, then, to stick at swallowing a few verbal changes in grammatical terminology when the alternative is to swallow the entire abolition of classical studies from our modern curricula" (*PCA* 1911: 36). Sonnenschein's proposed solution was only one possibility, but the one which seemed to him to promise the greatest chance of success. It is within this context that his exhortations to colleagues not to rock the boat through dissent gain their true significance.

Despite the claims made for them, the recommendation of the Joint Committee had been given an extremely bumpy ride. Arnold's opposition to the recommendations from within the Classical Association had been articulated even before their final publication. The dissatisfaction felt by Nesfield and Skeat had appeared in the national press, and Mawer's dissatisfaction was expressed before the English Association. It is perhaps not without some irony that while Arnold found that the grammatical categories proposed took too much account of English to be able to do justice to Latin, the I.A.A.M.S.S. *Memorandum on the Teaching of English* in 1923 expressed the suspicion that "classical necessities and usages have had a preponderating influence in shaping the decisions of the Joint Committee" (I.A.A.M.S.S. 1923: 52). By 1923, too, the threat to Classics seems to have taken clearer shape, together with the construction which Sonnenschein favoured to combat it. At their meeting in that year, members of the Classical Association were told that "if teachers will loyally co-operate, they will strike a powerful blow in support of all language teaching in our schools, and in particular they will do much to help forward a movement in which this

Association is specially interested—the maintenance of Latin as an integral part of the secondary school curriculum, for it is in the co-ordination of Latin studies with English studies that the hope of the salvation of Latin lies” (*PCA* 1923: 40).

It is not surprising, then, if Sonnenschein saw the suggestions for the revision of the Committee's terminology put forward by such figures as Mawer and Moore-Smith, together with the publication of Jespersen's *Modern English Grammar* as—in his beleaguered situation—a mounting threat. It explains, too, why, in the face of pressure to approach each language individually and on its own terms, Sonnenschein insisted so rigidly on trying to bind the 'school' languages together with a single, unified terminology. If implemented, the proposed changes would certainly have meant the destruction of the edifice he had so long and lovingly laboured to construct.

Who, then, was the winner in this contest? With the advantage of hindsight one is tempted to point to the esteem in which Jespersen's work—far from having been demolished—is nowadays held by linguists, and the comparative obscurity into which Sonnenschein's endeavours seem to have fallen. Within the schools—the point at which Sonnenschein's proposed reforms were intended to make their greatest impact—the teaching of grammar has been in the doldrums for many decades. The English 'grammar' school appears nowadays to be largely grammar-less. English Language is one of the languages *not* currently available as part of the normal programme of the Boards of Examinations for Advanced Level.

The result of this policy is that a generation has grown up which frequently shows interest in linguistic matters, but which is hampered by a lack of systematic linguistic or grammatical training at school. There seems to be a comparatively broad, interested, but largely unsophisticated lay public for books on language, grammar and linguistics, with the result that the public is supplied from two different sources—professional linguists and grammarians on the one hand, and non-professionals, peddling a kind of 'folk-linguistics' or 'folk-grammar', on the other—in a way which would be unthinkable in mathematics, say, or electronics. Complaints are increasingly made that the gap between the academic linguist and the layman has become unbridgeable (e.g. Burchfield [1985: 104, 158]; Howard [1984: xi]).

Students arrive at university interested and willing to learn but poorly equipped with the basic knowledge required (cf. Bloor 1986a and b). The reasons for these developments are doubtless many and complex. Two, however, seem to deserve special mention—one internal, the other external.

One internal reason for the demise of Sonnenschein's grammar was identified by Jespersen, commenting upon the consequences of Sonnenschein's definition of case for teaching: "Sonnenschein recognizes 'adverbial' uses of both cases [i.e. accusative and dative—J.W.], but it is not possible to discover any reasons for the distribution. 'Near *him*'—dative, why? If because of O.E. syntax, then *him* in *to him*, *from him* should also be a dative; here, however, it is said to be an accusative because of the fiction that all prepositions take the accusative, but why is it not the same with *near*, which is recognized as a preposition by the NED? 'He blew his pipe *three times*'—accusative, why? (In O.E. it would be a dative). And thus we might go on, for there is nothing to justify the perfectly arbitrary assignation of words to one or the other case. The rules have to be learned by rote by the pupils, for they cannot be understood" (Jespersen 1924: 176).

Sonnenschein's attempt to fuse functional (*subject*, *object* etc.) with formal (*nominative*, *accusative* etc.) categories—(resulting in the 'rat'-paradigm, for example)—made it almost impossible, as Jespersen said, for learners to identify forms correctly. Given the methods of teaching grammar current at the time—parsing and analysis—the lack of objectively identifiable data must have reduced the learning of grammar for many pupils into a mystifying game of trying to guess which particular answer the teacher had in his or her head.

This inherent weakness in Sonnenschein's system seems to have helped it to its downfall within a few decades after the end of World War I. It was, however, expedited on its way by an external factor—an antigrammatical tradition within the teaching profession, the effects of which are still evident. As early as 1891 Collins had written (of what he called 'philology'): "As an instrument of culture it ranks—it surely ranks—very low indeed. It certainly contributes nothing to the cultivation of the taste. It as certainly contributes nothing to the education of the emotions. The mind it neither enlarges, stimulates, nor refines. On the contrary, it too often produces or confirms that peculiar

woodenness and opacity, that singular coarseness of feeling and purlblindness of moral and intellectual vision, which has in all ages been the characteristic of mere philologists" (Collins 1891: 65). Though rejected by many of the major literary and other figures of his time (Tennyson, Nettleship), Collins seems to have set the tone for half a century or more of attacks on 'mere philology' by an influential sector of the literary establishment.

Of all the arguments which have been launched against the teaching of formal grammar in this century—that it cannot be shown to have beneficial effects on children's use of language, that it is of no interest to them, that it is inherently too difficult for any but the most intelligent to grasp, that there are insufficient properly trained teachers to teach it etc.—none is more ironic in the light of the Sonnenschein-Jespersen controversy than the accusation that it does not possess a unified, universally accepted terminology as, presumably, literary criticism does: linguists, currently "squabbling among themselves" (Wilson 1969: 157) "will have to compose some of their differences before their science can be of direct assistance to the teacher" (Thompson 1969: 7).

Nevertheless, and in spite of the attacks made upon his system, there are signs that Sonnenschein is still with us. The traditional stock of Latin terminology which he "found sufficient, or nearly sufficient"¹² is still the most widely current among linguists, who seem to manage to understand one another by means of it reasonably well. It has not yet been superseded by any alternative. It is only the definitions which Sonnenschein gave to these terms which have slowly been abandoned, and while Jespersen's line of thinking has proved fruitful, important areas of his terminology have not survived in general linguistic usage.¹³

Finally, there is evidence that McKerrow was being optimistic when he claimed in 1922 that the days were over when people "solemnly declined English nouns with all the cases of the Latin." As

¹² *Journal of Education* (1886: 169).

¹³ Apart from terms already mentioned cf. e.g. *principall/primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary, nexus, duplex, subnexus, verbid* etc.

late as 1950 a popular grammar book (Humphreys 1945) was still propagating the paradigm:

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	Master	Masters
<i>Vocative</i>	○ Master	○ Masters
<i>Accusative</i>	Master	Masters
<i>Genitive</i>	Master's	Masters
<i>Dative</i>	Master	Masters

To be fair, the book has been revised since then. The current edition (1980) reads:

	<i>Singular</i>	<i>Plural</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	Driver	Drivers
<i>Accusative</i>	Driver	Drivers
<i>Possessive</i>	Driver's	Drivers'
<i>Indirect Object</i>	Driver	Drivers

A comparison of the two tables speaks for itself. If Sonnenschein's name is not now as widely known as it used to be, his 'soul' at least, still goes marching on.

References

C.L.I.E. - *The Committee for Linguistics in Education*—a joint committee of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain and the British Association of Applied Linguistics.

I.A.A.M.S.S. - The Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools.

MEG - Jespersen *Modern English Grammar*.

NEG - Sonnenschein *New English Grammar*.

PCA - *Proceedings of the Classical Association*.

Terminology - Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology. *On the Terminology of Grammar*.

TES - *The Times Educational Supplement*.

TLS - *The Times Literary Supplement*.

- Arnold, E. V. (1910). *Considerations on the Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology, Addressed to members of the Classical Association*. Bangor.
- Bach, E. and R. T. Harms (eds.) (1968). *Universals in Linguistic Theory*. London and New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Bloor, T. (1986a). "Variation and Prescriptivism in English: Modern Language students' attitudes to some sociolinguistic issues." *C.L.I.E. Working Paper No. 7*.
- . (1986b). "University students' knowledge about language: Some aspects of language awareness prior to instruction in university courses." *C.L.I.E. Working Paper No. 8*.
- Burchfield, R. (1985). *The English Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Callaway, M., Jr. (1927). "Concerning the Number of Cases in Modern English," *Publications of the Modern Languages Association of America* 42, 238-254.
- Chomsky, N. (1964). *The Logical Basis of Linguistic Theory*. In: Lunt, 914-978.
- Fillmore, C. J. (1968). *The case for case*. In: Bach and Harms, 1-88.
- Howard, P. (1984). *The State of the Language*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Humphreys, G. (1945). *Teach Yourself English Grammar*. London: English University Press.
- Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters in Secondary Schools (1923). *Memorandum on the Teaching of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jespersen, O. (1904-1949). *Modern English Grammar*. 7 Vols., Copenhagen and London.
- . (1924). *The Philosophy of Grammar*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology (1911). *On the Terminology of Grammar*. London: John Murray.
- Lunt, H. (ed.) (1914). *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists*. London and The Hague: Mouton.
- Lyons, J. (1966). "Towards a 'notional' theory of the 'parts of speech,'" *Journal of Linguistics* 2, 209-236.
- . (1968). *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (1977). *Semantics*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKerrow, R. B. (1922). "English Grammar and Grammars." *Essays and Studies* VIII, 148-167.
- Nida, E. A. (1960). *English Syntax*. University of Oklahoma Summer Institute of Linguistics, Linguistic Series Number four.
- Padley, G.A. (1985). *Grammatical Theory in Western Europe 1500-1700: Trends in Vernacular Grammar I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Report of Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to enquire into the position of Modern Languages in the Educational System of Great Britain*. London: HMSO, 1918.

- Sedgwick, W. B. (1930). *Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf (1851-1929)* In: Weaver, 796-8.
- Sonnenschein, E. A. (1910). *The Unity of the Latin Subjunctive*.
- (1916). *A New English Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1927). *The Soul of Grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, D. (ed.) (1969). *Directions in the Teaching of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weaver, J. R. M. (ed.) (1930). *Dictionary of National Biography 1922-1930*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, R. (1969). "Language." In Thompson, 155-166.