

# Economics Seminar

Tuesday, 3. Juni 2025, Room H15, 2:30 pm



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Multi-Dimensional Social Choice under Frugal  
Information: Imprecise Bayesian Foundations for the  
Tukey Median

**Abstract:** We study a voting model with partial information in which the evaluation of social welfare must be based on information about agents' top choices plus qualitative background conditions on preferences. The resulting uncertainty is modeled in terms of the imprecise Bayesian beliefs of an evaluator who adopts an ex-ante Condorcet criterion. We show that for an appropriate class of imprecise beliefs, ex-ante Condorcet winners exist and refine the set of Tukey medians (Tukey, 1975). Tukey medians enjoy notable robustness to belief misspecification, and are distinguished also from a mechanism design perspective.