Power - From Risk Society to Audit Society
(1) Earlier versions of this paper were presented
at the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University and at the
Hart workshop on 'Law and Risk' at the Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies, University of London. Parts of the paper were also presented
at the Universities of Bielefeld and Witten/Herdecke in 1996. The
author is grateful for the helpful comments of Dirk Baecker, Rudolf
Stichweh and an anonymous reviewer.
(2) Porter (1992) has suggested that this is also
the case for accounting. It supplies a distinctive kind of administrative
objectivity which, though arbitrary in itself, embodies a certain
(3) Gunningham and Prest (1993), who draw on the
work of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), suggest that regulators must
signal their willingness to escalate regulation. The mutual regulation
of auditing as a form of control of control must be abandoned in particular
circumstances for stricter forms of policing.
(4) See Lucy Kellaway, 'Why tie yourself in knots
over badges?' Financial Times September 6 1996.
(5) See 'On trial for dangerous dealing' Financial
Times March 21, 1994; 'Alarming instruments of financial change'
Financial Times December 7, 1994; 'Taming the wild beast of
derivatives' Financial Times December 16, 1994.
(6) See 'Derivatives users lack refined controls
of risk' Financial Times December 6, 1994.