Practical Philosophy

The Structure of Normativity

Some of the core fields of philosophy – including moral philosophy, value theory, and epistemology – are, at their heart, concerned with normative questions: questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong, justified or unjustified. These questions concern the content of judgements that human beings are constantly making and that structure our way of thinking, feeling, and acting. But while there is wide agreement in contemporary philosophy that normative judgements form a unified and important category of human thought, philosophers still struggle to understand what normativity actually is. One highly attractive hypothesis is that normativity can be analysed in terms of reasons – i.e. in terms of the factors that count in favour of or against actions or attitudes. 

"REASONS F1RST: The Structure of Normativity" is an ERC funded research project led by Prof. Dr. Benjamin Kiesewetter (duration 2022-2027). More information can be found here on the project website.

Climate change and democracy

There are good reasons to doubt that current democracies are adequately addressing the global and future-related challenges of climate change. This research project deals with questions that arise from this tension. For example: How can representational deficits of current democracies (in relation to young, future or globally affected persons) be addressed? What alternatives are there to the current forms of democratic decision-making and what about their democratic legitimacy? Are veto rights justifiable for expert panels or citizens' panels that have come about on the basis of lotteries? To what extent do current democratic laws enjoy legitimacy when it comes to the destruction of important resources for the future? Do current climate policies justify civil disobedience or other forms of politically motivated lawbreaking? What are the dangers of social polarisation posed by climate change, climate policy, climate activism and a change in the political system appropriate to climate change, and how are these to be normatively assessed?

Moral rights

This project examines the notion of moral rights. One subproject ("Moral Rights and Aggregation") is concerned with the question of whether moral rights can be understood as contributory reasons with specific properties, in particular the property of excluding aggregative considerations that are central for consequentialist moral theories. This understanding of moral rights is then made fruitful for debates in normative ethics, such as the controversy over whether there is a duty to save the greater number of people when we cannot save them all. Another subproject ("Imperfect Moral Rights") explores the neglected distinction between perfect and imperfect rights. Imperfect moral rights differ from perfect ones, for instance, by being unclaimable or unenforceable. The subproject pursues the hypothesis that this distinction is helpful in addressing a number of controversially discussed questions, such as whether people in need have moral rights to be helped, whether people in close personal relationships have moral rights against one another, and whether benefactors have moral rights to gratitude.

Children's rights and child ethics

This project is about the moral status of children and ethical questions that arise in relation to this status. Among them: May we deprive children of basic rights, such as the right to vote, and if so, on what basis? How should we understand parental authority and what is its basis? Do children have specific obligations towards their parents? What is the basis for compulsory education and what rights do children have at school? What are the ethical implications of adopting a child? What are the implications of the assumption that children can be rights holders for the theory of rights (e.g. the will theory or the interest theory)?

Research colloquium

Research Colloquium Practical Philosophy & Normativity: Here we regularly exchange ideas about our work or discuss philosophical contributions with guests. You can find more information here.

Workshops

Rights and Reasons (January 2025)

„Rights and Reasons“ - a workshop on the relationship between moral rights and normative reasons, January 16-17, 2025. With: Joseph Bowen (Leeds), Rowan Cruft (Stirling), Adina Preda (Trinity College Dublin), Laura Valentini (LMU), Ariel Zylberman (Albany).

You can download the Call for Abstracts here: CfA-Rights-and-Reasons.

Normative Reasons, Explanation, and Grounding (October 2024)

"Normative Reasons, Explanation, and Grounding" - a workshop on the relationship between normative reasons and explanatory reasons, October 24-25, 2024. With: Selim Berker (Harvard), John Broome (Oxford), Daniel Fogal (NYU), Stephanie Leary (McGill), Olle Risberg (Uppsala), Eva Schmidt (Dortmund), Eliot Watkins (Bochum), Shlomit Wygoda-Cohen (Van Leer Institute).

For more information click here: Reasons-and Grounding

Reasons in Ethics and Epistemology (October 2023)

"Reasons in Ethics and Epistemology" - a workshop on the role of normative reasons in ethics and epistemology. With: Alexander (Sasha) Arridge (Oxford), Anne Meylan (Zurich), Thomas Schmidt (HU Berlin) and Mark Schroeder (USC).

You can download the workshop programme here:

Reasons-in-Ethics-and-Epistemology.

Winter semester 2024/25

Summer semester 2024

Winter semester 2023/24

Summer semester 2023