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Universität Bielefeld - Fakultät für Soziologie

 

 

Michael Power - From Risk Society to Audit Society

(1) Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University and at the Hart workshop on 'Law and Risk' at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. Parts of the paper were also presented at the Universities of Bielefeld and Witten/Herdecke in 1996. The author is grateful for the helpful comments of Dirk Baecker, Rudolf Stichweh and an anonymous reviewer.

(2) Porter (1992) has suggested that this is also the case for accounting. It supplies a distinctive kind of administrative objectivity which, though arbitrary in itself, embodies a certain procedural fairness.

(3) Gunningham and Prest (1993), who draw on the work of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), suggest that regulators must signal their willingness to escalate regulation. The mutual regulation of auditing as a form of control of control must be abandoned in particular circumstances for stricter forms of policing.

(4) See Lucy Kellaway, 'Why tie yourself in knots over badges?' Financial Times September 6 1996.

(5) See 'On trial for dangerous dealing' Financial Times March 21, 1994; 'Alarming instruments of financial change' Financial Times December 7, 1994; 'Taming the wild beast of derivatives' Financial Times December 16, 1994.

(6) See 'Derivatives users lack refined controls of risk' Financial Times December 6, 1994.