Wissen ist, wie der Frieden, eines der wenigen Dinge dieser Welt, die mehr werden, indem man sie teilt. - Johann M. Himmelstoß
Maria Kronfeldner (Jun. Prof. Dr.),
Email: mkronfeldner{a}uni-bielefeld.de
Sprechstunden: ON LEAVE from Sep 2012 - Aug 2014. Bei Fragen zur Nachreichung schriftlicher Arbeiten schreiben Sie mir!
Maria Kronfeldner, University of Pittsburgh, Center for Philosophy of Science, 817 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
Groups and functions in Bielefeld
News and events for Bielefeld
- [Fest, Apr 21, 2012]: Fest der Philosophie, mit M.A. Numminen, Bunker Ulmenwall, Bielefeld. [Flyer] [More Pics]
- [Workshop, Apr 05, 2012]: Concepts in use: Genes, Races and Human Nature, ZiF, Bielefeld. [Poster] [Abstracts]
General news and events elsewhere
- [Panel discussion, Mar 13, 2013] Caught between a rock and a hard place: Prospects and problems of careers between philosophy and science, as part of the GWP2013-conference, Hannover.
- [Talk, Mar 11, 2013] To have an effect of one's own, Hannover.
- [Talk, Feb 12, 2013] The genealogical concept of human nature, Pittsburgh.
- [Talk, Jan 2013] How norms make causes, Halifax.
- [Talk, Oct 2, 2012] Causal complexity and reconstituting the phenomena, Pittsburgh.
- [Symposion, Jul 19-21, 2012] Systems biology of the brain: Philosophical Aspects, München.
- [Workshop, Jul 16, 2012] Supervenience, Mechanistic Constitution, and Proportionality, Witten-Herdecke.
- [Talk, Jun 14, 2012] Abendvortrag auf dem Doktorandenforum der Studienstiftung, Fulda.
- [Symposion, May 10-12, 2012] Die anthropologische Wende, Symposion der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft, Zürich.
- [Workshop, May 05-06, 2012] First Bochum-Bielefeld Colloquium Philosophy of Science, Bochum.
- [Workshop, Apr 27/28, 2012]: 2. Netzwerktreffen Philosophie der Lebenswissenschaften, mit H.-J. Rheinberger und A. Fagot-Largeault. Historicum, München.
- [Workshop, Mar 13-14, 2012] Kulturelle Faktoren der Vererbung II, Zentrum für Literaturforschung, Berlin.
- Review, Feb 05, 2012] Review of "Darwinian Creativity and Memetics", Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
- [Vortrag, Jan 27, 2012] Wozu noch von der menschlichen Natur reden?, LMU München.
Archive Notice board (2009, 2010, 2011)
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Area of specialisation: philosophy of the life sciences.
Area of competence: history of the life sciences, general philosophy of science, philosophy of the social sciences, epistemology, philosophy of mind.
Research focus: evolutionary biology, biomedical sciences, anthropology.
Research keywords: nature-nurture dichotomy, evolutionary theory, genetic determinism, diseases, human nature, culture, creativity, authorship, individuality, causation, explanation, classification, discrimination, normality, complexity, simplicity, disciplines, unity of science, 'two cultures' of science, sharing knowledge, owning knowledge, science and society, science and art.
Profile: Maria Kronfeldner joined the department in 2008. She studied philosophy and religious studies at Regensburg University, where she obtained her PhD in philosophy in 2006, under the supervision of Hans Rott. Before she joined the department of philosophy at Bielefeld University, she was a Karl Schädler postdoctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin, and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University..
During her graduate time, she focused on philosophy of mind, pragmatism, and environmental ethics. Combining her interest in philosophy of mind with her artistic activities (theatre, video, photography), she started to do research on philosophy of creativity. Since novelty is not only occurring in human minds, but also in nature, her research on the concept of creativity led her to the history and philosophy of the life sciences (HPLS). She has analysed Darwinian approaches to creativity and cultural evolution as well as the history of the concept of culture and cultural inheritance.
At the moment, her focus is on the meaning, form and function of the nature-nurture divide in the life sciences. It is a project that combines an epistemological study on the social and epistemic role of dichotomies with historical case studies in medicine, psychology, and anthropology. Traditional issues of philosophy of science are related to this research project: e.g. causation, explanation, reductionism, complexity and unity of science. In the context of this project, she is currently writing a book on Divide and Conquer: Human nature between science, philosophy and politics.
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Current/ Central project: Nature-Nurture
1. Divide and Conquer: Human Nature between Science, Philosophy and Politics.
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- [Abstract]
Das Projekt untersucht die epistemischen und sozialen Rollen von Dichotomien im Erkenntnisprozess anhand des Beispiels der Nature/Nurture-Unterscheidung in den Lebenswissenschaften und des damit zusammenhängenden Begriffs der menschlichen Natur. Dabei kommen zentrale wissenschaftsphilosophische Debatten über Kausalität, Erklärung, Reduktion, Pluralismus und die Verschränkung von Wissenschaft und Werten zur Sprache. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf dem 19. und dem 20. Jahrhundert.
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Future/ In the making: Causation in the Life and Social Sciences
| 2. Causation, risk and responsibility in law and medicine |
- [Abstract]
Kausalität ist ein zentraler Begriff, nicht nur in den Lebenswissenschaften, sondern auch im Umgang des Menschen mit sich selbst bzw. der Menschen mit einander, z.B. in rechtlichen Kontexten. Verantwortung und Risiko sind wichtige Begriffe, die - je nach vorausgesetztem Kausalitätsbegriff - anders verstanden werden. In den letzten Jahren hat der Kausalitätsbegriff in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie neue Aufmerksamkeit erhalten, v.a. durch die Weiterentwicklung einer interventionistischen Theorie der Kausalität. Das Projekt soll prüfen, welche Begriffe von Kausalität, Verantwortung und Risiko in der heutigen Medizin und im Recht verwendet werden, welche Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede sich über den Kontext hinweg zeigen, und welche pragmatischen Aspekte diesbezüglich zum Tragen kommen. Das Projekt soll damit nicht nur zur Klärung eines angemessenen Kausalitätsbegriffs in Bereichen wie Medizin oder Recht beitragen, sondern v.a. die Werte und Ziele heutiger Medizin genauer beleuchten und die Voraussetzung bzgl. Kausalität in rechtlichen Kontexten explizieren. Ersteres ist ein Thema, das auch für die Politik und Ethik von Belang ist, insbesondere in Zeiten zunehmender Möglichkeiten und Kosten medizinischer Versorgung; letzteres ist v.a. für Fragen zu Schuld und Strafe relevant.
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Future/ In the making: Real People
| 3. Individuality and personhood in the ontology of the life and social sciences. |
- [Abstract]
Die Kategorie des Individuums und der Person in den Lebens- und Sozialwissenschaften soll ontologisch und wissenschaftsphilosophisch neu thematisiert werden. Wie es Kathleen Wilkes in ihrem Klassiker Real People (1988) vorgeführt hat, soll untersucht werden, wie Vereinfachungen (z.B. in der Philosophie durch einen Fokus auf Gedankenexperimente statt realen Personen) zu Verzerrungen und blinden Flecken in den philosophischen Theorien führen. Daher sollen neuere Themen in der Philosophie der Biologie, Medizin und der Anthropologie berücksichtigt werden (group selection, developmental systems theory, superorganism, microbiology, synthetic biology, immunological identity, genetic identity, relational versus genealogical thinking, looping effects and natural kinds, personality disorders, human nature, dehumanization, etc.) und mit klassisch philosophischen Debatten über Individualität und Personalität verbunden werden.
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Past: Evolution and Man
| 4. Creativity naturalized |
- [Abstract]
This project analysed the concept of creativity in philosophy and
psychology. At issue was whether creativity can be naturalized, i.e.
whether we can explain creativity as something special but without
invoking miracles. This project will find its continuation in the
project on the concept of authorship
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| 5. Cultural evolution |
- [Abstract]
This project's focus was on the merit of evolutionary analogies between nature
and culture, in particular the analogies used in theories of cultural evolution,
memetics, and Darwinian approaches to creativity. In most cases, the result was
a rather critical one.
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Satellite/ In general: Authorship
| 6. The author and his intellectual ownership in philosophy, science, and art. |
- [Abstract]
Es soll die Kategorie des Autors untersucht werden: wie sich diese
in der Philosophie, in den Wissenschaften, und der Kunst seit der
Neuzeit entwickelt hat, wie sich die unterschiedlichen institutionellen
Strukturen der Wissenschaft und der Kunst auf diesen Begriff auswirken,
wie sie sich im Urheberrecht spiegelt, und wie sie sich durch die
technischen Veränderungen des Forschungs- und Veröffentlichungsprozesses
und durch forschungspolitische Entscheidungen (open access) verändert.
Dieses Projekt hat Schnittpunkte zur Philosophie des Geistes und
philosophischen Anthropologie, zur Soziologie, zur Rechtsphilosophie,
und zur Informationsethik.
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For overview, official announcements and study regulations see
Lehrveranstaltungen im ekvv
Current
- no current teaching (on leave)
Past
General information and useful links
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Recent publications include the following:

- in prep. Divide and conquer: Human nature between science, philosophy and politics (Arbeitstitel Buchprojekt)
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- in prep. Recent work on human nature. To appear in Philosophical Compass (co-authored with Neil Roughley and Georg Toepfer)
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- draft. What use was human nature
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- draft. Causal complexity and explanatory virtues
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- draft. How norms make causes. To appear in International Journal of Epidemiology
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- draft. The genealogical concept of human nature
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- forthc. Die epistemische Fragmentierung des Menschen: Wie der Mensch zwischen Natur und Kultur verschwindet. Studia philosophica (Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft)
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- [Abstract]
On its way from the human Lebenswelt to science, human life becomes fragmented.
Science partitions the phenomenon of being human into different 'slices', i.e.
different epistemic objects, and does so according to its disciplinary structure.
Thus, none of the contemporary human sciences are studying humans as humans.
Through this epistemic fragmentation, the human being itself disappears as an
epistemic object of science. After mentioning the complaints about the fragmentation and after analysing why the distinction between nature and culture as a specific instance of partitioning happened in actual science, the paper analyses whether this epistemic fragmentation of ‘man’ in contemporary sciences is something we should condemn or not. I shall argue that we should not, at least not in principle. Fragmentation can be of epistemic value, and it can also fail to be so. The paper ends with a note on what a philosophy of science perspective
can and should aim to contribute to an anthropological turn in philosophy.
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- 2012. Seeds of change: A comparative review of five new collections in the philosophy of biology.Journal of General Philosophy of Science 43: 195-201.
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The review looks at five new collections on the field of philosophy of biology. It not only compares their structure and possible audience but also what they tell us about the future prospects of the field
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[download pdf]
[request-a-copy]
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- 2011. Darwinian Creativity and Memetics. Durham: Acumen.
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- [Abstract]
The book examines how Darwinism has been used to explain novelty and change in culture through the Darwinian approach to creativity and the theory of memes. The first claims that creativity is based on a Darwinian process of blind variation and selection, while the latter claims that culture is based on and explained by units - memes - that are similar to genes. Both theories try to describe and explain mind and culture by applying Darwinism by way of analogies. Kronfeldner shows that the analogies involved in these theories lead to claims that give either wrong or at least no new descriptions or explanations of the phenomena at issue. Whereas the two approaches are usually defended or criticized on the basis that they are dangerous for our vision of ourselves, this book takes a different perspective: it questions the acuteness of these approaches. Darwinian theory is not like a dangerous wolf, hunting for our self image. Far from it, in the case of the two analogical applications addressed in this book, Darwinian theory is shown to behave more like a disoriented sheep in wolf's clothing
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[link] |
- 2011. Causation and Disease. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (Special issue, ed. with Staffan Müller-Wille)
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- [Abstract]
This special issue collects papers presented at the first European
Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of the Life Sciences,
which was held at Brocher Foundation in Hermance (Switzerland) in September
6-10, 2011. The Advanced Seminar brought together philosophers of the life
sciences to discuss the topic of Causation and Disease. The introduction
summarizes the results from this seminar. The search for causes of disease in the biomedical sciences,
we argue on the basis of the contributions to this conference,
has not resulted in a simplification and unification of biomedical
knowledge, as once hoped for by philosophers of science, but rather
in its complexification.
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[download pdf]
[request-a-copy]
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- 2011. Die Flause . In: Azzouni, Safia; Brandt, Christina; Gausemeier, Bernd; Kursell, Julia; Schmidgen, Henning; Wittmann, Barbara [eds.]: Eine Naturgeschichte für das 21. Jahrhundert: Hommage à, zu Ehren von, in honor of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2011.
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- [Abstract]
Als Teil einer 'Naturgeschichte für das 21. Jhdt.', gemeint als Hommage an Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, wird auf humoristische Art ein fiktives Lebewesen beschrieben: die 'Flause', die bevorzugt in den Köpfen der Studierenden und des Homo postdoctus existiert.
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[request-a-copy] |
- 2010. Darwinian 'blind' hypothesis formation revisited. Synthese 175: 193-218.
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- [Abstract]
Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that
creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian 'blind' variation
have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route
through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected,
random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions
regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings
concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and
creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops
the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided rather
than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity.
On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to
answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist
that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments
all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation,
conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate
in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a 'Darwinian' account of
creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is
not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues
in Darwinian terms. Keywords Darwinism, Blind variation,Creativity, Hypothesis
formation, Guided variation, Lamarckism, Evolutionary epistemology,
Popper, Campbell, Simonton.
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[download pdf] |
- 2010. Won't you please unite? Darwinism, cultural evolution and kinds of synthesis. In: Barahona, Ana; Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg; Suarez-Diaz, Edna (eds.). The Hereditary Hourglass: Genetics and Epigenetics, 1868-2000. Preprint 392 (pp. 111-125). Berlin: Max Planck Insititute for the History of Science.
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The synthetic theory of evolution has gone stale and an expanding or (re-)widening of it towards a new synthesis has been announced. This time, development and culture are supposed to join the synthesis bandwagon. In this article, I distinguish between four kinds of synthesis that are involved when we extend the evolutionary synthesis towards culture: the integration of fields, the heuristic generation of interfields, the expansion of validity, and the creation of a common frame of discourse or ‘big-picture’. These kinds of synthesis are connected to epistemic values that are used to evaluate theories as well as analogies. A review of these epistemic values and the kinds of synthesis connected to them shall illustrate two points. First, that the discussions about culture and evolution exhibit an epistemic bias towards synthesis, even if, as history shows, synthesis and well as isolation can be fruitful epistemic strategies in science. The paper thus contains some critical notes on the value of synthesis in science. Second, reviewing the kinds of synthesis and values involved allows for a new perspective on the analogies involved in theories of cultural evolution. It is a perspective that makes the criteria with which these theories are usually evaluated explicit. With this we can compare the different standpoints people have taken on the usefulness of theories of cultural evolution at a higher level. Differences arise because of different epistemic values assumed.
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[download pdf] |
- 2010. Meme, Meme, Meme. Philosophia Naturalis 46: 36-60.
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Charles Darwin and his heirs applied the theory of evolution not only to biological species but also to culture: as with nature, culture evolves in a Darwinian manner. The so-called meme theory (or memetics), defended by various authors on the basis of gene selectionism, is one such analogical application of Darwinism. This article criticizes three central claims of meme theory: (i) that there are memes, i.e. units of culture analogous to genes; (ii) that memes are, in analogy to genes, replicators; (iii) that memes, as units of cultural selection, are as 'egoistic' as genes are claimed to be by gene selectionists for the biological case. After an introduction to meme theory in part 1, the three theses are debunked as either wrong or trivial. Part 2 will illustrate that meme theory is not a 'dangerous idea' that is able to challenge the received view of mind and culture in the humanities and social sciences. On the contrary, meme theory at best re-formulates in evolutionary language what we already know and is in this sense trivial. In part 3, the perspective of the analysis changes: not the content, but the function of memetics is at issue, i.e. the function of this theory for interdisciplinary communication. Despite the critique of the three central claims, memetics can have a communicative and therefore productive role to play between the 'two cultures' of science.
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[download pdf]
[request-a-copy]
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- 2009. Genetic determinism and the innate-acquired distinction. Medicine Studies 2: 167-181.
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[Abstract]
This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under attack in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment (ideally specifying what medicine and health care is all about) are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates.
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[download pdf] |
- 2009. Creativity Naturalized. The Philosophical Quarterly 59: 577-592.
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- [Abstract]
I argue that creativity is compatible with determinism and therefore with
naturalistic explanation. I explore different kinds of novelty, corresponding
with four distinct concepts of creativity: anthropological, historical,
psychological and metaphysical. Psychological creativity incorporates
originality and spontaneity. Taken together, these point to the independence
of the creative mind from social learning, experience and previously acquired
knowledge. This independence is nevertheless compatible with determinism.
Creativity is opposed to specific causal factors, but it does not exclude
causal determination as such. So creativity can be naturalized.
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[download pdf] |
- 2009. If there is nothing beyond the organic...: Heredity and Culture at the Boundaries of Anthropology in the Work of Alfred L. Kroeber. NTM- Journal of the History of Science, Technology and Medicine 17: 107-134.
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Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from biology in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. Keywords: culture, heredity, cultural anthropology, superorganic, hard inheritance, Alfred L. Kroeber, Franz Boas.
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- 2008. Trigger me: Evolutionspsychologie, Genzentrismus und die Idee der Kultur. Darwin. Nach Feierabend - Jahrbuch für Wissensgeschichte 4: 31-46.
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Die Evolutionspsychologie hat vor ungefähr 20 Jahren die Nachfolge der
Soziobiologie angetreten und zieht seitdem gegen die angebliche Rückständigkeit
der Sozialwissenschaften zu Felde. Der Gegenstand dieses Textes ist die
Rückständigkeit der Evolutionspsychologie - Rückständigkeit in Bezug auf die
Art und Weise, wie das Phänomen Kultur zugerichtet wird, um es dann, jenseits
der Lippenbekenntnisse zur Kultur, als explanatorisch irrelevant zu ignorieren.
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[download pdf]
[request-a-copy]
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- 2007. Is cultural evolution Lamarckian? Biology and Philosophy 22: 493-512.
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The article addresses the question whether culture evolves in a Lamarckian manner. I highlight three central aspects of a Lamarckian concept of evolution: the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the transformational pattern of evolution, and the concept of directed changes. A clear exposition of these aspects shows that a system can be a Darwinian variational system instead of a Lamarckian transformational one, even if it is based on inheritance of acquired characteristics and/or on Lamarckian directed changes. On this basis, I apply the three aspects to culture. Taking for granted that culture is a variational system, based on selection processes, I discuss in detail the senses in which cultural inheritance can be said to be Lamarckian and in which sense problem solving, a major factor in cultural change, leads to directed variation. Keywords: cultural evolution, Lamarckism, inheritance of acquired characteristics, transformational evolution, directed variation, memes, problem solving.
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[download pdf]
[request-a-copy]
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Open Access Note: If you cannot download a file because it is not open access, please feel free to contact me for a copy (via email or request-a-copy) or go to Phillister, the departmental publication list with further open access download functions.
Here is a complete list of publications for download.
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2012-13 Visting Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh
2011 Karl Peter Grotemeyer-Preis.
2010 (since) Juniorprofessor for Philosophy of Science, Bielefeld University.
2008-10 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in Philosophy, Bielefeld University.
2008 Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize
2007 Karl Popper Essay Prize
2006-08 Postdoctoral Fellow, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
2004 Visiting Fellow, Harvard University
2002-06 PhD-student at Regensburg University
2002-05 PhD-scholarship from the German National Scholarship Foundation
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