Abstract: We consider bimatrix games where each player (believes that the other player) plays according to a capacity, that is, a non-additive probability measure over the set of pure strategies (i.e., rows or columns). The payoffs of rows and columns are the Choquet expected payoffs. For several definitions of the support of a capacity (including the definition of Dow and Werlang, JET, 1994) we establish the conditions when a row or column is never a best reply, and we investigate Choquet equilibria: a pair of capacities is a Choquet equilibrium if each row in the support of player 1’s capacity is a best reply against the capacity of player 2, and each column in the support of player 2’s capacity is a best reply against the capacity of player 1. (This presentation is based on work in progress with Chris Kops and Dries Vermeulen.)