On the Pluralities of Worlds: Characterisation and Object Individuation in Extended Modal Meinongianism

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Abstract

Meinongians, who claim that some objects don’t exist, but nevertheless in some sense have the properties they’re characterised as having, are experts in defending their view against alleged counterexamples. They’ve dealt with round squares, vaguely identical objects and existent golden mountains. Modal Meinongians welcome these objects within a plurality of (nonexistent) worlds. Specifically, they claim that actually nonexistent objects have the properties they’re characterised as having, but only in certain worlds, which needn’t include the actual one. The existent golden mountain, for example, just is golden, a mountain and existent, but only in certain worlds, namely those that realise the situation about the object envisaged, among which the actual world isn’t to be found. Yet a new allegedly untameable object is ready to cause trouble: the actually existent golden mountain. In which world(s) does it have the properties it’s characterised as having? Clearly not in the actual world. But neither in any nonactual world(s), possible or impossible, or so I argue in this thesis. Problematically, then, there’s no place for this troublemaker within the Modal Meinongian’s plurality of worlds. Yet I argue further that the Modal Meinongian must merely expand the logical (and illogical) space into a plurality of pluralities of worlds, which the actually existent golden mountain can happily inhabit. Specifically, I claim that the actually existent golden mountain is actually golden, actually a mountain and actually existent, but only in certain pluralities of worlds, namely those that realise the situation about the object (and world) envisaged, among which the actual plurality isn’t to be found. This Extended Modal Meinongianism introduces objects that are hardly tameable beasts—but tameable nonetheless, at least until the Modal Meinongian’s imagination fails to handle them.
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1 Introduction

Inspired by the works of Alexius Meinong, who famously claimed that “there are objects such that it is true to say of them that there are no such objects” (Meinong, 1960, 83), including possible objects like the golden mountain, as well as impossible objects like the round square (Meinong, 1971a, 383), Neo-Meinongians, less paradoxically, claim that some objects don’t exist. The property of being existent (existence, for short; henceforth, I shall use small caps to refer to specific properties), they claim, is just an ordinary first-order property that such objects lack; yet even so, they continue, nonexistent objects can and do have other properties. In advancing these theses, Meinongians provide an account of the nature of the (pure) objects of thought and imagination, and thereby, assuming that fictional objects are special pure objects of imagination, also of fictional objects like Harry Potter, all of which can be referred to and said true things about (Sainsbury, 2010, 44f.). In this sense, such objects can be regarded as real (Barz, 2008, 368). So Meinongianism is a kind of intentional realism, according to which pure objects of thought are real but exotic, i.e., nonexistent or nonconcrete or nonactual (Sainsbury, 2010, 23). From here, while Nonactualists like David Lewis (1978) claim that such objects are existent and concrete, but nonactual, and Abstractualists like Peter van Inwagen (1977) and Maria Reicher (2010) claim that they’re existent and actual, but nonconcrete, Meinongians like Terence Parsons (1980), Edward Zalta (1983, 1988) and Graham Priest (2005) claim that they’re concrete and actual, but nonexistent.

Given that Meinongianism is typically advanced as an account of the nature of the objects of thought and imagination, realistically construed, it’s plausible to suppose that every characterisation can be used to single out a unique object in thought, be it existent or not. Taken together with Meinongianism’s ontological theses, given some thinker’s use of a characterisation C to single out a unique object o in thought, this Meinongian intentionality thesis naturally leads to the

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1Henceforth, I’ll drop the “Neo-”, as I won’t deal with Meinong’s account in this thesis, but only with Neo-Meinongian theories that resemble Meinong’s to a varying degree.

2A pure object of thought is an object that’s not actual and concrete and existent. When I’m thinking about my cat, for example, my cat is not a pure object of thought, as she can actually sit on my lap, which no pure object of thought can.
question of why it’s \( o \) that’s singled out by the use of \( C \), and not some other object. Presumably, \( o \) is individuated in terms of what it’s like. So we need to ask: what is \( o \) like, given that \( o \) is singled out by using \( C \)? That is, we need to ask how a given characterisation can be used to single out the right nonexistent object, i.e., the one the thinker intended to single out, which is, in turn, individuated in terms of what it’s like.

Consider the object that’s singled out by the characterisation of being golden and a mountain, i.e., the golden mountain. What’s it like? The Meinongian might at least give the following reply: “The golden mountain is golden and a mountain. Could an answer be any easier?” Perhaps not. But this easy answer presupposes the following intuitive, but ultimately untenable, necessary condition of a Meinongian principle of characterisation-induced object individuation: for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) can be used to single out a unique object \( o \) in thought, be it existent or not, in virtue of \( C \)’s semantically yielding a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that \( o \) instantiates all of \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \).\(^3\) But if this is true, and if existence is just an ordinary property, then the characterisation of being golden, a mountain and existent can be used to single out a unique object in virtue of its yielding goldenness, mountainhood and existence, all of which are instantiated by the object so characterised. So we reach an object that instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and existence, i.e., the existent golden mountain. But how can the existent golden mountain instantiate all of these properties, given that no golden mountain exists? Unfortunately, we can’t just characterise an object into existence. So Meinongians need to fix their account of how characterisations can be used to single out objects.

Luckily, Meinongians are experts in defending their view against such alleged counterexamples—or (Meinongian) Troublemakers, as I shall call them. Specifically, they’ve developed two prominent defence strategies: some Meinongians, following Parsons (1980), claim that for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) can be used to single out a unique object \( o \) in thought, be it existent or not, in virtue of \( C \)’s semantically yielding a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \), which are drawn from

\(^3\)This necessary condition is all I need for the purpose of this exposition. Yet in section 2.2, I’ll explain why it’s problematic to formulate a full intuitive Meinongian principle of characterisation-induced object individuation.
a range of properties that are of a special kind, however, such that \( o \), and only \( o \), either (i) exists and instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \), or (ii) doesn’t exist and instantiates, of the whole range of special properties, exactly \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \). So in any case, \( o \) instantiates the special properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \). And while goldenness and mountainhood are regarded as properties of this special kind, existence isn’t. But given that the existent golden mountain, unlike the golden mountain, is characterised as existent, such Meinongians introduce a further property, existence’, say, which is different from existence insofar as nonexistent objects can instantiate existence’, but not existence, in virtue of being so characterised. So the existent golden mountain instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and existence’. Alternatively, some Meinongians, following Zalta (1983, 1988), claim that for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) can be used to single out a unique object \( o \) in thought, be it existent or not, in virtue of \( C \)’s semantically yielding a set of any properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that \( o \), and only \( o \), either (i) exists and instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \), or (ii) doesn’t exist and has exactly \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) in a way that isn’t ordinary property-instantiation. So in any case, \( o \) has \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) in some way. In particular, the existent golden mountain has goldenness, mountainhood and existence in a way that isn’t ordinary property-instantiation.

Yet both the strategy of classifying some properties as being of a special kind, such that nonexistent objects can instantiate these in virtue of being so characterised, as well as the strategy of introducing another predication mode, which relates nonexistent objects to the properties they’re characterised as having, can be regarded as problematic, as there seem to be no Troublemaker-independent reasons for either strategy. Moreover, or for just that reason, it’s hardly clear how to understand the newly introduced kind/mode other than as being problem-solving in the case at hand.

Partly motivated by these considerations, Modal Meinongianism (MM), as advanced by Priest (2005) and defended by Francesco Berto (2011, 2012), leaves behind the above accommodation strategies and spells out an ingenious alternative. Specifically, Modal Meinongians claim that for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) can be used to single out a unique object \( o \) in thought, be it existent or not, in virtue of \( C \)’s semantically yielding a set of any properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that \( o \), and only \( o \), instantiates the properties that follow from \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \)
in exactly those worlds that realise the situation about the object envisaged—which needn’t include the actual world (@). So $o$ instantiates $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in every $C$-imagination-realising world. In particular, the existent golden mountain instantiates GOLDENNESS, MOUNTAINHOOD and EXISTENCE in all imagination-realising worlds. Among these worlds, however, @ isn’t to be found, as nothing instantiates GOLDENNESS, MOUNTAINHOOD and EXISTENCE in @.

Yet Meinongians aren’t permitted to catch their breath just yet. No matter how resourceful their specification of Meinongianism, given their general Meinongian commitments, imaginative opponents confront them with cleverly thought-out Troublemakers. Just like the other Meinongian principles of object individuation, the Modal Meinongian principle starts by assigning every characterisation a set of properties; then, however, departing from the other principles, the Modal principle has it that these properties are instantiated by the object so characterised in a world-relative way. But if every characterisation singles out an object according to this principle, then the characterisation of being actually golden, actually a mountain and actually existent individuates an object, the actually existent golden mountain, in virtue of its yielding the corresponding set of properties, all of which are instantiated by the object so characterised in all imagination-realising worlds. Presumably, the properties yielded are GOLDENNESS-IN-@, MOUNTAINHOOD-IN-@ and EXISTENCE-IN-@. So we reach an object that instantiates GOLDENNESS-IN-@, MOUNTAINHOOD-IN-@ and EXISTENCE-IN-@ in all imagination-realising worlds. Presumably, then, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates GOLDENNESS, MOUNTAINHOOD and EXISTENCE in @—but how can it instantiate all of these properties in @, given that no golden mountain exists in @? Unfortunately, we can’t just characterise an object into existence in @. So Modal Meinongians need to fix their account of how characterisations can be used to single out objects.

Modal Meinongians can do so in several ways. On the one hand, they can deny either of the two claims introduced by “presumably” in the preceding

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4More precisely, I should refer to it as the actually existent and actually golden actual mountain. It’s necessary to characterise the object in question as being actually golden and actually mountainous in addition to being actually existent, as only this characterisation excludes objects that are golden mountains in certain nonactual worlds, and existent in @, but without being golden mountains in @. (Perhaps my cat is such an object?)
paragraph. That is, they can, like Priest (2011), deny that something must be $P$ in $\@$ if it’s $P$-$in-$@ in a world $w$, at least for some worlds $w$; or they can, like Barz (2015), deny that the characterisation in question semantically yields the above set of @-indexed properties in the first place. Alternatively, however, they can also deny the seemingly indisputable presupposition of all Meinongian principles of object individuation: that every characterisation semantically yields a set of properties (which are then somehow had by the object singled out) and nothing else or in addition. Denying this presupposition is the strategy that I shall ultimately follow in this thesis. That is, I shall propose that the characterisation of being actually golden, actually a mountain and actually existent yields a set of properties, which is comprised of the straightforward non-$@$-indexed properties goldenness, mountainhood and existence, and a set of worlds, which is comprised only of $\@$, such that these properties are instantiated by the object so characterised in these worlds. To avoid paradox, however, I will round out this reply by essentially repeating the defence strategy employed by Modal Meinongians in order to accommodate the existent golden mountain, but on a higher level: that is, I shall argue that the actually existent golden mountain instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and existence in @, but in pluralities of worlds different from the actual plurality, namely those that realise the situation about the object envisaged.

More generally, I will suggest that MM can, and must, given the failure of the first two Modal accommodation strategies, be extended in this way so as to accommodate not only the actually existent golden mountain, but also other alleged Modal Meinongian Troublemakers that already queue up: the necessarily existent golden mountain, the possible round square or, in fact, the golden mountain that actually exists in the actual plurality of worlds. So as my final conclusion, I will offer a conditional of the form:

(Conclusion, to be specified) If Meinongianism is to be understood modally, then it must be extended in such-and-such a way.

Now, whether the conditional that’s going to emerge from this investigation of the Modal Meinongian’s ideas is to be regarded as refuting MM as the right specification of Meinongianism, by denying the consequent, or as establishing
an extended MM, by affirming the antecedent, shall, for the most part at least, be left up to the reader.

Before heading into the argumentation, let me briefly outline what lies ahead. In chapter 2, I’ll characterise (Modal) Meinongianism in more detail, by laying out the basic (Modal) Meinongian theses. Further, I’ll evaluate how MM fares against its property-kind/predication-mode-introducing sibling accounts. Specifically, I’ll show that, prima facie, MM doesn’t face four objections that can be formulated against its siblings.

In chapter 3, I’ll show how actually nonexistent objects that, given MM, allegedly have to instantiate existence in @ in virtue of how they’re characterised, have been invoked as Modal Meinongian Troublemakers by J.C. Beall (2006) and Andrea Sauchelli (2012), respectively. Specifically, I’ll formulate an argument against MM that these philosophers seem to have implicitly appealed to. This first argument from actuality, as I shall call it, contains three substantial premises, the denials of which correspond to the three Modal Meinongian accommodation strategies briefly outlined above.

In chapter 4, I’ll argue against specific instances of two of these three accommodation strategies, namely those developed by Priest (2011) and Barz (2015), respectively. Specifically, I’ll argue that neither of these strategies does justice to some imaginative intentions. I conclude that the actually existent golden mountain remains a Modal Meinongian Troublemaker.

So my interim conclusion will be that the failure of both Priest’s and Barz’ respective accommodation strategies suggests that the only way of accommodating the actually existent golden mountain within the Modal Meinongian’s realm of (actually) nonexistent objects is to give up the first argument from actuality’s third substantial yet dispensable premise. So I claim that if the characterisation of being an actually existent golden mountain can be used to single out an object in a way that employs worlds and the relocation of property instantiations, as Modal Meinongians hold, then the characterisation in question doesn’t yield only a set of properties such that their respective instantiations

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5Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on Milne-Plückebaum (2015a), and chapter 5 is based on Milne-Plückebaum (2014).
by the object so characterised are relocated to certain nonactual worlds. Yet denying this seemingly indisputable assumption requires Modal Meinongians to concede that their Modal principle of object individuation, which, like all Meinongian principles of object individuation, essentially incorporates this assumption, doesn’t apply to the characterisation in question at all. Qua theory of objects, then, MM isn’t comprehensive enough, and so, if it isn’t therefore to be rejected, is in need of extension.

In chapter 5, then, I’ll argue that the characterisation of being an actually existent golden mountain can be used to single out an object in virtue of its yielding a set of properties and a set of worlds such that the so-characterised object’s instantiation of each of its characterising properties in each of its characterising worlds is relocated to certain nonactual pluralities of worlds. These different pluralities can, just like different worlds in the actual plurality, have different properties. Specifically, by reflecting on an argument against MM as formulated by Fred Kroon (2012), I shall propose not only that different worlds are possible, impossible and actual with respect to different pluralities, but also that different pluralities can be thought of as fundamentally different in terms of their basic metaphysical characteristics. For example, while some pluralities of worlds are instances of the metaphysical picture as painted by Lewis (1986), comprising sets of worlds that are collections of spatiotemporally isolated individuals, others instantiate a metaphysics such that some objects are genuinely transworld-identical.

All in all, then, I’ll argue (i) that there’s indeed no place for the actually existent golden mountain within the Modal Meinongian’s plurality of worlds (chapter 4), but (ii) that the Modal Meinongian must merely expand the logical (and illogical) space into a plurality of pluralities of worlds, which the actually existent golden mountain can happily inhabit (chapter 5).

Finally, in chapter 6, I’ll summarise the results of this thesis.
2 Introducing Modal Meinongianism

According to Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects (“Gegenstandstheorie”), some objects don’t exist (Meinong, 1971b, 490), including possible objects like the golden mountain, as well as impossible objects like the round square (Meinong, 1971a, 383). Despite Gilbert Ryle’s harsh prediction that “Gegenstandstheorie itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected” (Ryle, 1973, 255; italics in the original), Meinongianism not only has been resurrected, but is slowly nursed back to health by contemporary proponents of its core theses, who ingeniously use modern ideas and techniques in their favour. While different Meinongians use different ideas and techniques in this ongoing project, they all hold that some objects lack existence, but that these objects can and do have other properties nonetheless (Kroon, 2012, 23), and that we can refer to and say true things about them (Sainsbury, 2010, 44f.). Characteristically, Meinongians thus reject the inference from “a is P” to “There exists something that’s P” or “a exists”. Instead, from “a is F”, they claim, one can infer only “Something is P” and “a is something” (Barz, 2008, 358).

In this chapter, I’ll spell out Meinongianism and its modal species in more detail, proceeding as follows. First, in section 2.1, I’ll lay out the basic Meinongian claims. Then, in section 2.2, I’ll explain how different Meinongians specify their respective accounts in order to fend off Troublemakers. Next, in section 2.3, I’ll introduce and motivate the most recent addition to the family of Meinongianisms: Modal Meinongianism, according to which some of the basic Meinongian claims need to be slightly reconceived. Finally, in section 2.4, I’ll compare Modal Meinongianism to its siblings.

2.1 Meinongianism

Let’s start with the most basic Meinongian claim:

(M1) Some objects don’t exist.

M1 sounds innocent, but is really substantial, as it contains a quantifier. Usually, one of the quantifiers of predicate logic is introduced as the existential
quantifier, “∃”, to be read as “There is” or “There exists”. If that were the quantifier used in M1, then M1 could be formalised as “∃x¬∃y(x = y)”, which is contradictory. So M1’s “some” quantifier must be different from the existential quantifier. Specifically, Meinongians regard the “some” quantifier as existentially neutral. So for Meinongians, contra Quine (1948, 32), to be the value of a bound variable is not to exist/be (Berto, 2008, 207), but just to be an object. In formalisations, we can use the symbol “∃”, to be read as “Some”.¹ M1 can then be formalised as “∃x¬∃y(x = y)”, which isn’t contradictory. In fact, M1 can be spelled out even simpler, as Meinongians also claim (Berto, 2011, 317):

(M2) To exist is to instantiate the property of existence (existence).

You and I exist, but the golden mountain and Harry Potter don’t. Meinongians say that while you and I instantiate existence, the golden mountain and Harry Potter lack this property. Existence, then, an object can, additionally to being something, have or lack—just as a cat can, additionally to being a cat, be tabby. Given that existence is just a property of individuals, we can use a predicate—“E”, say—to express it. So M1 becomes “∃x¬Ex”. Moreover, Meinongians needn’t postulate two modes of being, expressed by two irreducible quantifiers—we have: ∃xPx ≡ ∃x(Ex ∧ Px)—, but only objecthood, which carries no existential load whatsoever, and existence (Priest, 2011, 238).²

Given only M1 and M2, Meinongians as such aren’t committed to the claim that all nonexistent objects share a single nature. That is, Meinongians as such needn’t hold that there’s a single notion of “existence” such that all nonexistent objects lack the corresponding property. In fact, different Meinongians (even different Modal Meinongians) have different such notions (Berto and Priest, 2014, 4). For example, some Meinongians regard merely possible objects as nonexistent, while others don’t; some regard abstract objects as nonexistent, while others don’t; some regard past objects as nonexistent, while others don’t; some regard one of two objects in the same region of spacetime as nonexistent, while others don’t; and so on (Berto and Priest, 2014, 3-4). Each of these

¹Throughout this paper, I shall use the notation of Priest (2005).
²In fact, to distinguish his account from Meinong’s, according to which subsistence is another mode of being, Priest (2005, vii) calls his account “noneism”, as coined by Routley (1980), as “none” answers the question of which mode of being nonexistent objects have.
convictions adds something different to the notion of “existence”. All that Meinongians seem to agree on is that present spatially extended and causally efficacious objects exist. These are objects that one might actually spill coffee over, as Peter Strawson (1950, 61, fn 7; page number from reprint) would put it. But even this isn’t an essential component of their general conviction, which is only that some objects don’t exist. So the question of the right notion of “existence”, and thus the question of the nature of nonexistent objects, is orthogonal to many of the issues that Meinongians struggle with, including the issue that’s the focus of this paper.⁴

So while neither the golden mountain nor Harry Potter exist, they’re objects, and different ones as well. I can think about one of them without thereby thinking about the other. So Meinongians claim that some nonexistent objects are different from others [∃x∃y(¬Ex ∧ ¬Ey ∧ x ≠ y)]. But what makes a nonexistent object the object that it is, and not another (Sainsbury, 2010, 51)? Using the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, we can say that if the golden mountain and Harry Potter have different properties, then they’re different objects.⁴ This presupposes Meinong’s principle of the independence of an object’s so-being from its being (“Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein” (Meinong, 1971b, 489)), i.e.,

\[(M3)\] nonexistent objects have properties.

In order to find out whether the golden mountain and Harry Potter have different properties, notice, first, that these objects are characterised differently. While the first object is simply characterised as being a golden mountain, the second object’s (much longer) characterisation can be found within the pages of seven novels. Yet instances of being characterised as being thus-and-so (such as

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³Thanks to Marcus Kracht for urging me to consider this point.

⁴Of course, in order to say this, Meinongians need to claim that the law applies not only to existent objects, but to nonexistent objects as well. The law’s appropriate formalisation would thus be: ∀x∀y(x = y → ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy)), where “∀” is the new everything quantifier, which can be defined in terms of the something quantifier: ∀xFx ≡ def ¬∃x¬Fx. (Moreover, the old universal quantifier can be defined in terms of the everything quantifier and the existence predicate: ∀xFx ≡ def ∀x(Ex → Px).) But this seems unobjectionable. Note that in this formulation of the law of indiscernibility of identicals, the quantifier ranging over properties can be understood as the existentially loaded universal quantifier, as Meinongians aren’t committed to nonexistent properties, at least not qua properties that individuate nonexistent objects.
being characterised as being a golden mountain) can themselves be different properties only if they’re properties at all, which is controversial. Moreover, even if they are properties, are they part of the property sets that individuate objects? It doesn’t seem so in the case of existent objects, so why should things be different for nonexistent objects?

Even so, according to Meinongians, we do single out nonexistent objects in thought in virtue of having certain characterisations in mind. Characterisations are vehicles in thought and language that we can use to single out unique objects. In thought, a characterisation $C$ can be regarded as a mode of presentation, which, together with an intentional act of singling out a unique object that somehow satisfies $C$, does, according to Meinongians, single out a unique object that somehow satisfies $C$. So the characterisation itself doesn’t single out or refer to a unique object, but only serves as field of mental vision, so to speak, which restricts and guides a thinker’s act of intentional pointing.\(^5\) In language, characterisations must be turned into explicitly uniqueness-entailing expressions. This is typically done by formulating a definite description. For example, the characterisation of being a golden mountain can be turned into the definite description “the object such that it’s a golden mountain” (or just “the golden mountain”).

Importantly, in singling out an object on the basis of a certain characterisation, presumably, we single out the right object. When I intend the golden mountain, for example, then I single it out in virtue of the characterisation I have in mind—and not the philosophising cat, say. Moreover, there seem to be no restrictions as to the characterisations that we can come up with in thought. So given that Meinongians, qua intentional realists, put forward a theory of the objects of thought, they’re strongly inclined to adhere to the following intentionality thesis:

\textbf{(MI)} Every characterisation $C$ can be used to single out an object that uniquely satisfies $C$, be it existent or not.

According to Meinongians, then, in having a characterisation $C$ in mind that no existent object satisfies, we can always successfully single out a nonexistent

\(^5\)For the sake of brevity, I shall nevertheless often talk as if characterisations can single out objects by themselves.
object \( o \) in thought such that \( o \) uniquely satisfies \( C \). But what does it mean to say that an object uniquely satisfies some characterisation? In order to answer this question, Meinongians need to connect MI and M3. That is, they need to explain what an object \( o \) that satisfies some characterisation \( C \) is like such that \( o \), and only \( o \), satisfies \( C \). In other words, they need to formulate a Meinongian principle of characterisation-induced object individuation (in line with the literature, a Characterisation Principle (CP), for short). On the basis of any characterisation \( C \), a CP is supposed to tell us what the object \( o \) singled out in virtue of having \( C \) in mind is like such that \( o \), and only \( o \), satisfies \( C \). That is, for any characterisation \( C \), a CP is supposed to deliver a condition that (i) is in line with \( C \) and (ii) individuates the object so singled out in terms of the properties it has.

Now, while Meinongians don’t claim that nonexistent objects are individuated in virtue of having characterised-as-being-thus-and-so properties (if such they are), in cases in which a nonexistent object \( o \) is singled out by a characterisation, they rely on the idea that \( o \) has the properties it’s characterised as having (Priest, 2005, vii); for if \( o \) wouldn’t have the properties it’s characterised as having, then how would we know that we’re in fact thinking about \( o \) when we seemingly do so (Priest, 2005, 83)? So the golden mountain has goldenness and mountainhood; and Harry Potter has the properties the object is characterised, in the Harry Potter novels, as having.

To sum up: while Meinongians can’t say that any nonexistent object depends on someone actually using a characterisation to single it out,\(^6\) in cases in which a characterisation \( C \) is used to single out a nonexistent object in thought, the Meinongian principle of object individuation must individuate the object in question in line with \( C \); for otherwise the object individuated by the principle wouldn’t match the object intended by the thinker.\(^7\) Moreover, while a fully general Meinongian principle of object individuation doesn’t re-

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\(^6\)Obviously, no characterisation can bring a nonexistent object into existence; nor can any characterisation turn something into an object, as everything already is an object; lastly, no characterisation can bring into objecthood what formerly was nothing, as this is incoherent, at least for Meinongians who hold that existence is the only mode of being.

\(^7\)This would be the case, for example, if the principle would just yield a unique real number for every distinct characterisation used to single out a unique nonexistent object. (Yet of course, if real numbers exist, then such a principle wouldn’t be a genuine Meinongian principle of object individuation after all; but that’s beside the point.)
quire an antecedently formulated characterisation, on the basis of which an object is individuated, given that Meinongians want to secure a link between (characterisation-dependent) thought and the objects thereof, the special case of how objects are individuated in line with their characterisations needs to be spelled out.

In the following section, I’ll present different CP-formulations that have been proposed. These ground different species of Meinongianism.

2.2 Meinongian Characterisation Principles

In order to formulate a Meinongian principle of object individuation that operates on the basis of the characterisations used to single out objects in thought (a Characterisation Principle (CP), for short), Meinongians might try the following natural (or naive) formulation (see Russell, 1905, 483):

(NCP) For every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) semantically yields a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that some object, be it existent or not, instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \).

(Let’s say that NCP grounds \( N \)-Meinongianism.) Given NCP, the characterisation of being a golden mountain, for example, semantically yields goldenness and mountainhood, which some object instantiates.

Yet NCP isn’t suitable for the Meinongian’s purpose, for two reasons. First, NCP immediately leads to trouble, as we can formulate the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain, which introduces a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that some object instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \). As this set includes goldenness and mountainhood, which nothing existent instantiates, the object in question must be nonexistent. But given M2, the set also includes existence. So the object exists after all, which is unacceptable (Parsons, 1980, 23).

Second, NCP doesn’t, for every characterisation \( C \), provide a condition that individuates an object in line with \( C \). For example, given NCP, the characterisation of being a sunlit golden mountain semantically yields being sunlit,

\[ \text{Also, according to NCP, the object characterised as being a round square instantiates roundness and squareness (see Russell, 1905, 483), which is contradictory. In this thesis, I don’t explicitly deal with such (allegedly) contradictory Troublemakers from a Meinongian perspective; but see Milne (2013).} \]
GOLDENNESS and MOUNTAINHOOD, which some object instantiates.\textsuperscript{9} So in having the less specific characterisation of being a golden mountain in mind, which object does my accompanying intentional act single out? The golden mountain? Or the sunlit golden mountain? Are they the same object? How do we decide? NCP, at least, doesn’t tell us.\textsuperscript{10}

Given that Meinongians want to say that if we intend to single out a unique object in thought by using a characterisation, then we also know which object we’ve singled out, a suitably formulated CP needs to yield a unique object for every characterisation. One way to do so would be to say that for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) semantically yields a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that an object \( o \), and only \( o \), instantiates exactly \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) (or exactly the properties that follow from \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \)). The golden mountain, then, would be different from the sunlit golden mountain, as the former, but not the latter, instantiates exactly GOLDENNESS and MOUNTAINHOOD (or exactly the properties that follow from GOLDENNESS and MOUNTAINHOOD). But this proposal doesn’t work, as the golden mountain obviously also instantiates NONEXISTENCE and BEING AN EXAMPLE USED THROUGHOUT THIS PAPER, for example. Intuitively, these aren’t individuating properties. But if that’s right, then the N-Meinongian would at least need to round out her account by saying which properties can individuate nonexistent objects, and why.

So NCP must be replaced by a CP that (i) doesn’t lead to contradictions or factual falsities, and (ii) individuates objects in line with the characterisations used to single them out. Yet given that NCP is the most intuitive CP, Meinongians want to depart from it as little as possible. Given this proviso, three alternative CPs have been proposed. I’ll consider these in turn.\textsuperscript{11}

According to the path of restriction, defended most prominently by Parsons (1980) (see also Jacquette (1996)), there are two basic property kinds, only one of which can be instantiated by nonexistent objects in virtue of their characterisations. Objects instantiate these so-called “nuclear” properties (as coined by

\textsuperscript{9}Thanks to Christian Nimtz for pointing this example out to me, and for urging me to treat the issue it raises in more detail.

\textsuperscript{10}These questions are, of course, reminiscent of those asked by Quine (1948, 23-24) about the possible fat man and the possible bald man in the doorway.

\textsuperscript{11}The following exposition of Parsons’ account is based on Milne (2013, 48).
Findlay (1963)) intrinsically, i.e., independently of whether they exist. In contrast, objects instantiate so-called “extranuclear” properties only extrinsically. As this distinction is somewhat difficult to get one’s head around, Parsons (1980, 23) provides some examples of predicates that stand for nuclear properties and predicates that stand for extranuclear properties:

**Nuclear Predicates:**
- ‘is blue’, ‘is tall’, ‘kicked Socrates’, ‘was kicked by Socrates’, ‘kicked somebody’, ‘is golden’, ‘is a mountain’

**Extranuclear Predicates:**
- Ontological: ‘exists’, ‘is mythical’, ‘is fictional’
- Modal: ‘is possible’, ‘is impossible’
- Intentional: ‘is thought about by Meinong’, ‘is worshipped by someone’
- Technical: ‘is complete’

While Parsons defines neither property kind in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, he claims that the distinction can be roughly made by noticing which properties are or have been the object of (philosophical) debate: if most people agree that a property $P$ is a normal property of individuals, then it’s plausible to regard $P$ as a nuclear property. Otherwise, $P$ can be regarded as an extranuclear property (Parsons, 1980, 23). So Parsons primarily appeals to intuitions in arguing for the plausibility of his proposed distinction.

Yet even if the paradigmatically extranuclear property **existence** is excluded from the set of CP-suitable properties, the existent golden mountain is characterised as existent, which forces such Meinongians to assume that there’s also **nuclear existence**, which nonexistent objects can instantiate in virtue of being so characterised. And indeed, Parsons holds that there are nuclear (“watered-down”) counterparts of at least some extranuclear properties, which are such that, unlike existent objects, nonexistent objects can instantiate them without also instantiating their respective extranuclear counterparts (Parsons, 1980, 44). So given that the existent golden mountain is (extranuclearly) nonexistent, it can be said to instantiate **nuclear existence** without also instantiating **existence**. The existent Mount Everest, on the other hand, instantiates **nuclear existence and existence**.
Now, given this distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, Meinongians can hold that it’s not the case that for every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of any properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that some object instantiates $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. Instead, they can say:

(RCP) For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of nuclear properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, either (i) instantiates existence and $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, or (ii) doesn’t instantiate existence, but, of all nuclear properties, exactly $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.

(Let’s say that RCP grounds R-Meinongianism.) Given RCP, the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain semantically yields goldenness, mountainhood, and nuclear existence, which are regarded as nuclear properties, and which are uniquely instantiated by some extranearly nonexistent object that instantiates no other nuclear properties. Instantiating, of all nuclear properties, exactly these properties is what makes the existent golden mountain the object that it is, and not another. Additionally, the existent golden mountain instantiates the extranuclear properties nonexistence and being an example used throughout this paper, for example. Yet the instantiation of these properties doesn’t feature in the object’s individuation condition.

Alternatively, according to the path of disambiguation, defended most prominently by Zalta (1983, 1988) (see also Rapaport (1978)), there are two basic predication modes, only one of which applies to nonexistent objects and their respective properties in virtue of being so characterised. Zalta refers to this predication mode as “encoding” and claims that existent objects don’t encode any properties, but only ordinarily instantiate them. On the other hand, nonexistent objects—which, given Zalta’s identification of existence with having a location in space-time, can also be regarded as abstract objects—can encode and instantiate properties. For their individuation conditions, however, it matters only which properties they encode, just as, for existent objects’ individuation conditions, it matters only which properties they instantiate (Zalta,

Qua extranuclearly existent object, the object singled out by using the characterisation of being the highest mountain on earth, for example, doesn’t instantiate, of all nuclear properties, only the properties semantically yielded by the characterisation, which is why clause (i) is needed. Yet in this thesis, I want to remain neutral concerning the questions of when and how (extranuclearly) existent objects are singled out by using characterisations.

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1992, 60). Without contradiction, then, nonexistent objects can be said to encode, but not also to instantiate, the properties they’re characterised as having, including existence.

Now, given this distinction between property-instantiation and -encoding, and the different sets of objects to which these relations can be applied, Meinongians can hold that it’s not the case that for every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that some object instantiates $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. Instead, they can say:

**DCP** For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, either (i) instantiates existence and $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, or (ii) doesn’t instantiate existence, but encodes exactly $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.

(Let’s say that DCP grounds *D-Meinongianism.*) Given DCP, the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain semantically yields goldenness, mountainhood, and existence, which aren’t regarded as being of a certain kind, and which are uniquely encoded by some nonexistent object that encodes no other properties. Encoding exactly these properties is what makes the existent golden mountain the object that it is, and not another. Additionally, the existent golden mountain *instantiates* nonexistence and being an example used throughout this paper, for example. Yet the instantiation of these properties doesn’t feature in the object’s individuation condition.

So both RCP and DCP essentially rely on some basic distinction—the nuclear/extranuclear property distinction and the instantiation/encoding distinction, respectively—in order to accommodate Troublemakers like the existent golden mountain. Yet in relying on such distinctions, both paths can be judged as ontologically extravagant, insofar as they double property kinds/predication modes, and mysterious, insofar as both ontological additions are hard to get one’s head around, and so as ad hoc (see Priest, 2005, 83). Motivated by the thought that Meinongians should do their best to secure the simple idea that nonexistent objects have all of the properties they’re characterised as having, but without relying on controversial distinctions (see Barz, 2015, 3), another
path of Troublemaker accommodation has been recently proposed: the path of modal relocation.

Adherents of this path call attention to something that, in their view, both R- and D-Meinongians have overlooked: in order to formulate a CP, they claim, we must ask not only what kind of properties nonexistent objects can have, or what the nature of the having relation towards properties of the kind in question is, but also *where* nonexistent objects have their individuating properties, modally speaking. Given this further variable, Meinongians can hold that it’s not the case that for every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) semantically yields a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that some object instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) *in the actual world* (\( @ \)). Instead, they can say:

**\( \text{MCP, to be specified} \)** For every characterisation \( C \), \( C \) semantically yields a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that an object \( o \), and only \( o \), instantiates \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) in all worlds of a certain kind, which may not include \( @ \).

Given MCP, which grounds MM, the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain yields *goldenness, mountainhood* and *existence*, all of which are uniquely instantiated by some object, but only in certain worlds, which, given that no golden mountain actually exists, doesn’t include \( @ \). Instantiating these properties in certain nonactual worlds is what makes the existent golden mountain the object that it is, and not another. Additionally, the existent golden mountain actually instantiates *nonexistence* and *being an example used throughout this paper*, for example. Yet the actual instantiation of these properties doesn’t feature in the object’s individuation condition.

The path of modal relocation is paved with questions: specifically, we must ask (i) how the basic Meinongian claims are to be understood in the MM framework, (ii) which worlds feature in objects’ individuation conditions, and (iii) how MM fares against its siblings. In the next section, I shall turn to questions (i) and (ii); in the section after next, I shall turn to question (iii).

### 2.3 Modal Meinongianism

According to the core Meinongian thesis M1, some objects don’t exist. Yet given MM, as grounded in MCP, we need to reformulate:
(MM1) In @, some objects don’t exist.

Given that M-Meinongians hold on to (M)M2, i.e.

(16) To exist is to instantiate existence,

they can just say that in @, some objects don’t instantiate existence. You and I instantiate existence in @, but the golden mountain and Harry Potter don’t instantiate existence in @. Given our existence predicate, “$E$”, MM1 becomes “@ $\vDash \exists x \neg Ex$, where “$w \vDash p$” is to be read as “It’s true in $w$ that $p$” (“$w \vDash \neg p$” is to be read as “It’s false in $w$ that $p$”). According to MM, then, existence is instantiated by different objects in different worlds, just like other properties. So in order to meet the intuition that different objects exist in different worlds, M-Meinongians needn’t invoke a variable domain structure, where each world-$w$-domain includes all and only the objects that exist in $w$, but a constant domain structure, where, given any world $w$, the domain of quantification just includes all objects, whether or not they exist in $w$. So existence is still detached from the basic quantifier (Priest, 2005, 13-14): every object is something in every world, but in some worlds, some objects don’t exist. In particular, while the existent golden mountain is something in @, it doesn’t exist in @. Instead, given MCP, the existent golden mountain is a golden mountain and existent only in certain nonactual worlds.

Further, MM can easily handle the intuition that some properties are existence-entailing, i.e., such that any object that instantiates such a property also instantiates existence. Consider mountainhood: how can an object instantiate it, i.e., really be a mountain, without also instantiating existence (Berto, 2011, 324)? In particular, then, it seems as if the golden mountain must, qua something that’s a mountain, exist. On the other hand, qua something that I’m writing about, the golden mountain mustn’t exist. Now, M-Meinongians can just say that some properties $P$ are such that any object that instantiates $P$ in a world $w$ also instantiates existence in $w$.14 In general, according to MM, objects not

14So in the hands of M-Meinongians, the golden mountain and the existent golden mountain are the same object. This might be regarded as a drawback of MM, as a Meinongian object’s properties aren’t as tightly connected to its characterisation as they are for other Meinongians; but this just begs the question against the claim that some properties are existence-entailing.
only have the properties they’re characterised as having, at least in certain worlds, but also have, in those worlds, all of the properties that follow from the properties they’re characterised as having (Priest, 2005, 86).

Concerning the question of which properties are existence-entailing—which, according to Maria Reicher (2014, section 5.2), is equally difficult to answer in a principled manner as the question of which properties are nuclear and which are extranuclear—, M-Meinongians can just say that, first, like the question of the nature of existence, this question is orthogonal to MM and, second, that it can be answered largely by common sense (Priest, 2011, 249).

This view on existence-entailing properties has consequences for the M-Meinongian’s understanding of M3, according to which Meinongian objects have properties: given MM, while an object $o$’s instantiation of certain, i.e., existence-entailing, properties in a world $w$ entails $o$’s instantiation of existence in $w$, an object $o$’s instantiation of non-existence-entailing properties in a world $w$ doesn’t entail $o$’s instantiation of existence in $w$. In general, then, MM captures Meinong’s principle of the independence of an object’s so-being from its being in a minimal sense: from the standpoint of a world $w$, not every so-being in $w$ is independent from an object’s being in $w$; instead, an object that’s nonexistent in $w$ can instantiate only non-existence-entailing properties in $w$ itself, and existence-entailing properties in worlds other than $w$ (see Berto, 2011, 323). So an object $o$’s instantiation of properties in a world $w$ as such doesn’t entail $o$’s instantiation of existence in $w$. In particular,

**(MM3)** in @, Meinongian objects only instantiate properties that aren’t existence-entailing.

So the golden mountain, for example, instantiates neither goldenness nor mountainhood in @—as both properties are existence-entailing, but the golden mountain doesn’t instantiate existence in @. Instead, in @, the golden mountain only instantiates non-existence-entailing properties like nonexistence and being an example used throughout this paper, for example, but also the world-

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15Henceforth, I’ll use the umbrella term Meinongian object for objects that, according to R-Meinongianism, don’t instantiate the extranuclear property existence; according to D-Meinongianism, don’t instantiate existence; and according to MM, don’t instantiate existence in @.

Hence, unlike N-, R-, and D-Meinongians, M-Meinongians don’t attempt to specify what an object is like simpliciter, i.e., in @, at least insofar as its characterising properties are concerned, but what an object is characteristically like relative to certain nonactual worlds. In general, M-Meinongians want to give an account, first, of the sense in which Meinongian objects can have properties in @ at all, and, second, of the sense in which Meinongian objects can also be said to have their characterising properties. By introducing the machinery of worlds, M-Meinongians claim that they can best reconcile conflicting intuitions concerning Meinongian objects and their having of properties: they just instantiate properties here, in @, albeit only non-existence-entailing ones; and they also just instantiate their characterising properties somewhere else, namely in certain nonactual worlds. That is, departing from N-, R-, and D-Meinongianism, MM has it that Meinongian objects’ instantiation of their characterising properties is modally relocated.

But to which worlds? According to Priest, qua objects of thought, Meinongian objects don’t necessarily instantiate all of their characterising properties in @, but do necessarily instantiate all of their characterising properties in worlds that realise the way in which one imagines things to be in the case at hand (Priest, 2005, 84). For example, the golden mountain is a golden mountain, and thus existent, in those worlds that realise my imagination of how things are in the case of there being a golden mountain. A world in which only philosophising cats exist, say, isn’t such an imagination-realising world, whereas a world in which a golden mountain exists right beside Bielefeld University, say, qualifies. @, in particular, doesn’t qualify, as nothing actually existent is a golden mountain in @. But just as many worlds, including @, don’t realise my imagination, the imagination-realising worlds are manifold, too, as my imagination is highly incomplete. For example, while imagining the golden mountain, I don’t simultaneously imagine whether there are more black or grey cats. So in some imagination-realising worlds, there are more grey cats than black ones; in some others, there are more black cats than grey ones; and in yet others, there are equally many black and grey cats. And so on for everything else.
Further, the worlds used for individuating objects must be partitioned into possible worlds (including @) and impossible worlds, which are worlds in which the laws of logic are different from those that hold in possible worlds (Priest, 2005, 16) or where a law of logic fails (Priest, 1997b, 531), whatever the logic that holds in possible worlds might be. More broadly, impossible worlds can be conceptualised as ways things could not have been (see Yagisawa, 1987). More narrowly, impossible worlds can be regarded as worlds in which some contradictions are true (Berto, 2011, 322). Given MCP, impossible worlds are needed for individuating impossible Meinongian objects like the round square, as only such worlds can realise one’s imagination of these objects.

Finally, then, we can formulate the fully specific Modal CP:

(MCP) For every characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in exactly those worlds, possible or impossible, that are $C$-imagination-realising.

So the existent golden mountain instantiates goldenness, mountainhood and existence, and the properties that follow, in all and only imagination-realising worlds, which include possible and impossible worlds, but not @, as nothing instantiates these properties in @. Instantiating these properties in all and only imagination-realising worlds is what makes the existent golden mountain the object that it is, and not another. Additionally, the existent golden mountain instantiates nonexistence and being an example used throughout this paper, for example, in @. Yet the instantiation of these properties in @ doesn’t feature in the object’s individuation condition.

Before examining MCP in detail, we shall see, in the next section, whether M-Meinongianism can prevail against its siblings.

2.4 Modal Meinongianism Versus Its Siblings

With the exception of N-Meinongianism, all kinds of Meinongianism considered here incorporate some fundamental distinction in order to individuate

\footnotetext{16}{For overviews on the topic of impossible worlds, see Berto (2013a) and Priest (1997a).}
objects on the basis of certain characterisations, which, in turn, is necessary in order to satisfy MI. Specifically, while R-Meinongians distinguish between nuclear and extranuclear properties, and D-Meinongians distinguish between property-instantiation and -encoding, M-Meinongians distinguish between the actual world and nonactual worlds (including possible and impossible worlds) in order to accommodate Troublemakers. So in order to evaluate how MM fares against its siblings, one question to ask is whether the distinction it characteristically incorporates is more plausible than either of the other distinctions. In particular, there are four objections that might be advanced against a given kind of Meinongianism:

(Collapse) X-Meinongianism collapses into Nonactualism or Abstractualism.\(^{17}\)

(Extravagance) X-Meinongianism is ontologically extravagant.

(Mysteriousness) X-Meinongianism is ontologically mysterious.

(Diversion) X-Meinongianism can be unduly imagination-diverting.

In this section, we shall see which kind of Meinongianism is vulnerable to which of these objections.

Concerning D-Meinongianism’s distinction between property-instantiation and property-encoding, one can’t avoid the impression that it secures MI by running against the spirit of M3, thus making itself vulnerable to Collapse. According to D-Meinongians, the object as individuated on the basis of the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain, for example, doesn’t \textit{really} have \textit{existence}, \textit{goldenness} and \textit{mountainhood} (anywhere). That is, the existent golden mountain doesn’t have these properties in the standard, instantiation-sense of “having” properties (see Reicher, 2014, section 5.4). Instead, the existent golden mountain only “has” its characterising properties in the non-standard, \textit{encoding}-sense of “having” properties.

But what distinguishes the encoding-sense of “having” properties from its instantiation-sense, other than the fact that Meinongian objects can be related to

\(^{17}\)Recall: Nonactualism is the kind of intentional realism according to which pure intentional objects are existent and concrete, but nonactual; and Abstractualism is the kind of intentional realism according to which pure intentional objects are existent and actual, but nonconcrete.
their characterising properties only in the former sense? The fact that no one has been able to satisfactorily spell out this relation (Barz, 2015, 3) suggests that it has just been stipulated to serve as the relation that fulfils the required function. In fact, the closest one can come to explicating the encoding-relation seems to lie in explicating it in terms of set inclusion.\textsuperscript{18} A set that includes \textit{mountainhood}, for example, also isn’t a mountain, but is nevertheless (partly) individuated by its including \textit{mountainhood}. Moreover, just as Meinongian objects as conceived by D-Meinongians, such a set instantiates properties over and above the ones it includes, such as \textit{being} (partly) individuated by the property of \textit{mountainhood}, \textit{being used as an example in this text}, and \textit{abstractness} (and so \textit{nonexistence}, at least given Zalta’s understanding of \textit{existence}). Insofar as D-Meinongianism essentially incorporates this distinction in order to secure MI, then, it can be judged as either violating M3, at least as far as Meinongian objects’ characterising properties are concerned, which such objects don’t really have in any standard sense, or else as being just too mysterious, as the encoding-relation, if it’s supposed to be understood in conformity with M3, is hard to get one’s head around. So of the above four objections, either Collapse applies to D-Meinongianism (see Reicher, 2014, section 5.5), as Abstractualism essentially functions similar to D-Meinongianism insofar as the former, too, relies on a distinction between modes of predication (see Reicher, 2010, 117ff.), or else Mysteriousness and Extravagance.

In contrast, R-Meinongianism straightforwardly satisfies M3. The existent golden mountain, for example, simply instantiates the \textit{nuclear} properties \textit{nuclear existence, goldenness and mountainhood}, in the ordinary instantiation-sense of “having” properties. Yet concerning the R-Meinongian’s MI-securing distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties, it’s hard to understand what differentiates these property kinds, as there’s no principled recipe for classifying a given property as belonging to one kind rather than the other. In order to substantiate this distinction, Parsons primarily appeals to intuitions. Yet partitioning the set of properties into sets of nuclear and extranuclear prop-

\textsuperscript{18}Looking at the other labels that philosophers have given this relation—\textit{being determined by} (Mally, 1912), \textit{being consociated with} (Castañeda, 1972) and, most strikingly, \textit{being constituted by} (Rapaport, 1978)—reinforces this impression.
erties, even on a case by case basis, remains a problem even for Meinongians who find such a distinction intuitively plausible (Berto, 2011, 317).

But even if we assume that R-Meinongians can convincingly partition the set of properties into these subsets, nothing is gained: in order to secure MI, R-Meinongians need to claim that at least for some extranuclear properties, there are also watered-down nuclear counterparts. But what distinguishes nuclear existence, for example, from the extranuclear property existence, other than the fact that only nuclear existence can be instantiated by Meinongian objects in virtue of being characterised as existent? There seems to be no satisfactory answer (Barz, 2015, 3). So while R-Meinongianism’s fundamental distinction within the (thus far unsorted) set of properties that’s already at our disposal might go through, and while the account secures MI in conformity with M3, Extravagance and Mysteriousness apply to it, insofar as certain properties need to be doubled, but only in order to accommodate Troublemakers, which results in a new set of properties, the nature of which can’t be understood independently of this function.

Moreover, in light of the intuition that some properties, like mountainhood, are existence-entailing, R- and D-Meinongians would struggle if they shared it (which, typically, they don’t): R-Meinongians could say that mountainhood, for example, isn’t really existence-entailing, but only nuclear-existence-entailing. Conceding this wouldn’t really do justice to the intuition, though, or would, in fact, suggest that mountainhood can’t be the same property as real mountainhood, say, which is existence-entailing. So if R-Meinongians took seriously the intuition, they’d need to hold that existence, qua extranuclear property, is entailed only by (other) extranuclear properties, like extranuclear mountainhood, say. But then not only would extranuclear properties have nuclear counterparts, but some nuclear properties would have extranuclear counterparts as well. In contrast, D-Meinongians can just grant that some properties are existence-entailing, given that this holds for property-instantiation. An object’s encoding an existence-entailing property needn’t entail its encoding existence; but since we don’t have clear intuitions regarding the encoding-relation, D-Meinongians can really spell it out in many problem-evading ways. So any
attempt of dealing with this intuition in the R- or D-Meinongian’s way would just add to the respective Meinongianism’s extravagance and mysteriousness.

Finally, Anthony Everett (2005, 644f.) holds that the R-Meinongian’s distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties leads to ambiguities that intuitively don’t obtain (see also Voltolini, 2010, 59ff.). The R-Meinongian’s guiding idea is that, qua object of thought, every object should have all of the properties it’s characterised as having, even if that includes watered-down nuclear counterparts of extranuclear properties. But in formulating the characterisation of being the existent Mount Everest, for example, it’s indeterminate which object is to be individuated: the one that instantiates only nuclear existence and all of the other nuclear properties that the really—i.e., extranuclearly, in the R-Meinongian’s conception—existent Mount Everest instantiates, or the one that instantiates nuclear existence and existence and all of the other properties that the extranuclearly existent Mount Everest instantiates? Further, in formulating the characterisation of being an existent golden mountain, imaginers might want to single out an object that really, i.e., extranuclearly, exists, and so instantiates existence, in which case R-Meinongianism has it that the characterisation in question individuates an object that, in instantiating nuclear existence, instantiates a mere surrogate property. Moreover, the imaginer can explicitly characterise an object as being an extranuclearly existent golden mountain, in which case the surrogate property seems all the more ineligible.

Much the same can be said for D-Meinongianism: after all, we can easily formulate the characterisation of instantiating, but not encoding, existence, goldenness and mountainhood. So given such “meta”-characterisations, R- and D-Meinongians can only say that they aren’t legitimate in the first place—which seems like an ad hoc restriction—, or else that RCP/DCP must override them insofar as the individuation conditions yielded are the same as the ones yielded for the object characterised as being an existent golden mountain.

Now, is MM susceptible to the same problems as either R- or D-Meinongianism, i.e., to Collapse (as D-Meinongianism), Extravagance (as R- and D-Meinongianism), Mysteriousness (as R- and D-Meinongianism), or Diversion (as R- and D-Meinongianism)? So far, at least, it doesn’t seem so, or so I shall indicate in the remainder of this section. Yet the subsequent chapters are meant to show
that certain of the problems that don’t seem to befall MM at this point do creep up on it again at a later stage.

Concerning Collapse, one might suspect that MM is really a form of Nonactualism. Wolfgang Barz, for example, isn’t happy about regarding MM as a genuine kind of Meinongianism, as he regards Meinongianism as essentially tied to the thought that @ contains nonexistent objects that just instantiate the properties they’re characterised as having here, and so is incompatible with the thought that objects that don’t exist in @ are contained in nonactual worlds, where they instantiate properties (Barz, 2015, 3, fn 5). Yet I think that Barz partly mischaracterises MM. Objects that don’t exist in @ aren’t contained in nonactual worlds, as the objects themselves aren’t relocated, but only their instantiation of certain properties is. In fact, if nonexistent objects are contained in a single existent world, then it’s @, as, at least according to Priest (2005, 139), @ is the only existent world. So every nonactual world that features in a nonexistent object’s individuation condition is itself a nonexistent object. Moreover, as we’ve seen, nonexistent objects instantiate properties in @, just not the ones they’re characterised as having. So MM isn’t a form of Nonactualism, as, first, (Lewisian) Nonactualism has it that objects like the golden mountain are world-bound individuals, while MM has it that they’re transworld-individuals; and, second, the worlds invoked in Nonactualism are the same as those postulated in realist (i.e., non-fictionalist) modal metaphysics, while, qua Meinongianism, MM isn’t committed to invoking these worlds for individuating nonexistent objects, even if these worlds exist, but can invoke nonexistent worlds instead.

Concerning Extravagance, we might be tempted to say that MM isn’t in the same way ontologically extravagant as R- or D-Meinongianism: in order to secure MI, M-Meinongians postulate two kinds of nonactual worlds where R-Meinongians postulate a new property kind and D-Meinongians postulate a new predication mode. Yet given that possible worlds are omnipresent in analytic philosophy anyway, and that impossible worlds enjoy increasing support as well, independently of their usefulness in accommodating Troublemakers (see Berto, 2013a, section 1), this move doesn’t appear as costly as a new property kind or a new predication mode, at least insofar as the latter two ontological additions are postulated solely in order to accommodate Troublemakers. Yet in
arguing against Extravagance in this way, MM becomes susceptible to Collapse. Specifically, if the worlds invoked in MM are regarded as abstract and existent entities, then, given that it isn’t clear how objects can really instantiate properties in such worlds, MM comes dangerously close to Abstractualism. So the worlds invoked in MM must be concrete. But if the worlds invoked in MM are regarded as concrete and existent entities in the sense of Lewis (1986) and Yagisawa (1987), then MM comes dangerously close to Nonactualism. Yet as I’ve said in the preceding paragraph, to evade Nonactualism, MM’s concrete worlds can be understood as different from the worlds invoked in other areas of philosophy, at least if these areas aren’t understood along fictionalist lines, insofar as the former, but not the latter, are nonexistent. And of course, given Meinongianism, this isn’t ontologically extravagant.\textsuperscript{19}

Concerning Mysteriousness, we can say that we have a clear understanding of concrete-world-relative property instantiation, including the instantiation of existence-entailing properties, as objects instantiate properties in concrete nonactual worlds exactly as they instantiate properties in @.

Lastly, concerning Diversion, we can say that in imagining objects as ordinarily having ordinary properties, MM yields individuation conditions that genuinely respect this. The existent golden mountain, for example, really instantiates real existence, but only in certain nonactual worlds. So in imagining the existent golden mountain, we aren’t fobbed off with some airy surrogate object that we didn’t intend to imagine.

So \textit{prima facie}, MM has a lot going for it. Compared to its siblings, MM is ontologically parsimonious, less mysterious and imaginatively liberal. Moreover, M-Meinongians plausibly reconceive the basic Meinongian claims in order to reconcile conflicting intuitions concerning Meinongian objects and their properties: according to MM, Meinongian objects just instantiate certain nonexistence-entailing properties in @ and the properties they’re characterised as having in imagination-realising worlds. This is a significant departure from R- and D-Meinongianism. And as such, it might lead to new Troublemakers. Whatever Meinongians propose in terms of distinctions, restrictions, disambiguations, ontological additions, or relocations, remember that it’s ultimately

\textsuperscript{19}See section 5.2 for more on the ontological status of MM’s worlds.
all in the service of the Meinongian intentionality thesis, which, in the hands of M-Meinongians, becomes:

\[(MMI)\] Every characterisation singles out a unique object in thought, be it existent in or not.

So no matter how parsimonious, intelligible or liberal MM seems to be, it must be able to deal with every characterisation that R- or D-Meinongianism can deal with. In the next chapter, we’ll see how MM can be made to struggle with this requirement, as a new Troublemaker enters the scene; and in the chapters after next, we’ll see whether accommodating this Troublemaker requires giving up MM’s parsimony, intelligibility or liberality after all.
3 Challenging Modal Meinongianism

Qua intentional realists, M-Meinongians hold on to

(MMI) Every characterisation C singles out a unique object in thought, be it existent in @ or not.

Now, MMI, together with

(MCP) For every characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only C-imagination-realising worlds,

can be held to yield the following problem: we can characterise an object as being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain (and thus, given that goldenness and mountainhood are existence-entailing, existent; henceforth, I will leave the conjunct “and thus existent” implicit). Given MMI, this characterisation singles out a unique object, which, according to MCP, instantiates the property actually being a golden mountain in all imagination-realising worlds. But assuming that “actually” involves rigid reference to the actual world (@), the only way in which an object can instantiate the property in question in an imagination-realising world is by instantiating golden mountainhood in @. But nothing instantiates this property in @. So MCP is false. And so MM, as grounded in MCP, is false.

To see how this problem can be evaded by M-Meinongians, I will, in this chapter, spell it out in more detail, proceeding as follows. First, in section 3.1, I’ll look at the nature of the “actually” operator invoked in the above allegedly trouble-inducing characterisation, as specified by J.C. Beall (2006). Given Beall’s specific understanding of the “actually” operator invoked, I’ll show, in section 3.2, which property set is allegedly yielded by the characterisation containing it, following Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Finally, in section 3.3., I’ll formulate the first argument from actuality against MM.

3.1 The Operator of Actuality

According to Beall (2006), MM can’t consistently cope with an actuality operator that has the same truth conditions at every world. Yet given that such a uniform
operator expresses a recognisable notion of actuality, and so plays a role in thought and imagination, it shouldn’t be problematic for a theory that wants to explicate what the objects of thought and imagination are like. As a theory of this kind, then, MM fails.

Specifically, the allegedly trouble-inducing operator refers back to the actual world (@) from wherever, as specified in the following truth condition:

\[(\text{ACT}) \text{ For every world } w, [w \vDash + \text{actually}(\varphi) \iff @ \vDash + \varphi].\]

Given ACT, the problem for MM arises as, first, according to MMI, every characterisation \(C\) singles out a unique object in thought, presumably in virtue of yielding a set of properties \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\) such that, according to MCP, \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\) are uniquely instantiated by an object in every \(C\)-imagination-realising world; and, second, we can formulate the characterisation of being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain (AGM, for short).

Now, if AGM introduces a property set \(P_{AGM} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}\) such that, according to MCP, each \(P_{AGM}\) member is instantiated by an object—“Goldy”, say—in each imagination-realising world, then we have, for each of these worlds \(w\), \(w \vDash + \text{actually}(\text{Goldy is a golden mountain})\). Then ACT yields: \(@ \vDash + \text{Goldy is a golden mountain}.\) So Goldy is a golden mountain in @. But nothing is a golden mountain in @. So MMI, MCP or ACT must be given up.

Of these options, Beall claims that M-Meinongians might just reject the existence of the “actually” operator as given by ACT. Yet he also claims that

[t]he trouble [...] is that what makes [MM] attractive is its drive towards accommodating all properties in [a CP], rather than ad hocly restricting against various properties. If the alleged ‘uniform’ notion of actuality is indeed an independently recognized and coherent notion of actuality, then [MM] is forced to perform the very restrictions that it so admirably sought to avoid.

---

\(^1\)Beall himself introduces a different characterisation, namely the characterisation of being an \(x\) such that \(x = x \land \text{actually}(\varphi)\) (\(B\), for short), where \(\varphi\) is an arbitrary sentence. So if \(B\) is legitimate, then it introduces a set of properties \(P_B\) such that, according to MCP, each \(P_B\) member is instantiated by some object—call it “Jim”—in every \(B\)-imagination-realising world. So we have, for every \(B\)-imagination-realising world \(w\), \(w \vDash + \text{Jim} = \text{Jim} \land \text{actually}(\varphi)\). From this, we can infer, for every \(B\)-imagination-realising world \(w\), \(w \vDash + \text{Jim} = \text{Jim} \land w \vDash + \text{actually}(\varphi)\). (This needn’t be a valid inference in impossible worlds, though.) Then, given ACT, \(@ \vDash + \varphi\). So for every \(\varphi\), \(\varphi\) is true in @.
So what’s the proposal here? M-Meinongians can regard ACT as incoherent, or as not tracking an independently recognised notion of actuality, or as not tracking the notion of actuality that’s invoked in AGM, or as being inadequate in another way that’s independent from its leading to trouble in the MM setting. In each case, M-Meinongians give up only ACT, while AGM is still regarded as a legitimate characterisation. Hence, insofar as AGM is regarded as legitimate, MMI mustn’t be given up, at least if M-Meinongians can find an adequate replacement for ACT that’s coherent and that tracks the notion of actuality invoked in AGM.

On the other hand, what Beall seems to be getting at is that M-Meinongians might reject the “actually” operator as given by ACT (henceforth, “ACTually”) as part of legitimate MM characterisations, despite ACT’s tracking an independently recognised and coherent notion of actuality. In that case, AGM would be illegitimate in the MM setting, but, presumably, solely in virtue of its singling out a Troublemaker. The reasoning is this: MMI, MCP and ACT lead to an intolerable Troublemaker for MM. So fending off the Troublemaker requires giving up MMI, MCP or ACT. ACT, as such, isn’t given up. But “ACTually” can’t feature in a legitimate MM characterisation anyway, as, given MCP, a characterisation including it could yield a property set that, if instantiated by some object in every imagination-realising world, might lead to an object that’s existent in @ although it isn’t existent in @. The characterisation of being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain is a case in point. In making this precautionary move of forbidding that characterisations contain “ACTually”, then, M-Meinongians ensure that MCP needn’t world-relatively ascribe the so yielded properties to an object. So M-Meinongians effectively restrict MCP against the properties yielded by characterisations containing “ACTually”. But then, in virtue of yielding property sets that MCP can’t (or shouldn’t) handle, characterisations containing “ACTually” don’t single out unique objects in thought. So MMI must be restricted as well. So in acknowledging that MCP must be restricted against certain trouble-inducing properties, M-Meinongians are forced to give up a claim that Meinongians are strongly inclined to adhere to.

So if AGM is regarded as invoking a coherent and independently recognised notion of actuality, but rejected as singling out an object anyhow, this seems to
be so in virtue of the fact that MCP can’t (or shouldn’t) handle the property set yielded by AGM, \( P_{AGM} \). According to Beall, this (ad hoc) restriction cancels out one of MM’s key merits. Before examining the strategies that M-Meinongians can follow in order to adhere to MMI after all, let’s have a closer look at the seemingly problematic properties that \( P_{AGM} \) includes.

### 3.2 \@-Indexed Properties

In the preceding section, we’ve seen that some property sets can’t (or shouldn’t) be handled by MCP, which is why certain characterisations, which are otherwise legitimate, but which allegedly yield these property sets, are regarded as illegitimate and so don’t individuate objects. One of these property sets is the one yielded by the characterisation of being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain (AGM), \( P_{AGM} \). But which properties does \( P_{AGM} \) contain at all?

Beall himself briefly mentions world-indexed properties in the sense of Alvin Plantinga (1974, 62-65) as incorporating the notion of actuality that ACT is meant to track. According to Plantinga, a property \( P \) is world-indexed if there’s a property \( Q \) and a world \( w \) such that for every object \( o \) and world \( w’ \), \([o \text{ has } P \text{ in } w’ \text{ iff } o \text{ exists in } w’ \text{ and } o \text{ has } Q \text{ in } w]\) (Plantinga, 1974, 63). Of course, given MM, we need to delete the conjunct that \( o \text{ exists in } w’ \). Then, if we particularise the Plantingan MM-compatible characterisation of world-indexed properties to actual-world-indexed properties, we get:

\[
(\@IP) \text{ A property } P \text{ is } @-\text{indexed iff there’s a property } Q \text{ such that for every object } o \text{ and every world } w', \ [o \text{ has } P \text{ in } w' \text{ iff } o \text{ has } Q \text{ in } @].
\]

So AGM might be held to yield the property set \( P_{AGM} = \{\text{golden-mountainhood-in-@}\} \), where golden-mountainhood-in-@ is an @-indexed property, as there’s a property, golden mountainhood, such that for every object \( o \) and (AGM-imagination-realising) world \( w \), \( o \) has golden-mountainhood-in-@ in \( w \) iff \( o \) has golden mountainhood in @.

Now, if M-Meinongians hold on to MCP even if it can’t handle certain @-indexed properties, then, given that property sets including such properties are yielded by certain characterisations, these characterisations must be rejected.
as characterisations that single out objects, as nothing fulfils them in virtue of instantiating the members of the yielded property sets in all imagination-realising worlds. Taking this route seems ill-guided, though, not only because “then [MM] is forced to perform the very restrictions that it so admirably sought to avoid”, as we’ve seen in the preceding section, but also because, in engaging in certain kinds of fiction, we do seem to imagine objects that are just as they are according to such allegedly non-singling-out characterisations.

This leads us to the second version of the challenge from actuality, formulated by Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Sauchelli claims that some of the characterising properties attributed to fictional objects involve a reference to the world in which these objects have certain properties (Sauchelli, 2012, 139). That is, some fictional objects’ characterising properties are world-indexed properties. In particular, Sauchelli holds that some fictional objects are characterised as having @-indexed properties (Sauchelli, 2012, 141-2). Sauchelli provides the following example: a certain fictional character—call him “Travis”, from the film Taxi Driver—can be characterised as being-a-taxi-driver-in-@. Then, given MCP, we have, for every imagination-realising world w, w ⊩+ Travis is a-taxi-driver-in-@. But it seems plausible to hold that, for every world w, w ⊩+ Travis is a-taxi-driver-in-@ implies @ ⊩+ Travis is a taxi driver. So we have @ ⊩+ Travis is a taxi driver (Sauchelli, 2012, 142). But Travis, qua fictional character, doesn’t exist in @, and so can’t be a taxi driver in @.

To this, M-Meinongians might reply that the movie Taxi Driver doesn’t really characterise Travis as being a-taxi-driver-in-@, but as being a taxi driver simpliciter, while also characterising most other things in a way such that the characterised movie-world is in all relevant respects similar, but nevertheless non-identical, to @ (see Sauchelli, 2012, 144). Given that each world has exactly the same objects within its domain of quantification, namely the set of all objects whatsoever, according to this reply, the world characterised by Taxi Driver might be one in which, first, every object is the same object as it is in @ (see Berto, 2013b, 167-8), and, second, all but finitely many objects are exactly like they are in @.²

²In fact, we might say that some objects’ having different properties in the Taxi-Driver-world than they have in @ makes it so that the Taxi-Driver-world is nonactual. After all, nonactual
According to Sauchelli, this reply doesn’t evade the problem, however, as, first, in some works, objects are explicitly characterised as having some property in @ (Sauchelli, 2012, 144); and, second, the reply doesn’t do justice to the content that some works prescribe us to imagine. In particular, according to Sauchelli, many works prescribe us to imagine that certain events happen, states of affairs occur, and characters have the properties they’re characterised as having in @ (Sauchelli, 2012, 145), and this influences our way of characterising these characters outside of our engagement in the fiction. For example, consider a fictional character called “Sivart”, which, for every @-indexed property @P Travis is characterised as having, is characterised as having the corresponding non-@-indexed property P. Now, according to Sauchelli, Sivart seems to be different from Travis. Hence, given that characterised-as-being-thus-and-so properties don’t individuate objects, having certain @-indexed properties seems to be an essential feature of Travis, which he has in virtue of Taxi Driver’s prescribing us to imagine that the events represented take place in @, and not in some nonactual world(s) (Sauchelli, 2012, 145). So certain fictional objects that seem to be different from one another wouldn’t be different if @-indexed properties weren’t invoked in one of their respective characterisations, and thus wouldn’t feature in their respective individuation conditions.

So Sauchelli’s point is that in the case of fictional objects whose characterisations include reference to @-indexed properties, as invoked by many “realistic” fictions (like Taxi Driver, for example), the fictional objects have different characterisations, and so should be individuated differently, than fictional objects, like wizards or dragons, for example, whose characterisations derive from works that are much more “fantastical” (like Game of Thrones, for example), and in which what’s represented in the fiction can be regarded as being represented as true in some nonactual world(s) (Sauchelli, 2012, 144).³

³Essentially the same point can also be made by using a different kind of example. Say you’re reading an article that shows an actual photograph of what appears to be the Loch Ness Monster (e.g. Gander, 2014). Then, assuming that you take the article’s intention seriously for a moment, you formulate a characterisation that refers to the @-indexed properties of what worlds mustn’t be conceptualised as (spatiotemporally isolated) totalities of spatiotemporally isolated world-bound objects in the sense of Lewis (1986). Instead, they can just be conceptualised as another configuration of the totality of objects’ properties. So a nonactual world is represented as soon as some object is represented as having a different property than it has in @.
So where does this leave us with our choice between giving up MMI, MCP or ACT? Given the desideratum that fictional characters are often not the same when they’re not characterised as having certain @-indexed properties, giving up the allegedly trouble-inducing characterisations involving “ACTually” is a move M-Meinongians ought to resist. So M-Meinongians can hold on to MMI. But given further that characterisations involving “ACTually” yield property sets that include @-indexed properties, which differentiate fictional characters that are characterised as having @-indexed properties from those that aren’t so characterised, we’re stuck with @-indexed properties as part of our object-individuating property sets. But given MCP, @-indexed properties can’t generally feature in the object-individuating property sets, on pain of (actual) contradiction. This suggests that MCP, and so MM, is false.

In the following section, I shall make this reasoning precise by formulating the first argument from actuality against MM.

3.3 The First Argument From Actuality

Here’s the first argument from actuality against MM. First, given Beall’s and Sauchelli’s respective considerations, M-Meinongians have good reason to hold on to MMI. In particular, independently of the problems it might lead to, it should include AGM as a legitimate characterisation. So we have:

(P1) AGM individuates an object.

Next, we’ve assumed that every characterisation $C$ semantically yields a distinctive set of properties, $P_C$, and nothing else, which somehow features in the object’s individuation condition, i.e., the members of which are somehow had by the object singled out by $C$. So we have:

appears to be an object in the photograph, including existence-in-@. In this case, perhaps more so than in the case of certain fictions, @-indexed properties are essential for individuating the object in question, i.e., the Loch Ness Monster. I owe this kind of example to Christian Nimtz. I haven’t replaced the example in the main text because I’m not sure whether, in cases of really believing or asserting that something uniquely satisfies the characterisation of being the actually existent Loch Ness Monster, instead of just make-believing/imaging/pretending it, this really singles out a Meinongian object, instead of just singling out nothing at all. See Milne-Plückebaum (2015b) for an argument to the conclusion that psychology and pragmatics influence semantics in this way, at least in moral talk and thought.
(P2) AGM individuates an object only if AGM semantically yields a distinctive property set, \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \), and nothing else.

P1 and P2 entail:

(P3) AGM semantically yields \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \), and nothing else.

The following premise establishes the connection between MM and the CP that grounds it, i.e., MCP, according to which objects are individuated in terms of imagination-realising-world-indexed property instantiations:

(P4) MM implies MCP.

Applied to \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \), as yielded by AGM, we get:

(P5) MM implies that the object characterised as AGM instantiates every \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \) member in every AGM-imagination-realising world.

As we’ve seen, ACT is meant to capture the notion of actuality that the “actually” operator, as contained in AGM, is supposed to express. Supposedly, the notion in question coincides with Plantinga’s notion of @-indexed properties. So the following pair of premises, first, introduces an @-indexed property as a member of the AGM-yielded object-individuating property set \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \) and, second, establishes the Plantingan connection between instantiating an @-indexed property in a world and instantiating the corresponding non.@-indexed-property in @.

(P6) \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}} \) includes golden-mountainhood-in-@.

(P7) Any object instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in any world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

Finally, we have the following factual premise:

(P8) Nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

So given P6 and P7, MM implies a CP that has it that something instantiates a property in @ that nothing instantiates in @. Hence, we reach:

(C) MM is false.
Given that the argument is valid, in order to evade its conclusion, M-Meinongians must reject at least one of the argument’s main premises. Of these, P8 is fixed, given our knowledge of @; given (M)MI, P1 is fixed as well; and so is P4, given that it’s true by definition. Of the remaining premises, P2 follows from an implicit assumption that’s made by all Meinongians, but which may still be open to debate; finally, P6 and/or P7 might also be rejected, insofar as the route alluded to earlier is still open, according to which M-Meinongians can regard AGM as a legitimate characterisation, but regard ACT as incoherent, irrelevant or inadequate. Yet in following this route, M-Meinongians must provide a replacement for ACT that coherently tracks the notion of actuality that’s invoked in AGM. In the following chapter, I shall discuss, and ultimately reject, two attempts of doing so.
4 Defending Modal Meinongianism

In refuting the first argument from actuality, M-Meinongians adhere to MMI, MCP and P2. So they can reasonably refute:

(P6) \( P_{AGM} \) includes golden-mountainhood-in-@.

(P7) Any object instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in any world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

In this chapter, I’ll argue against two strategies for refuting either of these premises, as developed by Priest (2011) and Barz (2015), respectively. In arguing against these strategies, it will emerge that premise

(P2) AGM individuates an object only if AGM semantically yields a distinctive property set, \( P_{AGM} \), and nothing else

is false. Yet even so, the actually existent golden mountain still troubles MM. Given the falsity of P2, then, I will develop the final argument from actuality against MM. This argument, I claim, can only be evaded by extending MM, which I shall do in the next chapter.

So here’s how I’ll proceed. First, in section 4.1, I’ll present Priest’s official strategy for evading the first argument from actuality, which zeroes in on P7, and which I’ll reject for reasons that reveal that the argument needs to be reformulated. Then, in section 4.2, I’ll provide this required reformulation. Next, and given this new argument from actuality, I will, in section 4.3, present, and also reject, Barz’ two-dimensional strategy for evading it, which zeroes in on P6. Ultimately, the failure of both replies will leave the M-Meinongian with a seriously challenging final argument from actuality, which can, I think, be refuted only if they’re ready to reconceive the whole Modal Meinongian project. Finally, in section 4.4, I’ll formulate this argument.
4.1 Priest’s Official Reply

Graham Priest (2011) himself has formulated a reply to the first argument from actuality, which I shall spell out and evaluate in this section.¹ Once again, here’s the set-up.

Recall the characterisation that causes the M-Meinongian’s headaches, namely the characterisation of being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain (AGM). AGM contains a uniform actuality operator, the truth conditions of which are held to be the following:

\[(ACT)\] For every world \(w\), \([w \Vdash^+ \text{actually}(\varphi) \iff @ \Vdash^+ \varphi]\).

Given that every characterisation \(C\) singles out an object only if \(C\) semantically yields a property set, \(P_C\), but nothing else, AGM singles out an object only if AGM semantically yields a property set, \(P_{AGM}\), and nothing else. Further, given the notion of actuality that’s captured by ACT, it’s plausible to suppose that \(P_{AGM}\) includes an @-indexed property, where @-indexed properties are specified thus:

\[(@IP)\] A property \(P\) is @-indexed iff there’s a property \(Q\) such that for every object \(o\) and every world \(w'\), \([o \text{ has } P \text{ in } w' \iff o \text{ has } Q \text{ in } @]\).

Now, if \(P_{AGM}\) includes an @-indexed property that “bleed[s] back from an arbitrary world to the actual world” (Priest, 2011, 251; emphasis added), namely golden-mountainhood-in-@, then we can infer that something instantiates golden mountainhood in @. But nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @. So it’s not the case that \(P_{AGM}\) includes an @-indexed property that bleeds back from an arbitrary world to @. But this is exactly how @-indexed properties have been specified. So what has gone wrong?

According to Priest, to get to the bottom of the problem, we need only look at the truth conditions of sentences containing the necessity operator (“\(\Box\)”).

¹I call Priest’s reply “official”, as, first, it was formulated by the leading M-Meinongian and, second, it has since been treated as the definitive solution to the challenge from actuality: Berto (2013b, 171), for example, claims that “the solution to [Sauchelli’s version of the challenge from actuality] has already been pointed out by Priest” (emphasis added; see also Berto and Priest, 2014, 11-12, fn 10).
according to which, for every possible world, \([w \vDash^+ \Box(\varphi)] \text{ iff } \text{ for every possible world } w', w' \vDash^+ \varphi]\) (Priest, 2011, 250). In contrast, impossible worlds can have different necessary truths than possible worlds, as what’s necessarily true at an impossible world needn’t depend on what’s true at any possible world. So the truth conditions of “\(\Box\)”-sentences at impossible worlds must differ from their truth conditions at possible worlds (Priest, 2005, 85, fn 3). Given this non-uniform treatment of sentences containing a standard modal operator, Priest proposes that such a partitioning of worlds, and an assignment of different truth conditions to sentences as evaluated at worlds falling on either side of the divide, is to be implemented with respect to sentences containing the actuality operator as well. In general, according to Priest, given that we have impossible worlds at our disposal, we can never suppose that the truth conditions of non-atomic sentences are uniform across all worlds, possible and impossible, as the latter “can violate any constraint” (Priest, 2011, 251). In particular, then, ACT is to be replaced by:

\[(\text{ACT}') \quad \text{For every possible world } w, [w \vDash^+ \text{ actually(\varphi)}] \text{ iff } w \vDash^+ \varphi].\]

In contrast, at impossible worlds, “actually”-sentences behave like atomic sentences. So according to Priest, at impossible worlds, “actually”-sentences can be true independently of what’s true at any other world, including \(@\).²

To round out the official reply, we can say that Priest holds on to the thought that the property sets yielded by characterisations containing the actuality operator include \(@\)-indexed properties: in replying to Reicher’s claim that MM isn’t clear about which properties Meinongian objects instantiate in \(@\) (Reicher, 2014, fn 22), Priest holds that they can instantiate properties like \(\text{being-red-in-a-nonactual-world in @}\) (Priest, 2011, 250). \(A \text{ fortiori, given that nonactual-world-indexed properties are more controversial, qua properties, than @-indexed ones,}\)

²In replying to a different problem for MM, as advanced by Bob Hale (2007), Priest claims that an operator \(O\) isn’t \textit{ambiguous} if \(O\)-sentences have non-uniform truth conditions across possible and impossible worlds, respectively. With respect to “actually”-sentences in particular, we can express their truth conditions uniformly as: for every world \(w\), \([w \vDash^+ \text{ actually(\varphi)}] \text{ iff } [[w \text{ is a possible world and } @ \vDash^+ \varphi] \text{ or } [w \text{ is an impossible world and } w \vDash^+ \text{ actually(\varphi) }]]\). Moreover, given that we identify a sentence’s meaning with the proposition it expresses, if we regard the proposition expressed by a sentence \(\psi\) as the pair \(\langle [\psi]^+, [\psi]^\text{−} \rangle\), where \([\psi]^+\) is the set of worlds \(w\) such that \(w \vDash^+ \psi\), and \([\psi]^\text{−}\) the set of worlds \(w\) such that \(w \vDash^\text{−} \psi\), then “\text{actually(\varphi)}” expresses \(\langle \text{actually(\varphi)}^+, \text{actually(\varphi)}^\text{−}\rangle\) at every world (see Priest, 2011, 241).
Priest can be said to hold that actually nonexistent objects can instantiate @-indexed properties, at least in nonactual worlds. Now, this concession requires a replacement of @IP that matches ACT′, namely:

(@IP′) A property \( P \) is @-indexed iff there’s a property \( Q \) such that for every object \( o \) and every possible world \( w′ \), \( o \) has \( P \) in \( w′ \) iff \( o \) has \( Q \) in @.

So Priest holds on to P6, but, given the revised notion of the actuality operator in terms of ACT′, and the corresponding notion of @-indexed properties in terms of @IP′, replaces P7 by:

(P7′) An object instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in any possible world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

Given P7′, the first argument from actuality breaks down. We need only concede that the AGM-imagination-realising worlds in which the object characterised as AGM instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ are impossible worlds. Then nothing unwanted “bleeds back to the actual world”. Problem solved.

Upon closer inspection, however, the concession that the AGM-imagination-realising worlds in which the actually existent golden mountain instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ are impossible worlds reveals that both Priest’s reply and, in fact, the whole first argument from actuality are, or at least can be understood as being, entirely beside the point. To see why, it’s instructive to examine a concern about the official solution that doesn’t directly reveal its (potential) irrelevance to the real issue, but points us in the right direction.

Before developing his own reply to the argument from actuality, Wolfgang Barz (2015, 4) advances the following argument against Priest’s official reply:

(B1) An impossible world \( w \) can be such that, in \( w \), something instantiates golden mountainhood in @ only if \( w = @ \).

(B2) No impossible world \( w \) is such that \( w = @ \).

∴ (BC) No impossible world \( w \) is such that, in \( w \), something instantiates golden mountainhood in @.
As plausible as this argument may seem, before we can properly assess it, note that B1 has two readings, namely:

(B1’) An impossible world \( w \) can be such that, in \( w \), something, in \( @ \), instantiates golden mountainhood only if \( w = @ \).

(B1’’) An impossible world \( w \) can be such that, in \( w \), something instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ only if \( w = @ \).

Yet of these disambiguations, while B1’ is true, it doesn’t apply to Priest’s reply; and while B1’’ applies to Priest’s reply, it is false, as an impossible world \( w \) can surely be such that, in \( w \), something instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@, but without it also being the case that \( w = @ \), just as \( @ \) can be such that, in \( @ \), something instantiates being-a-wizard-in-harry-potter-worlds, but without it also being the case that \( @ \) is a Harry-Potter-world. So neither B1’ nor B1’’ can ground the case against Priest’s reply.

Instead, Priest’s reply faces the problem that any (impossible) world \( w \) such that, in \( w \), something instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@, but without its also being the case that \( w = @ \), isn’t (necessarily) a world that realises the situation about the object characterised as AGM. This is similar even for the object characterised as being such that, actually, it’s a granitic mountain: while \( @ \) realises the situation about the object envisaged, a nonactual world \( w \) such that, in \( w \), something instantiates granitic-mountainhood-in-@, isn’t (necessarily) imagination-realising. If such a world were imagination-realising, then, in the case of an object like Harry Potter, at least if it’s characterised as being such that, in Harry-Potter-worlds, it’s a wizard, which instantiates the property of being-a-wizard-in-harry-potter-worlds in \( @ \), \( @ \) would have to count as realising the situation about Harry Potter as well—against our intuitions. So given an object that’s characterised as being such that, actually, it’s \( P \), if a nonactual world \( w \) such that, in \( w \), something instantiates \( P \)-in-@ isn’t (necessarily) imagination-realising even if something instantiates \( P \) in \( @ \), then, a fortiori, a nonactual world \( w \) such that, in \( w \), something instantiates \( P \)-in-@ isn’t (necessarily) imagination-realising.
realising if *nothing* instantiates $P$ in $@$; *a fortiori*, I suppose, for an *impossible* world of this kind.\(^3\)

So far, I kept saying that certain worlds needn’t *necessarily* be imagination-realising, as I want to leave open the possibility that for some objects, whose characterisations explicitly refer to $@$-indexed properties, as in *being such that it instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-$@$* ($GM@$, for short), or for some imaginers, these worlds realise the situation about the object envisaged. Yet I for one must admit that, in imagining the object characterised as AGM (or GM@), I can’t do so without also imagining its instantiating golden mountainhood in $@$. But that doesn’t mean that no such imagination succeeds: perhaps Priest’s imaginative capacities far outreach my own.

So as we’ve seen, while $B1''$ applies to Priest’s reply, it’s false. But anyhow, Priest’s reply refutes the first argument from actuality only insofar as, in individualising the object characterised as AGM, it yields an object that instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-$@$ only in impossible worlds that aren’t (necessarily) AGM-imagination-realising. Ultimately, then, we can say that Priest relies on a technical loophole that’s (potentially) irrelevant to the real issue. In breaking the link between an object’s instantiating golden-mountainhood-in-$@$ in a world and its instantiating golden mountainhood in $@$, even if only for impossible worlds, Priest involuntarily reveals that golden-mountainhood-in-$@$ isn’t (necessarily) the property we imagine the object characterised as AGM as having in the first place. So while Priest’s $P7'$ might be true, the impossible worlds it forces upon us as worlds in which the object characterised as AGM instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-$@$ aren’t (necessarily) the worlds required by MCP. So we must concede that there’s another understanding of AGM ($\neq GM@$; henceforth, just $AGM_1$) that induces another argument from actuality that isn’t even touched upon by Priest’s reply. In fact, this new argument from actuality is alluded to by $B1'$, which, while true, doesn’t apply to Priest’s reply.

In the next section, I’ll formulate the new argument from actuality.

\(^3\)Similarly, to use a world-independent example, when I imagine that it’s raining in Bielefeld, an imagination-realising place isn’t (necessarily) some place $p$ other than Bielefeld such that, in $p$, it’s true that it’s raining in Bielefeld, even if it *were* raining in Bielefeld. So *a fortiori*, a place in which it’s true that it’s raining in Bielefeld, although it *isn’t* even raining in Bielefeld, wouldn’t (necessarily) be an imagination-realising place.
4.2 The New Argument From Actuality

In refuting Priest’s official reply to the first argument from actuality, we’ve seen that golden-mountainhood-in-@ isn’t (necessarily) the property we imagine the object characterised as AGM as having in the first place. Let AGM be an understanding of AGM that isn’t instantiating golden-mountainhood-in-@ (GM@). This leads to a new argument from actuality, which can be formulated thus:

Straightforwardly, we have:

(P1’) AGM individuates an object: the actually existent golden mountain.

(P2’) AGM individuates the actually existent golden mountain only if AGM semantically yields a distinctive property set, $P_{AGM}$, and nothing else.

∴ (P3’) AGM semantically yields $P_{AGM}$, and nothing else [from P1’-2’].

(P4) MM implies MCP.

∴ (P5’) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in all and only AGM-imagination-realising worlds [from P3’-4].

Given that AGM $\neq$ GM@, $P_{AGM}$ doesn’t include only golden-mountainhood-in-@. So MM opponents must ask what other property set AGM yields—in virtue of which the object so characterised is individuated by MCP, but such that, problematically, the only imagination-realising world can be @. Specifically, MM opponents might try $P_{AGM} = \{ \text{golden mountainhood} \}$, as we just imagine the actually existent golden mountain as instantiating golden mountainhood simpliciter in the only imagination-realising world, @. Yet if $P_{AGM} = \{ \text{golden mountainhood} \}$, then, given that AGM doesn’t yield anything else—in particular, no condition as to the world(s) in which every $P_{AGM}$ members is instantiated—, how can it be guaranteed that the object characterised as AGM can instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member only in @? If this can’t be guaranteed, then the actually existent golden mountain is identical to the golden mountain, which isn’t the case, though (recall Sauchelli’s argumentation). So MM opponents must specify $P_{AGM}$ such that (i) golden mountainhood $\in P_{AGM}$, but (ii) $P_{AGM} \neq \{ \text{golden mountainhood} \}$, (iii) $P_{AGM} \neq \{ \text{golden
MOUNTAINHOOD, GOLDEN-MOUNTAINHOOD-IN-@], and (iv) any world in which an object instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member realises the situation about the actually existent golden mountain. But, the new argument from actuality continues, the only world in which some object can instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member is @, in which nothing instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member, however. So no world is AGM$_2$-imagination-realising.

(P6') $P_{AGM}$ fulfils conditions i-iv.

(P7'') The actually existent golden mountain can instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member only in @ (i.e., only @ can be AGM$_2$-imagination-realising).

(P8') Nothing instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in @ (i.e., @ isn’t AGM$_2$-imagination-realising).

∴ (P9) No world is AGM$_2$-imagination-realising (i.e., the set of AGM$_2$-imagination-realising-worlds is $\emptyset$) [from P6'-8'].

So no world $w$ is AGM$_2$-imagination-realising and such that the actually existent golden mountain doesn’t instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member in $w$. So it’s (vacuously) true that the actually existent golden mountain instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in all and only AGM$_2$-imagination-realising worlds.

Now, problematically, essentially the same argument can be formulated for the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat, say (APC, for short). It yields the conclusion that no world is APC-imagination-realising. But then no world $w$ is APC-imagination-realising and such that the actually existent philosophising cat doesn’t instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member in $w$. So it’s (vacuously) true that the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates every

$^4$Alternatively, the Modal CP might have been formulated as follows:

(MCP') For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising worlds, but at least in one world.

In following this route, we’re basically back at the original argument from actuality, except that the detour through @-indexed properties isn’t taken: that is, if we replace P4 by

(P4') MM implies MCP',

we have: P1'; P2'; P4'; P6'; P7''; P8' $\models C$. 


$\mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}}$, member in all and only APC-imagination-realising-worlds. Moreover, of course, the set of AGM$_{-}$-imagination-realising worlds is identical to the set of APC-imagination-realising worlds. So it’s also (vacuously) true that the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates every $\mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}}$, member in all and only AGM$_{-}$-imagination-realising worlds. But then the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat share an individuation condition. So they’re the same object, or at least there’s no principled way of telling which one we’re picking out when we’re formulating either characterisation. But Meinongians want to say that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are different objects. And they want to be able to tell which one is singled out if either characterisation is used, and why. All in all, then, if MM opponents succeed in specifying $\mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}}$, such that i-iv are fulfilled, then M-Meinongians are forced to concede that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are the same object; yet they can’t accept this; so MM is false.

So we have:

$\therefore$ (P10) Given MM, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates every $\mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}}$, member in all and only AGM$_{-}$-imagination-realising worlds [from P9].

$\therefore$ (P11) Given MM, the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates every $\mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}}$, member in all and only AGM$_{-}$-imagination-realising worlds [from a structurally identical argument to the one from P1’-9 and the fact that the set of AGM-imagination-realising worlds and the set of APC-imagination-realising-worlds are identical.]

$\therefore$ (P12) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are identical [from P5’, P10 and P11].

(P13) The actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are not identical.

$\therefore$ (C) MM is false [from P12-13].
Now, can M-Meinongians refute this new argument from actuality? And if so, how? In the next section, I’ll examine a strategy that essentially amounts to getting ahead of the MM opponent in specifying $P_{AGM}$, but such that both P6’ and non-P7”. Moreover, according to this strategy, some worlds are AGM$_7$-imagination-realising (but, given P8’, none of these is @). So P9 is false. Further, given that in all AGM$_7$-realising worlds, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member, but that some worlds are AGM$_7$-imagination-realising, P10 is true, but not vacuously so. But according to this strategy, P11 comes out as false, as desired. So P12 doesn’t follow. So according to this strategy, MM doesn’t yield the unwanted consequence that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are the same object.

4.3 Barz’ Two-Dimensional Reply

Despite Priest’s best efforts, AGM still troubles MM, but only if it isn’t understood as GM@, as GM@ yields \{golden-mountainhood-in-@\}, which is either irrelevant or unproblematic for MM. Instead, MM opponents hold that AGM can be understood differently—as AGM$_7$, for now—, yielding a different property set, $P_{AGM}$, and nothing else. But then MM opponents must specify $P_{AGM}$ such that (i) golden mountainhood $\in P_{AGM}$, (ii) $P_{AGM} \neq \{\text{golden mountainhood}\}$, (iii) $P_{AGM} \neq \{\text{golden mountainhood, golden-mountainhood-in-@}\}$, and (iv) any world in which an object instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member realises the situation about the object characterised as AGM$_7$. So they hold:

(P6’) $P_{AGM}$ fulfils conditions i-iv.

But given P6’, MM opponents also hold:

(P7’’) The actually existent golden mountain can instantiate every $P_{AGM}$ member only in @ (i.e., only @ can be AGM$_7$-imagination-realising).

So given that nothing instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in @, in the MM framework, either AGM$_7$ doesn’t individuate an object in virtue of yielding $P_{AGM}$, and nothing else, or, if it does, AGM$_7$ yields the same object as the
characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat, say, which is unacceptable. So the only way out for M-Meinongians seems to lie in refuting \( P7'' \), despite conceding that \( \text{AGM}_7 \) yields a property set \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}_7} \) such that \( P6' \). Now, in my view, Barz (2015) can be regarded as proposing exactly this: implicitly at least, he specifies \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{AGM}_7} \) such that both \( P6' \) and non-\( P7'' \). In this section, I will examine Barz’ proposal.\(^5\)

Barz begins with the observation that \( \text{AGM}_7 \)'s actuality operator, understood as equivalent to “in the actual world”, contains an indexical rigid designator (Barz, 2015, 5): just as in the cases of “here” and “now”, for example, the referent of “the actual world” can shift from context to context in which the designator is used (see Braun, 2015). In particular, “the actual world” depends for its referent on the world \( w \) in which it’s being used as a designator for \( w \). If a world other than \( @ \) were actual—\( w_1 \), say—, then “the actual world”, as used by a \( w_1 \)-inhabitant, would rigidly designate not \( @ \), but \( w_1 \). So the referent of “the actual world” depends not only on the world in which it’s evaluated, where the referent, whichever it is, remains constant across (possible) worlds, but also on the world \( w \) in which it’s being used as a designator for \( w \) in the first place. To see how this works, let’s look at a so-called two-dimensional (2D) matrix for the sentence “Something is \( \text{AGM}_7 \)”:

\[
(\text{AGM}_7\text{-2D})
\begin{array}{ccc}
@ & w_1 & w_2 \\
@ & false & false & false \\
w_1 & true & true & true \\
w_2 & true & true & true
\end{array}
\]

In a 2D matrix, the worlds as listed in the top line, said to be “considered as counterfactual”, are those in which a given sentence is evaluated, from the standpoint of the world whose respective line we’re looking at. The world-lines capture the dependence and variation of a sentence’s truth-value on how the respective worlds considered as counterfactual are like. In contrast, the worlds as listed in the left column, said to be “considered as actual”, are those from which we’re looking at worlds in order to evaluate a sentence. They specify

\[^5\text{My presentation of Barz' reply deviates quite considerably from his own, so that it fits into the argument developed thus far.}\]
what proposition a sentence expresses in the first place, and so are regarded as a second set of parameters on which a sentence’s truth-value depends, and given which it can vary. So according to 2D semantics, a sentence S’s truth value in a world w, considered as counterfactual, depends both on what the facts are in w and on the proposition expressed by S, which, in turn, depends on what the linguistic/intentional facts are in the world w′ considered as actual, i.e., the world w′ relative to which w is considered as counterfactual (or factual, if w = w′) at all (see Nimtz, 2007, 4).

In AGM₁-2D, let the relevant nonlinguistic/-intentional facts as they hold in three out of an uncountably infinite set of worlds be the following: in @, nothing is a golden mountain; in w₁, something is a golden mountain (let it be an object that’s Mount Everest in @); and in w₂, something is a golden mountain, too (let it be an object that’s nonexistent in @). Now, the referent of “the actual world” depends on the world w in which it’s being used as a designator for w. And an indexical sentence containing “the actual world” depends for its truth value assignments against the background of different facts on the proposition expressed by it, which, in turn, depends on the referent of “the actual world” (see Nimtz, 2007, 4). So given the nonlinguistic/-intentional facts as they hold in different worlds, “Something is AGM₁” is false in every world considered as (counter-)factual if the world considered as actual is @ (where “the actual world” refers to @, which carries over to every world considered as counterfactual); but if the world considered as actual is w₁ [w₂] (where “the actual world” refers to w₁ [w₂], which carries over to every world considered as counterfactual), then “Something is AGM₁” is true in every world considered as (counter-)factual.

Coming back to the new argument from actuality, if we focus only on the @-line, which, given that the 2D framework hasn’t so far been presupposed, we’ve implicitly done all along, then, however far we’d extend AGM₁-2D to the right, we wouldn’t find an AGM₁-imagination-realising world in which “Something is AGM₁” is true. But given the 2D framework, there’s more to consider: we need an AGM₁-2D element that contains “true” and that represents an AGM₁-imagination-realising world. Just settling on an arbitrary element of one of the other world-lines doesn’t work, though, as all but one of the respective line-worlds aren’t AGM₁-imagination-realising: a world that realises
the situation about the object characterised as AGM\(_7\) must be the actual world, and not a counterfactual world in which a sentence is true. So in the \(w_1\)-line, for example, the only imagination-realising world is \(w_1\), as \(w_1\) both contains a golden mountain and is the world considered as actual.

Yet given that my imagination is very unspecific, as I imagine only the object characterised as AGM\(_7\), it’s counterintuitive to single out just one world. Instead, given these provisos, Barz proposes to look at AGM\(_7\)-2D’s (top left to bottom right) diagonal in order to reach a multitude of imagination-realising worlds, as \(w_2\), considered as actual and as the world of evaluation, realises my imagination of the object characterised as AGM\(_7\) just as well as \(w_1\), similarly considered; and while some worlds do realise my imagination of the object characterised as AGM\(_7\) (Barz, 2015, 6), @ doesn’t, as desired.

The guiding intuition behind this reply is that “when an agent characterizes an object as [AGM\(_7\)], she imagines herself at centre stage, surrounded by [golden mountains]” (Barz, 2015, 5-6). And indeed, this kind of imagination seems to be modelled appropriately within the 2D framework. Given the assumption that AGM\(_7\) yields only a property set \(P_{AGM}\), such that every \(P_{AGM}\) member is instantiated by some object in every AGM\(_7\)-imagination-realising world, Barz’ AGM\(_7\)-imagination-realising worlds, represented by certain of AGM\(_7\)-2D’s diagonal elements, must be such that something instantiates the properties included in \(P_{AGM}\) in them. Given the above intuition, we might include being related by \(R\) to the imaginer, where \(R\) is a relation that’s existence-entailing for both of its relata (like being spatiotemporally related to), and being such that the imaginer experiences her surroundings from within\(^6\) alongside golden mountainhood. So P6’ becomes:

\[\text{(P6’)} \quad P_{AGM}\text{ includes golden mountainhood, being } R\text{-related to the imaginer,}
\]

where \(R\) is existence-entailing for both of its relata, and being such that the imaginer experiences her surroundings from within.

\(^6\)The latter property can be regarded as derivable from certain fictional truths about oneself, namely those generated by one’s self-imaginings, which Walton (1990) calls instances of “imagining de se”, whereby one imagines something from the inside, as “doing or experiencing something (or being a certain way)” (Walton, 1990, 29).
So given the 2D move of allowing worlds to be considered as actual, and not just as counterfactual, from which P6’’ can be suitably derived, P7’’ is false, as it’s not the case that an object can instantiate every \( P_{AGM} \) member only in \@. Instead, an object can instantiate every \( P_{AGM} \) member in every world that’s both considered as actual and such that the relevant facts hold in it. So the new argument from actuality against MM breaks down.

Unfortunately, however, like Priest’s reply to the first argument from actuality, Barz’ reply to the new argument, while suitable in some cases, just isn’t far-reaching enough. Given that AGM mustn’t be understood in terms of GM@, Barz claims that, in grasping AGM?, i.e., an AGM understanding other than GM@, we should take the actuality operator’s indexicality into account. Then, by using the 2D framework, we can specify a property set \( P_{AGM} \) such that P6”, in which case \( P_{AGM} \)’s members are instantiated by the object characterised as AGM? in certain “diagonal” worlds, which are (considered as) actual, but without being identical to @. So AGM? individuates an object in virtue of yielding a property set that’s suitably handled by MCP. Yet while this works for some cases, AGM? mustn’t be understood in this 2D way, either. Instead, AGM? can be understood as instantiating-in-@ golden mountainhood (@GM, for short), or, in other words, as being an x such that @ ⊩ x is a golden mountain. Then, finally, any world w that realises the situation about the object characterised as @GM must be @, in which the object instantiates golden mountainhood simpliciter. But given that nothing instantiates golden mountainhood simpliciter in @, we’re back at where we started.

This result matches the intuition that a 2D individuation of the object characterised as AGM? might exceed what its imaginers really imagine. Given the 2D framework, characterisations containing “actually” can be regarded as involving reference to worlds in which both the imaginer as well as the object so characterised exist. Yet in imagining the object characterised as AGM?, it doesn’t seem necessary to imagine a golden mountain that also instantiates a doubly-existence-entailing relation to oneself; instead, one might just imagine this world, @, as being such that it contains a golden mountain, and not some nonactual world that contains a golden mountain and myself. Moreover, I can imagine, of @, that it contains a golden mountain, but not myself as existent.
So there seem to be two relevant kinds of imagination: first, I can imagine myself as existing in a nonactual world in which something is a golden mountain, which is an instance of *de se* imagination; second, I can imagine *this* world, @, as containing a golden mountain, which is an instance of *de re* imagination, but without also being *de se*.

So while Barz’ reply to the new argument from actuality is superior to Priest’s, insofar as it doesn’t merely exploit a technical loophole, it also falls short of our imaginative capacities, as it provides us with imagination-realising worlds only in some cases of what we might imagine in imagining the object characterised as AGM. Specifically, in cases of imagining the object characterised as @GM, @ definitely is the only world that can realise the situation about the object envisaged, and so can’t be explained away. Ultimately, then, Barz is unsuccessful in refuting the new argument from actuality.

Given the failure of both Priest’s reply to the first as well as Barz’ reply to the new argument from actuality, as we can formulate a characterisation that remains trouble-inducing for either accommodation strategy, i.e., @GM, I will, in the next section, formulate the final argument from actuality against MM.

### 4.4 The Final Argument From Actuality

According to the first argument from actuality against MM, the property set yielded by the characterisation of *being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain* (AGM) includes golden-mountainhood-in-@, which an object instantiates in *any* world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @; as no object instantiates golden mountainhood in @, though, either MM, according to which the object so characterised instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in all AGM-imagination-realising worlds, or the claim that AGM individuates an object is false. To defend MM and MMI against the first argument from actuality, we’ve seen that Priest denies that an object’s instantiating golden-mountainhood-

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7Employing the terminology of Walton (1993), we can say that the prop fictionally described by invoking the golden mountain fiction is @ itself. In engaging in this world-oriented game of make-believe, this fiction is the frame in terms of which the actually golden-mountain-less world is regarded (see Yablo, 2005, 98, for a discussion of mathematics as a world-oriented game of make-believe).
in-@ in an impossible world implies its instantiating golden mountainhood in @. Yet we’ve also seen that breaking the link between an object’s instantiating golden-mountainhood-in-@ and its instantiating golden mountainhood in @ reveals that, in imagining the object in question, we don’t necessarily imagine it as instantiating golden-mountainhood-in-@ at all, at least not if the worlds in which it instantiates this property are nonactual. In some cases of imagining the object characterised as AGM, then, the only imagination-realising world can be @.

Taking over, the new argument from actuality has it that AGM, understood differently, yields a property set that fulfils certain conditions, but that any object can instantiate each of its properties only in @; but given that no object instantiates each property so specified in @, either MM or the claim that AGM, rightly understood, individuates an object must be false. Specifically, if AGM, rightly understood, is held to individuate an object, then MM must be regarded as false, as it implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are the very same object, which, according to Meinongians, they clearly aren’t.

To defend both MM and MMI, we’ve seen that Barz denies that the members of the property set yielded by AGM, rightly understood, can be instantiated by some object only in @, which requires conceding that the object in question has certain additional properties we don’t necessarily imagine it as having, and that the imagination-realising worlds, while considered as actual, are nevertheless nonidentical to @. Yet we’ve also seen that in some cases of imagining the object characterised as AGM, the only imagination-realising world can be @. Specifically, the truly problem-inducing characterisation is instantiating-in-@ golden mountainhood (@GM).

To see the M-Meinongian’s problem as induced by @GM, note, first, that @GM isn’t problematic for other non-naive Meinongians: R-Meinongians can say (i) that @GM yields the nuclear property set {golden mountainhood, nuclear existence}, exactly each member of which is instantiated by the actually existent golden mountain in @, (ii) that the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat yields the nuclear property set {being a philosophising cat, nuclear existence}, exactly each member of which is instantiated by
the actually existent philosophising cat in @, and (iii) that these objects are clearly non-identical. Similarly, D-Meinongians can say (i) that @GM yields the property set \{golden mountainhood, existence\}, exactly each member of which is encoded by the actually existent golden mountain in @, (ii) that the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat yields the property set \{being a philosophising cat, existence\}, exactly each member of which is encoded by the actually existent philosophising cat in @, and (iii) that these objects are clearly non-identical. So these Meinongians can adhere to the claim that @GM and the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat yield certain property sets, and nothing else, which are then handed over to RCP or DCP, respectively, which, in turn, yield different individuation conditions, respectively.

For M-Meinongians, on the other hand, the “in w”-part is just what’s contributed to an object’s individuation condition by MCP, and isn’t held fixed (on @), as by the other CPs. So incorporating information about the world in which properties are instantiated into a characterisation interferes with the workings of MCP, which, like the other CPs, is tailored to take property sets, and nothing else, and to deliver individuation conditions according to which objects somehow/somewhere have the properties, somehow conceived, within these sets. So either M-Meinongians can find a @GM-yielded property set such that MCP can handle it differently than the property set yielded by the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat, or MCP isn’t extensive enough to deal with certain characterisations that aren’t problematic for other Meinongians. Yet I suspect that all attempts of specifying a property set \(P_{\text{@GM}}\) such that MCP can deliver an individuation condition for the actually existent golden mountain that’s different from the individuation condition for the actually existent philosophising cat will suffer from the same inadequacies as Priest’s and Barz’ respective attempts: the worlds, which must be nonactual to avoid factual falsity, won’t be imagination-realising. The only world that can realise the situation about the object characterised as @GM is @, and there’s no room for M-Meinongians to wriggle out of this concession.

To see what M-Meinongians can do now, even when they concede that @ can be the only world that realises the situation about the object characterised as
@GM, I shall now formulate the final argument from actuality against MM and then single out the premise(s) that M-Meinongians might reasonably reject.

First, given MMI, and given that @GM isn’t problematic for R- or D-Meinongians, we have:

**(P1’’)** @GM individuates an object: the actually existent golden mountain.

Now, as I’ve argued in the preceding sections, @GM doesn’t, like GM@ or the 2D understanding of AGM, yield only a set of properties. Instead,

**(P2’’)** given MM, @GM individuates an object only if @GM semantically yields a distinctive property set, $P_{@GM}$ ($=$ \{	ext{golden mountainhood}\}), and a distinctive world set, $W_{@GM}$ ($=$ \{[@]\}).

That is, @GM yields not only a set of properties, such that each of its members is instantiated by the actually existent golden mountain in every @GM-imagination-realising world, but also a set of worlds, such that only each of its members can serve as @GM-imagination-realising worlds in the first place.

P1’’ and P2’’ entail:

**(P3’’)** Given MM, @GM yields \{	ext{golden mountainhood}\} and \{[@]\}.

Next, we have:

**(P4**) MM implies MCP.

Naturally, MM opponents hold that the following premise follows from P3’’ and P4:

**(P5’’)** MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be \{[@]\} members.

But of course, we still have the following factual premise:

**(P8**) Nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @.
So we have:

∴ (P9′) No world is @GM-imagination-realising [from P8].

∴ (P10′) Given MM, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates golden

  mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds [from 
P9′].

Similarly, a structurally identical argument, together with the fact that the
set of @GM-imagination-realising worlds and the set of worlds that realise the
imagination of the actually existent philosophising cat are identical, yields:

∴ (P11′) Given MM, the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates golden

  mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds.

Problematically, then, the argument continues as follows:

∴ (P12) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually

  existent philosophising cat are identical [from P5″, P10′ and P11′].

(P13) The actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosoph-

  ising cat aren’t identical.

∴ (C) MM is false [from P12-13].

This argument, finally, seems to bring MM to its knees; for how can M-
Meinongians possibly refute any of its premises? P4 and P8 seem irrefutable for
definitional and factual reasons, respectively; and assuming that M-Meinongians
can’t find only a property set \( P_{@GM} \) such that some object instantiates every \( P_{@GM} \)
member in genuinely @GM-imagination-realising nonactual worlds, P2″ is true;
moreover, M-Meinongians don’t want to reject P1″ or P13, as that would make
MM less extensive than other versions. Yet in the following chapter, I’ll show
that, despite appearances, one of these premises is false after all; and, to try
the MM opponent’s patience sorely, I shall suggest that it’s perhaps the most
unlikely candidate of them all.

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5 Extending Modal Meinongianism

In refuting the final argument from actuality, M-Meinongians adhere to MCP and MMI. In particular, they hold that the characterisation of instantiating-in-@ golden mountainhood (@GM) individuates an object. Yet we’ve seen that @GM individuates an object only if @GM semantically yields {golden mountainhood} and {@}. But then, MM opponents claim, MCP yields the following individuation condition for the actually existent golden mountain: the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be elements of {@}. But given that no world (of {@}) is @GM-imagination-realising, and equally so for the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat, it’s not only (vacuously) true that the actually existent golden mountain instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, but also that the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds. So MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are identical, which is clearly false. And so MM is false.

Although the final argument from actuality seems devastating, I will, in this chapter, refute it. In doing so, I shall finally extend MM, which results in what I call Extended Modal Meinongianism. Specifically, I’ll proceed as follows. First, in section 5.1, I’ll argue that the final argument from actuality rests on two false presuppositions, the first of which simply makes the argument invalid. But even when the argument is suitably repaired, by reformulating one of its premises, the second false presupposition shows that the reformulated premise is simply false. Departing from this false premise, I’ll suggest how it can be suitably replaced, by formulating an additional Modal CP, MCP+, which will indeed have it that the actually existent golden mountain instantiates golden mountainhood in @. So of the final argument from actuality’s premises, I’ll reject what’s perhaps the most unlikely candidate, namely

(P8) Nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @.
Yet of course, even though I reject P8, I still hold that the actually existent golden mountain is a Meinongian object. So as much as we might like to, we still can’t bump into it. The key to this strategy is that unlike MCP, MCP+ incorporates not just a single plurality of worlds, but a whole plurality of pluralities of worlds. The actually existent golden mountain, then, instantiates GOLDEN MOUNTAINHOOD in @ in all and only @GM-imagination-realising pluralities of worlds, among which the actual plurality of worlds isn’t to be found. Given this prima facie outrageous proposal, I shall spend the rest of this chapter defending it against four objections, which we’ve already encountered in the discussion of R- and D-Meinongianism. Specifically, in section 5.2, I’ll argue that my proposal is neither ontologically extravagant nor collapses into either Nonactualism or Abstractualism. Then, in section 5.3, I’ll spell out what’s required in order to say that the actually existent golden mountain actually exists, but is different from the actually existent philosophising cat. Next, in section 5.4, I’ll argue that MCP+ isn’t imagination-diverting. Finally, in section 5.5, I’ll show that the pluralities of worlds invoked in MCP+ aren’t mysterious.

5.1 Adding a Characterisation Principle

The final argument from actuality rests on two false presuppositions. The first false presupposition is that MCP, i.e.,

(MCP) for every characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only C-imagination-realising worlds,

can somehow handle property sets and world sets at all. That is, the first false presupposition is that MCP can turn property sets and world sets into objects’ individuation conditions, such as the one formulated in

(P5″) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates GOLDEN MOUNTAINHOOD in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be [@] members.
Most apparently, this is technically not kosher: just like the other Meinongian CPs, MCP has been built to take property sets, and nothing else, and then to yield objects’ individuation conditions on the basis of these sets. In particular, MCP does so by ascribing these properties to objects in a world-relative way. So the worlds aren’t part of MCP’s input, but part of its output: given some characterisation \( C \), via the property set yielded by \( C, P_C \), MCP provides both \( C \)-imagination-realising worlds and a unique object that’s suitably spread out over these worlds, in that it instantiates every \( P_C \) member in all and only \( C \)-imagination-realising worlds. So if some characterisation \( C \), such as \(@GM\), contains a world-reference, and so yields not only a set of properties, but also a set of worlds, then it’s entirely unclear how MCP is supposed to turn these two sets into an object’s individuation condition, as every MCP-yielded individuation condition effectively provides imagination-realising worlds in the first place. So in formulating the individuation condition for the actually existent golden mountain, as featured in P5’’, MM opponents have already implicitly appealed to another Modal CP. But then P5’’ simply doesn’t follow from

\((P3’’)\) Given MM, \(@GM\) yields \{golden mountainhood\} and \{\(@\)\}

and

\((P4)\) MM implies MCP,

as MCP can’t handle \{golden mountainhood\} and \{\(@\)\}, and so can’t serve as the required link between P3’’ and P5’’. Instead, P5’’ can only follow from P3’’ and

\((P4’)\) MM implies MCP’ and MCP’+,

where MCP’+ is another Modal CP, which individuates objects on the basis of world-involving characterisations, and MCP’ differs from MCP insofar as MCP’ is restricted to non-world-involving characterisations. That is, we have

\((MCP’)\) for every non-world-involving characterisation \( C \), \( C \) semantically yields a set of properties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) such that an object \( o \), and only \( o \), instantiates the properties that follow from \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) in all and only \( C \)-imagination-realising worlds.
So what’s the formulation of MCP\(^+\) that, together with P3”’, yields P5”’? MM opponents might try the following:

(MCP\(^+\)) For every world-involving characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\) and a set of worlds \(w_1, \ldots, w_m\) such that an object \(o\), and only \(o\), instantiates the properties that follow from \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\) in all and only C-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be worlds from \(w_1, \ldots, w_m\).

Now, the relevant question becomes: is MCP\(^+\) plausible? In the rest of this section, I shall suggest that it’s not, as it rests on the second false presupposition—which, in fact, Priest and Barz have also fallen victim to.

To see the problem, consider other world-involving characterisations: being a necessarily existent golden mountain, being a possible round square or being a philosophising cat in every dogless world. According to MCP\(^+\), each of these characterisations C yields a property set, \(\mathcal{P}_C\), and a set of worlds, \(\mathcal{W}_C\), such that an object instantiates every \(\mathcal{P}_C\) member in all and only C-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be \(\mathcal{W}_C\) members. But this presupposes that anything is imagination-realising in the case of such characterisations only if it’s a world. Yet how could any single world realise my imagination of the necessarily existent golden mountain, for example? I must, in order to imagine this object, imagine what all other (possible) worlds are like. Or consider the possible round square. In order to imagine it, I don’t merely imagine the round square, but also the world(s) in which it’s round and square: these are possible worlds, and so I’m additionally required to imagine that the set of all worlds is differently partitioned into sets of possible and impossible worlds than it actually is. Finally, consider the philosophising cat in dogless worlds. In order to imagine it, I must imaginatively spread out all worlds in front of me, pick out all and only dogless worlds, and imagine that the object in question is a philosophising cat in all of these. So all of these characterisations trigger an irreducibly modal imagination. And such imaginations can’t be realised by mere worlds, each of which would have to be fully imagination-realising, but can only be realised by whole pluralities of worlds. And so MCP\(^+\), according to which only worlds qualify for the role of imagination-realisers, is false.
I suggest that the key to formulating MCP\textsuperscript{+}, which takes property sets and world sets, and returns plausible individuation conditions on their (combined) basis, lies in the simple idea of essentially repeating, albeit on a higher level, what M-Meinongians do in order to accommodate the existent golden mountain. Recall: M-Meinongians don’t rely on a surrogate property of existence, nuclear existence, or on a surrogate relation of the relation of property-instantiation, property-encoding, in order to say that the existent golden mountain nevertheless “has” the property of “existence”; instead, they claim that in saying that the existent golden mountain doesn’t exist, we’re implicitly saying that the existent golden mountain doesn’t exist \textit{in @}. Then, given that the existent golden mountain doesn’t exist \textit{in @}, although it’s characterised as existent, M-Meinongians relocate the object’s instantiation of existence to imagination-realising nonactual worlds. So instead of asking “\textit{Does the existent golden mountain exist?}”, and then going on to specify the sense in which the existent golden mountain does indeed “have” “existence”, M-Meinongians ask “\textit{Where does the existent golden mountain exist?}” and then simply go on to answer: “\textit{In imagination-realising nonactual worlds!}”

Similarly, the actually existent golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ \textit{golden mountainhood}, although it’s characterised as \textit{instantiating-in-@ golden mountainhood}. But in order to accommodate the actually existent golden mountain anyway, essentially the same two-step strategy can be applied: in saying that the actually existent golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ \textit{golden mountainhood}, I claim that we’re implicitly saying that the object so characterised doesn’t instantiate-in-@ \textit{golden mountainhood in the actual plurality of worlds}. Then, given that the actually existent golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ \textit{golden mountainhood} in the actual plurality of worlds, although it’s characterised as \textit{instantiating-in-@ golden mountainhood}, we can just relocate the object’s instantiating-in-@ \textit{golden mountainhood} to @GM-imagination-realising nonactual pluralities of worlds. So just as M-Meinongians ask “\textit{Where does the existent golden mountain exist?}”, which is answered by “\textit{In imagination-realising worlds!}”, adherents of Extended MM ask “\textit{Where does the actually existent golden mountain actually exist?}” and then simply go on to answer: “\textit{In imagination-realising nonactual pluralities of worlds!}”
So the following additional Modal CP suggests itself:

\textbf{(MCP$^+$)} For every world-involving characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a set of worlds $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in some or all of $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising pluralities of worlds.

Of course, given MCP$^+$, MCP must be replaced by MCP$'$, which yields objects’ individuation conditions only for non-world-involving characterisations. So we have:

\textbf{(P4$'$)} MM implies MCP$'$ and MCP$^+$.

So the actually existent golden mountain instantiates all of the properties that follow from golden mountainhood in @ in all and only @GM-imagination-realising pluralities of worlds (POWs). Yet the actual POW (@POW) isn’t among these @GM-imagination-realising POWs, as nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @ in @POW. Instantiating these properties in @ in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs is what makes the actually existent golden mountain the object that it is, and not another. Additionally, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates the properties of nonexistence and being an example used throughout this paper, for example, in @ in @POW. Yet the instantiation of these properties in @ in @POW doesn’t feature in the object’s individuation condition.

So MCP$^+$ is just what M-Meinongians need in order to save their account. Yet in formulating MCP$^+$, M-Meinongians invoke whole nonactual pluralities of (possible and impossible) worlds where, in formulating MCP$'^{(i)}$, M-Meinongians invoke only nonactual (possible and impossible) worlds. This proposal might seem outrageous. Invoking nonactual possible worlds, even if they’re used diversely and fruitfully in philosophy, is still controversial. Invoking impossible worlds, even if they’re slowly gaining recognition and application, is even more contentious. But surely, invoking different pluralities of (possible and impossible) worlds caps it all! In the rest of this chapter, we’ll see whether MCP$^+$ constitutes a consequence of MM that’s just too absurd to accept, and so forces M-Meinongians finally to give in, or whether it can be defended.
5.2 Meinongian Worlds

Meinongianism is the kind of intentional realism according to which pure objects of thought are concrete, i.e., nonabstract. Effectively, this concreteness condition for Meinongian objects\(^1\) corresponds to the condition that Meinongian objects really have the properties they’re characterised as having: Meinongians (naively) want to say that the golden mountain is concrete in that it really \emph{is} a mountain, for example. But given that this naive view immediately leads to contradictions, different kinds of Meinongianism spell out the sense in which Meinongian objects can have their characterising properties differently, as we’ve seen. Yet given their basic Meinongian mindset, in formulating such specifications, they want to remain as true to naive Meinongianism as possible. So in evaluating different kinds of Meinongianism, we need to evaluate how well they capture the basic Meinongian concreteness-condition while avoiding contradiction. We’ve seen that D-Meinongianism, in particular, fails in this respect, as its specification of how Meinongian objects can have their characterising properties is mysterious, or else D-Meinongianism just collapses into Abstractualism.

M-Meinongians don’t want to suffer the same fate as D-Meinongians. That is, they don’t want their account to be susceptible to (Collapse) X-Meinongianism collapses into Nonactualism or Abstractualism.

So by relocating Meinongian objects’ \textit{having} of their characterising properties to certain (pluralities of) nonactual worlds, they want to formulate a noncontradictory yet genuinely concretist Meinongianism. But how can an object be concrete, in that it really instantiates properties like \textit{golden mountainhood} in certain worlds, if these worlds aren’t themselves concrete? That is, how can an object really \textit{be} a mountain in a world \(w\) if \(w\) isn’t just like the actual world in that the objects in \(w\) have properties just like they have here? For example, how can an object really be a mountain in a world \(w\) if \(w\) is just an \textit{Ersatz} abstract object like a set of propositions, for example?\(^2\) In my view, if M-Meinongians

\(^1\) Given MCP\(^+\), we can say that an object is \textit{Meinongian} if (v) according to MM, it doesn’t exist in @POW.

\(^2\) For overviews of Ersatz accounts of nonactual worlds, see Parent (2015, section 3), Menzel (2015, sections 2.2 and 2.3), Berto (2013a, section 3) and Lewis (1986, chapter 3).
just resort to Ersatz accounts of worlds, as Berto (2008) does, their Meinongian-
ism, like D-Meinongianism, just effectively collapses into Abstractualism. So
genuine M-Meinongians, i.e., M-Meinongians who fulfil the concreteness condi-
tion in a modal framework, must construe nonactual (pluralities of) worlds as
congeal objects, over which Meinongian objects are spread out.3

So what are the arguments for the existence of nonactual yet concrete possible
and impossible worlds? Consider first David Lewis’ strikingly evocative
argument from ways for the existence of possible worlds:

I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit.
If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might
be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been
different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits
the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been beside the way they
actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says
that there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit ‘ways things could
have been’. I believe that things could have been different in countless ways; I
believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face
value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways
things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’ (Lewis, 1973, 84).

In the same vein, Margery Naylor (1986, 29) formulates a structurally identi-
cal argument, claiming that it’s also uncontroversially true that things could not
have been different in countless ways. Paraphrasing, we get: there are many
ways things couldn’t have been. On the face of it, this, too, is an existential
quantification. So there exist entities that might be called “ways things couldn’t
have been” or simply “impossible worlds”.4

But of course, postulating possible worlds in the sense of Lewis, according to
whom they’re spatiotemporally isolated mereological sums of spatiotemporally

3This is hardly more than a suspicion, however, and so needs to be established by argument. Yet for reasons of space, I shall reserve this for another occasion. In what follows, then, the claim that M-Meinongians must resort to concrete nonactual (pluralities of) worlds in formulating their account shall be treated as a working assumption. Yet helping themselves to concrete nonactual (pluralities of) worlds doesn’t cost M-Meinongians anything, as we shall shortly see.

4Of course, Naylor advances her argument as a reductio against Lewis’: if we accept the argument from ways for the existence of possible worlds, then parity of reasoning requires us to accept a similar argument for the existence of impossible worlds; but that’s absurd; so we shouldn’t accept Lewis’ argument from ways in the first place (see Berto, 2013a, section 3). But this needn’t be the lesson to draw from Naylor’s argument, as we shall see below.
connected objects (Lewis, 1986, 69-96), faces the “incredulous stare” objection, as this ontological admission “does disagree, to an extreme extent, with firm common sense opinion about what there is” (Lewis, 1986, 133). And surely, this holds to an even larger degree for impossible worlds. But Lewis forcefully argues that the admission of possible worlds into one’s ontology is worth the cost, as possible worlds are incredibly useful for explaining many metaphysical, semantic and intentional phenomena (Lewis, 1986, 5-68). Similarly, Takashi Yagisawa claims that impossible worlds are just as useful in many philosophical contexts (Yagisawa, 1987, 176-182; 187). From there, parity of reasoning requires that we should also accept impossible worlds.

The upshot of the arguments from ways and the arguments from usefulness, together with arguments to the effect that abstract nonactual(ised) worlds can’t yield the same benefits as concrete nonactual worlds (see Lewis, 1986, 136-190), is that possible and impossible worlds are just as real and concrete as @. That is, @ doesn’t enjoy some special ontological status, but is just the world we happen to inhabit, which is all that makes @ special (for us). And given this picture (see Figure 1), it seems plausible to suggest that we can just put all of these worlds to even more use by having them play a role in a Modal CP.

In contrast, nonactual POWs are postulated here solely for the work they do in accommodating Troublemakers. That is, there seem to be no CP-inde-
pendent reasons for postulating nonactual POWs. In connection with R- and D-Meinongianism, this kind of ontological extravagance has been regarded as a serious drawback, which motivated MM in the first place. Yet if, in order to deal with certainTroublemakers, MM must be extended by introducing MCP$^+$, and if Extended MM is guilty of the same drawback as R- and D-Meinongianism, then, insofar as the worry of ontological extravagance is concerned, nothing has been gained by choosing MM over R- and D-Meinongianism in the first place. So we need to ask whether Extended MM is guilty of the same drawback as R- and D-Meinongianism, i.e., whether Extended MM is susceptible to

(Extravagance) X-Meinongianism is ontologically extravagant.

I claim that Extended MM isn’t ontologically extravagant. Yet I also claim that the nonactual POWs, as invoked in MCP$^+$, needn’t be useful in any way other than in accommodating Troublemakers (and in explaining certain intentional phenomena). In fact, I claim that the same is true for the nonactual worlds as invoked in MCP’, qua worlds in which Meinongian objects have their characterising properties, as they’re not identical to the worlds postulated by Lewis and Yagisawa. But that doesn’t make their invocation, qua worlds across which Meinongian objects are spread out, ontologically extravagant at all. In fact, (Extended) MM is compatible with actualism, according to which @ is the only concrete world that exists.

To see why M-Meinongians needn’t fear incredulous stares, at least insofar as their non-Meinongian commitments are concerned, recall Lewis’ argument from ways, which includes the following passage:

[T]hings could have been different in countless ways. [...] Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been beside the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist [...] “possible worlds” (Lewis, 1973, 84; emphasis added).

Now, it’s fairly obvious how Meinongians can reply to this passage: they can just deny that the sentence “there are many ways things could have been” is an existential quantification; instead, for Meinongians, it’s just a quantification. So it doesn’t say that possible worlds exist, but only that some objects are possible worlds, which is indeed compatible with the claim that @ is the only
existent world. In principle, Meinongians can read On the Plurality of Worlds and accept everything Lewis says, except what hardly anyone accepts, namely that nonactual worlds exist.\(^5\) In addition, Meinongians can give the same reply to Naylor’s argument, and so claim that impossible worlds are indeed ways the world couldn’t have been, and, as such, of the same kind as possible worlds. So Meinongians can accept a parity of worlds, according to which possible and impossible worlds are the same kind of object (see Priest, 1997b, 531), at least for the worlds as invoked in their Meinongianism: these are all concrete, and Meinongian as well.

Figure 2 schematically shows the actual plurality of existent concrete worlds (@POW), whatever it’s like. @POW might, for all we know, contain only @; or it might also contain other possible words; or it might contain impossible worlds in addition to possible worlds. But whatever @POW is like, it is, in fact, irrelevant for the individuation of Meinongian objects. Consider the existent golden mountain, which, according MCP’, instantiates golden mountainhood in all imagination-realising worlds. So we have, for every such world \(w\), \(w \Vdash^+\) the existent golden mountain is a golden mountain. But “\(w \Vdash^+\) the existent golden mountain is a golden mountain” is effectively a world’s characterisation;

\(^5\)Lewis isn’t a Meinongian (see Lewis, 1986, 97-101), and so puts forward the above quantification as an existential quantification. But Meinongians needn’t follow him in this.
and “\(\#^+\)” and “\(\#^-\)” aren’t existence-entailing (Priest, 2005, 139). So the worlds, as they feature in Meinongian objects’ individuation conditions, needn’t exist. So for the purpose of individuating Meinongian objects, @POW isn’t needed, even if it’s exactly like the Lewisian-Yagisawan POW.

In fact, according to Priest, all nonactual worlds can plausibly be regarded as Meinongian objects (Priest, 2005, 139). While I wouldn’t go as far as Priest, as Meinongians might nevertheless believe in an existent plurality of (possible and impossible) worlds, perhaps for reasons such as those given by Lewis and Yagisawa, I do wonder why Meinongians who use worlds in order to individuate Meinongian objects should use existent worlds to do so; for if they use existent worlds in order to individuate Meinongian objects, their account threatens to collapse into (Lewisian) Nonactualism, according to which pure objects of thought are existent (insofar as they inhabit existent worlds), concrete (insofar as they inhabit concrete worlds) and nonactual (insofar as one can’t spill coffee over them in @) (see Lewis, 1978). Moreover, while Meinongians might also resort to an Ersatz account of worlds, again, why should they individuate Meinongian objects in terms of these, given that their Meinongian commitments allow for what most philosophers want: having nonactual worlds at one’s disposal, albeit Meinongian ones, but which nevertheless have the properties they’re characterised as having (by Lewis), such as being concrete, spatiotemporally isolated mereological sums of objects. Meinongians can have extensional entities en masse. So why shouldn’t they use them?

So we’ve reached the following picture (see Figure 3): on the one hand, we have @POW (whatever it’s like, but definitely including @); the worlds of @POW exist, but play no role in individuating Meinongian objects. On the other hand, we have a plurality of Meinongian nonactual worlds (excluding @); in some of these worlds, Meinongian objects have the properties they’re characterised as having (by Lewis), such as being concrete, spatiotemporally isolated mereological sums of objects. Meinongians can have extensional entities en masse. So why shouldn’t they use them?

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6Arguably, Meinongian worlds don’t yield the same benefits, especially in the area of metaphysics. For example, they can’t be used to give a reductive account of the modalities. However, some modal fictionalists claim that they can nevertheless be useful in other ways (see Nolan, 2011, for an overview of modal fictionalism).

7Again, this is hardly more than a suspicion, and so needs to be established by argument. Yet for reasons of space, I shall reserve this for another occasion as well.
having, at least according to M-Meinongians. And given Meinongianism, this picture isn’t ontologically extravagant.

In the next section, I’ll show how the proposed picture, plausibly extended, can finally be used to individuate the actually existent golden mountain in a non-vacuous way.

5.3 Actual Worlds

In the preceding section, we’ve reached a weird hybrid host of worlds, consisting of the existent @, existent nonactual worlds (perhaps), and Meinongian nonactual worlds. So @POW and the Meinongian POW differ insofar as the former, but not the latter, contains existent worlds; in particular, the former, but not the latter, contains (the existent) @.

Given MCP+, this difference leads to the following problem, which is a close relative to the one familiar by now: according to MCP+, the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs. But given the picture developed thus far, no POW realises the imagination that something instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood. So no POW is @GM-imagination-realising and such that the actually existent
golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ golden mountainhood in it. So it’s (vacuously) true that the actually existent golden mountain instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs. Yet a structurally identical argument, together with the fact that the set of @GM-imagination-realising POWs and the set of POWs that realise the imagination of the actually existent philosophising cat are identical, yields the conclusion that it’s also (vacuously) true that the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs. So given MCP+, the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat share an individuation condition. So they’re the same object, or at least there’s no principled way of telling which one we’re picking out when we’re formulating either characterisation. But Meinongians want to say that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are different objects. And they want to be able to tell which one is singled out if either characterisation is used, and why. So how can these desiderata be ensured in our framework?

The basic idea is simple. Obviously, we need an @GM-imagination-realising POW that doesn’t also realise the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat. In this @GM-imagination-realising POW, then, something instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood, while nothing instantiates-in-@ being a philosophising cat. So the (non-empty) set of @GM-imagination-realising POWs isn’t the same as the (empty) set of POWs that realise the characterisation of being an actually existent philosophising cat. So we can’t say that it’s (vacuously) true that the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs.

Now, in order to reach such an @GM-imagination-realising POW, we need to add a Meinongian actual world, @1, to our plurality of Meinongian worlds such that something instantiates-in-@1 golden mountainhood, but not being a philosophising cat. So we no longer have a disparity of worlds—insofar as @ exists, but the relevant worlds for Meinongian objects don’t—one that interferes with @-world-involving characterisations, and which thus constitutes, I think, the source of confusion that gives rise to the final argument from actuality. Instead, our full Meinongian POW (see Figure 4) now contains an actual world,
\@_1, which is different from the actual actual world, \@ (formerly, \@), insofar as \@_1, but not \@, contains a golden mountain.

Yet if \@_1 is just like \@, except that something instantiates-in-\@_1 golden mountainhood, while nothing instantiates-in-\@ golden mountainhood, then \@_1’s introduction doesn’t help in differentiating the actually existent philosophising cat from the actually existent bank-robbing dog, say. So we must add yet another Meinongian actual world, \@_2, such that something instantiates-in-\@_2 being a philosophising cat, while nothing instantiates-in-\@_2 being a bank-robbing dog. And so on for infinitely many other characterisations involving the instantiation-in-\@ of properties that aren’t instantiated-in-\@ in @POW. Finally, given that every actual world can come with its own set of nonactual worlds, we reach a plurality of POWs, all but one of which are fully Meinongian (see Figure 5). This move doesn’t just help us with individuating the actually existent golden mountain and the like, but also with individuating the necessarily existent golden mountain, the possible round square and the cat that philosophises in every dogless world, for example.

Now, as straightforward as this accommodation strategy might look like, at least given our acquaintance with the M-Meinongian’s world-invoking accommodation strategy, in the next section, we’ll see how the picture developed thus far is susceptible to a serious, and in fact familiar, objection.
5.4 Objects, Including Worlds

Given MCP, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs. Given our model consisting of @POW and Meinongian POWs, @POW isn’t @GM-imagination-realising, as nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @POW’s actual world, @. But other POWs are @GM-imagination-realising, as something instantiates golden mountainhood in their respective actual worlds—in @1 and @5, say. Now, we can formulate the following objection: in characterising an object as @GM, we want to say that the object so singled out instantiates golden mountainhood in @, and not in some surrogate Meinongian actual world. Recall that, in discussing R- and D-Meinongianism, recourse to nuclear existence

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This objection has been raised by Wolfgang Barz (in conversation).
and the relation of property-encoding were dismissed, as these were held to be mere surrogates of the property/relation that’s really meant in characterising an object as being an existent golden mountain, say. But now, essentially the same strategy appears to be employed: in characterising an object as @GM, we’re asked to settle for an object that instantiates golden mountainhood in @₁ (and in @₅). @₁ and @₅ might be Meinongian actual worlds, but neither of them is the actual world, @, which is the actual world we wanted. So MCP+ seems unduly imagination-diverting insofar as the POWs in which the actually existent golden mountain instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood aren’t (necessarily) @GM-imagination-realising. That is, like R- and D-Meinongianism, Extended MM appears to be susceptible to

(Diversion) X-Meinongianism can be unduly imagination-diverting.

But note that the actual world, @, is so far nowhere to be found in our model. In saying that nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @₆ (or @₂, @₃, @₄, @₆), but that something instantiates golden mountainhood in @₁ (and @₅), the actual world, @, has somehow dropped out of the picture. If @ is identified with @₆, then, indeed, we face a problem: in extending MM in the way proposed, I would have, in passing, changed the semantics of “actually”, claiming that it’s not the case that “actually(ϕ)” is true in a world w (in a POW Ψ) iff “ϕ” is true in @ (= @₆) (in @POW), but that “actually(ϕ)” is true in a world w (in a POW Ψ) iff “ϕ” is true in @₆ (in @POW) or in @₁ (in POW₁) or ... This would indeed be a similar move as saying that “a exists” is true iff a instantiates Nuclear existence or existence, or as saying that “a exists” is true iff a instantiates or encodes existence. It would lead to an ambiguity that intuitively doesn’t obtain. So this move can indeed be regarded as imagination-diverting.

So how can this problem be solved? Here’s a proposal.⁹ Again, let’s identify @ with @₆. Then I might not change the semantics of “actually”, but redescribe what the imager imagines in characterising an object as @GM: instead of saying that in characterising an object as @GM, an imager imagines that something instantiates golden mountainhood in @ (= @₆), I might claim that the imager imagines a POW that’s grouped around a different actual world

⁹This proposal has been made by Wolfgang Barz (in conversation).
such that something instantiates golden mountainhood in it. But just as Priest’s and Barz’ respective replies to the argument(s) from actuality, this reply would be imagination-dictating. I do want to say that imaginers can imagine of this world, @, that something instantiates golden mountainhood in it.

I think that both the problem with the “change of semantics”-solution and the “change of imagination”-solution lies in identifying this world, @, with @. In search of another candidate, I want to say that, in the Extended MM framework, worlds, including @, must be regarded in essentially the same way as ordinary objects are regarded in the MM framework. Yet this isn’t surprising, of course, given that worlds just are objects in the (Extended) MM framework, albeit of a more extensive kind.

Ordinary objects, for M-Meinongians, aren’t world-bound individuals. Instead, according to Priest, objects are correlated with function from worlds to what Priest calls identities (Priest, 2005, 43). An identity, one might say, is just what an object has in a world, similarly as it has certain properties therein (Priest, 2005, 47). Other than that, Priest characterises identities mainly negatively, and metaphorically.

Negatively, Priest (2005, 47) claims that identities are not to be thought of as objects’ parts, analogously to temporal parts, as that would mean to regard objects’ identities as metaphysically primary, which they’re not. Instead, Priest claims, the objects are metaphysically primary and not merely the sums of their respective parts. Further, according to Priest, one shouldn’t think of identities as genuine objects, and so of the set of identities as constituting the domain of quantification, as in counterpart theory. Instead, the objects themselves, of which identities are identities in the first place, constitute the only domain of quantification.

Simpler, according to Priest, objects might just be identified with functions from worlds to identities (Priest, 2005, 43). But then Collapse reappears, as functions are set-theoretical entities, and thus abstract. So just as other Meinongians should resist the temptation of identifying objects with property sets, but should just say that objects are correlated with property sets, M-Meinongians should settle on mere correlation. (Yet in their formal semantics, M-Meinongians can let these functions play the object role, of course.)

If objects were the sums of metaphysically primary parts, then every function from worlds to identities would be an object, which Priest regards as implausible (Priest, 2005, 47).
Metaphorically, Priest (2011, 246) offers the following general characterisations of identities, of which he says that one can’t do much better when trying to illuminate such a basic metaphysical notion:

Consider an actor, say Anthony Hopkins. In each play in which he plays, he has a role, or identity—Macbeth, Iago, Caesar. It is helpful to think of metaphysical identities as rather like this. [...] When one watches a play, one thinks of Hopkins as, Macbeth, Iago, and so on. This is who he is in a world which realizes how one thinks things to be.

Or consider a different metaphor. In many religions, a god may be embodied in the form of an avatar. Thus, for example, Visnu manifests himself as Krisna in the Mahabrata, and as Rama in the Ramayana. One may think of identities as avatars. An object transcends any particular world, but manifests itself, possibly in different ways, in different worlds.

So whatever identities are exactly, according to MM, ordinary objects are transworld-individuals, each of which has an identity in every world.

Similarly, I claim that worlds, in the Extended MM setting, aren’t POW-bound individuals, but are correlated with functions from POWs to world-identities. A world-identity, one might claim, is just what a world has in a POW, similarly as it has certain properties therein. A world “transcends any particular [POW], but manifests itself, possibly in different ways, in different [POWs].” So again, whatever world-identities are exactly, according to Extended MM, worlds are trans-POW-individuals, each of which has an identity in every POW. @, in particular, is to be identified with the trans-POW-individual whose world-identities are @ @ in @POW, @1 in POW1, and so on (see Figure 6). @, then, is a trans-POW-individual, which, in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs, contains something that instantiates golden mountainhood, in virtue of having a world-identity @7 in every @GM-imagination-realising POW, and only in every such POW, such that something instantiates-in-@7 golden mountainhood. So I conclude that MCP+ isn’t imagination-diverting.

So we finally have all we need in order to accommodate the actually existent golden mountain in a modal framework. In particular, we need nonactual Meinongian POWs. But, as we’ve seen, this concession is neither ontologically extravagant nor turns Extended MM into another kind of intentional realism. Moreover, we must understand worlds as trans-POW-individuals. Then we
can understand MCP+ as yielding an individuation condition for the actually existent golden mountain that isn’t imagination-diverting. Yet one final question remains: what are nonactual Meinongian POWs like? Aren’t they utterly mysterious? In the next section, I shall answer this question.

5.5 Metaphysics

Recall the arguments from ways, as formulated by Lewis and Naylor. Meinongians can read these arguments as not involving existential quantifications over nonactual (im)possible worlds, but as involving just quantifications. So read, the arguments from ways establish that some objects are (im)possible worlds. Prima facie, given that these argument are based on intuitive understandings of

Figure 6: The Actual World (@)
what nonactual (im)possible worlds are like, introducing them simply as “ways things could(n’t) have been”, nonactual worlds aren’t mysterious.

In the preceding sections, I made use of nonactual Meinongian pluralities of possible and impossible worlds in order to accommodate certain Troublemakers. Now, concerning these POWs, the final question of this thesis is: what are they like? That is, what makes them different from @POW, other than being Meinongian? Are they, like (Lewis’ and Yagisawa’s) worlds, easily imaginable? Consider this further “argument from ways”: “I believe that the possible and impossible worlds could have been different in countless ways; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe that some objects are what might be called ‘ways that the possible and impossible worlds could have been’, or simply ‘possible POWs’.” We can then go on to formulate a structurally identical argument for the conclusion that some objects are impossible POWs. But neither argument is as immediately and intuitively appealing as the world-introducing arguments from ways; for what does it even mean to say that the possible and impossible worlds could have been different in countless ways?

In order to see how we might think of nonactual POWs, I think that the following argument, formulated against MM by Fred Kroon (2012, 28-31), is illuminating. Moreover, Kroon’s argument shall serve as a final testing ground for Extended MM. In the following presentation of Kroon’s argument, let “@” refer not to a trans-POW-individual, but just to the actual world as invoked by Beall, Sauchelli, Priest and Barz, ignoring Meinongian POWs.

According to Kroon, given two of the M-Meinongian’s central claims, namely (i) that no world w is such that the golden mountain is nothing in w, and (ii) that the golden mountain doesn’t instantiate golden mountainhood in all worlds, MM can’t guarantee that the golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ golden mountainhood (Kroon, 2012, 27). Specifically, given that nothing instantiates-in-@ golden mountainhood, and so that the golden mountain, in particular, doesn’t instantiate-in-@ golden mountainhood, but that the golden mountain does instantiate-in-@ properties, the golden mountain must instantiate-in-@ properties other than golden mountainhood. Yet problematically, according to Kroon, we can’t know whether any of the properties instantiated-in-@ by the golden mountain are existence-entailing. Given MM, then, we can’t know
whether the golden mountain instantiates-in-@ existence. But we do know that the golden mountain is a Meinongian object, and so doesn’t instantiate-in-@ existence. And so MM is false.

In arguing for the premise that we can’t know whether the golden mountain instantiates-in-@ existence-entailing properties, Kroon claims, first, that our imagination can be directed towards actually existent objects. For example, we can imagine Mount Everest as being magically transformed into a golden mountain. Given MM, then, every world \( w \) that realises this imagination contains an object that instantiates-in-\( w \) golden mountainhood. So Kroon claims that a golden mountain \( g \) instantiates-in-@ existence, as \( g \) is actually Mount Everest, which instantiates-in-@ existence. Second, Kroon argues along the following lines: given MM, if we imagine the golden mountain, for some imagination-realising words \( w \), the golden mountain not only instantiates-in-\( w \) golden mountainhood, but also modal properties like possibly being grey and granitic. So some world \( w \) is such that the golden mountain instantiates-in-\( w \) being grey and granitic. Yet according to Kroon, there’s no a priori reason to deny that \( w = @ \). So given that being grey and granitic is existence-entailing, there’s no a priori reason to deny that the golden mountain instantiates-in-@ existence, although it doesn’t instantiate-in-@ golden mountainhood.

While Kroon, of course, wants to say that the golden mountain doesn’t instantiate-in-@ existence, and so that it’s a Meinongian object if anything is, his point is simply that MM can’t ensure this result. Replying to Kroon, Berto and Priest (2014, 11-12) concede that their Modal CP must indeed be fixed in order to evade Kroon’s conclusion: while, in Towards Non-Being, the Modal CP has it that, for every characterisation \( C \), (i) if an object \( o \) uniquely satisfies \( C \) in \( @ \), then \( C \) singles out \( o \), but (ii) if nothing satisfies \( C \) in \( @ \), then \( C \) singles out an object that uniquely satisfies \( C \) in all and only \( C \)-imagination-realising worlds, given Kroon’s argument, Berto and Priest claim that clause (ii) must be replaced by: (iii) if nothing satisfies \( C \) in \( @ \), then \( C \) singles out a Meinongian object \( o \) that uniquely satisfies \( C \) in all and only \( C \)-imagination-realising worlds.\(^{12}\) But while this might be right, and so refutes Kroon’s argument, it

\(^{12}\)Earlier I said that I want to remain neutral regarding the question of when and how the use of a characterisation singles out a non-Meinongian object. Yet regarding the question of when
doesn’t tell us which Meinongian object Kroon effectively imagines in formulating his argument. That is, the Modal CP, fixed in the way Berto and Priest propose, can’t individuate Kroon’s object of imagination in line with the full characterisation he formulates (via his argument); for from the perspective of MM, we can say that, in formulating his argument, Kroon effectively imagines the golden mountain as instantiating-in-@ existence. Effectively, then, Kroon offers a characterisation, namely the characterisation of being a golden mountain that’s possibly grey and granitic, and so grey and granitic in some world, which might, for all we know, be the actual world, where the golden mountain is Mount Everest (the characterisation of being Kroonian, for short). This characterisation, like the much simpler @GM, is irreducibly modal. It requires not just imagining some object or other, but an object, (at least) two worlds, and the way in which the object is related to each of these worlds. And as such, Kroon’s characterisation can’t be handled by MCP’, but must be handled by MCP+.

So where is Kroon’s object Kroonian? That is, where is Kroon’s object identical to Mount Everest in @ (for all we know)? Given the fact that being Kroonian is an irreducibly modal characterisation, we need MCP+, and so imagination-realising POWs. And a POW that realises the characterisation of being Kroonian is one in which the object so characterised is identical to Mount Everest in @. So a POW that realises Kroon’s imagination is one that has the metaphysical characteristics of Kris McDaniel’s modal realism with overlap, for example, according to which objects can literally exist at more than one world (McDaniel, 2004, 140), where a world isn’t the “totality of things it contains” (Lewis, 1986, 73), but the container itself, as it’s a maximally spatiotemporally related region of spacetime (McDaniel, 2004, 147). The details of McDaniel’s account needn’t concern us here, as the important point is simply that such a POW is among the POWs that realise Kroon’s imagination of how an object that’s characterised as Kroonian is like. While David Lewis has argued against modal realism with overlap as constituting the right metaphysical picture for @POW (Lewis, 1986, 198-209), and Berto (2014, 77), citing van Inwagen (1986), claims that “worlds and how the use of a characterisation singles out a Meinongian object, I think that when one intends to single out a Meinongian object o (given one’s knowledge that nothing instantiates-in-@ the properties o is characterised as having), then this should always be held to succeed.

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are not boxes, nor containers,” this is irrelevant for the adherent of Extended MM, for whom some Meinongian POWs nevertheless realise this picture, although it might not be realised by @POW. In general, we can say that some Meinongian POWs realise the ways in which different metaphysicians (falsely) characterise @POW. Understood in this way, whole nonactual POWs aren’t mysterious. Effectively, like certain worlds, they’re Meinongian objects themselves, and as such can be the objects of modal metaphysicians’ thoughts, and so not only consist of worlds that might be different from the worlds of @POW, but also straightforwardly instantiate general metaphysical properties. So our final objection, i.e.,

**(Mysteriousness)** X-Meinongianism is ontologically mysterious,

doesn’t apply to Extended MM. And neither do Collapse, Extravagance or Division. So extending MM, by adding MCP+, isn’t an outrageous proposal at all.

In section 2.4, I claimed that whatever Meinongians propose in terms of distinctions, restrictions, disambiguations, ontological additions, or relocations, it’s ultimately all in the service of the Meinongian intentionality thesis (MI). So no matter how parsimonious, intelligible or liberal MM seems to be, it must be able to deal with every characterisation that R- or D-Meinongianism can deal with. In this chapter, we’ve seen that, and how, MM can accommodate the actually existent golden mountain. In order to do so, MM must be extended. But this extension consists only in formulating an additional Modal CP, MCP+. So contrary to what one might initially think, nonactual POWs aren’t *postulated* by adherents of Extended MM, but only *used* in order to accommodate certain Troublemakers. They’re Meinongian objects, after all, and so readily available. So M-Meinongians only need to broaden the path of relocation, which, given that certain characterisations trigger irreducibly modal imaginations, constitutes a natural accommodation strategy.

Finally, recall the (fixed) final argument from actuality:

**(P3′′)** MM implies that @GM yields \{golden mountainhood\} and [@].

**(P4′)** MM implies MCP’ and MCP+. 

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(P5″) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates **golden mountainhood** in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be [@] members [from P3″-4″].

(P8) Nothing instantiates **golden mountainhood** in @.

∴ (P9′) No world is @GM-imagination-realising [from P8].

∴ (P10′) Given MM, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates **golden mountainhood** in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds [from P9′].

(P11′) Given MM, the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates **golden mountainhood** in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds.

∴ (P12) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are identical [from P5″, P10′ and P11′].

(P13) The actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat aren’t identical.

∴ (C) MM is false [from P12-13]

In this chapter, I’ve argued that P4′ is false, and is to be replaced by

(P4″) MM implies MCP′ and MCP⁺.

In turn, given MCP⁺, we must replace P5″ by

(P5‴) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates **golden mountainhood** in @ in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs.

Now, if we replace P8 by

(P8″) Nothing instantiates **golden mountainhood** in @ in @POW,

which is true, then none of the further premises follow. So given the proposed extension of MM, the final argument from actuality, finally, breaks down.

In the next and final chapter, I’ll summarise the results of this thesis.
6 Conclusion

Meinongians are experts in accommodating Troublemakers. In fact, the history of Meinongianism can be regarded in terms of Meinongians’ providing ingenious specifications of their general commitments in the service of welcoming these Troublemakers within the realm of Meinongian objects.

The existent golden mountain is the first of these Troublemakers, as it must, according to Meinongians, in some way have the properties it’s characterised as having, but can’t be held to instantiate existence, goldenness and mountainhood in @. So Meinongians must spell out an alternative principle that individuates the existent golden mountain on the basis of its characterisation. Adherents of the path of restriction try to do so by restricting the set of properties a Meinongian object can instantiate in @ in virtue of how it’s characterised. existence, in particular, isn’t among these properties. Instead, the existent golden mountain is held to instantiate nuclear existence, goldenness and mountainhood in @. Alternatively, adherents of the path of disambiguation try to accommodate the existent golden mountain by claiming that Meinongian objects can only “have” their characterising properties in one of two senses. In particular, Meinongian objects don’t instantiate their characterising properties, but only encode them in @. So the existent golden mountain is held to encode existence, goldenness and mountainhood in @. Yet both paths, and the corresponding Meinongianisms, are susceptible to at least three1 out of the following four objections:

(Collapse) X-Meinongianism collapses into Nonactualism or Abstractualism.

(Extravagance) X-Meinongianism is ontologically extravagant.

(Mysteriousness) X-Meinongianism is ontologically mysterious.

(Diversion) X-Meinongianism can be unduly imagination-diverting.

So Meinongians must formulate another principle that individuates the existent golden mountain in accordance with its characterisation.

\[1\]As far as I can tell, R-Meinongianism isn’t susceptible to Collapse.
Taking on this task, M-Meinongians follow the path of modal relocation, claiming that a Meinongian object mustn’t instantiate its characterising properties in @, but in all and only worlds that realise the situation about the object envisaged. So instead of saying that the existent golden mountain instantiates existence, goldenness and mountainhood in @, M-Meinongians claim that it instantiates these properties in all and only imagination-realising worlds. In non-imagination-realising worlds, the existent golden mountain is perhaps golden, but not a mountain; or a mountain, but not golden; or neither golden nor a mountain, but something else entirely.

Of the above objections, none applies to MM. Extravagance doesn’t apply, as the M-Meinongian’s worlds can, and indeed should, given the threat of Collapse, be regarded as Meinongian. So while the golden mountain, for example, exists only in nonactual worlds, M-Meinongians aren’t committed to saying that these are existent worlds, which would be to concede that the golden mountain, while being nonactual, exists simpliciter. Moreover, given that concrete nonactual worlds and the instantiation of properties therein are well understood, and that, even if no nonactual worlds exist, Meinongian nonactual worlds behave equally in all relevant respects, Mysteriousness doesn’t apply to MM. And neither does Diversion, as Meinongian objects aren’t world-bound individuals in the MM framework, but transworld-individuals, and so one’s imagination of an object is never diverted to a fully nonactual surrogate object.

Yet as meritorious as MM may appear on these grounds, given its specific commitments, a new Troublemaker already lurks in the shadows: the actually existent golden mountain. Presumably, given MM, it must be held to instantiate existence, goldenness and mountainhood in @, which is unacceptable, as “one may imagine one’s dreams or fantasies to be realized, but unfortunately, that doesn’t make them real” (Berto, 2013b, 171-172). But the object so characterised nevertheless needs to be individuated in tight accordance with its characterisation, which presents M-Meinongians with a serious challenge. In order to meet it, they follow several strategies. Yet every strategy that doesn’t take into

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2So contra Sainsbury’s classification (Sainsbury, 2010, 90), MM isn’t a form of Nonactualism, but a genuine form of Meinongianism. Of course, it’s a Meinongian Nonactualism, which isn’t a form of Nonactualism, though, as existential commitments to possibilia, including worlds, are essential for the latter theory.
account that single worlds can’t be imagination-realising fails—not because no such world is actual, but because characterising an object as being such that, actually, it’s a golden mountain triggers an irreducibly modal imagination, for which single worlds, actual or not, aren’t the right kind of imagination-realisers in the first place.

Instead, in order to extend a warm welcome to the actually existent golden mountain, as spread out over suitable imagination-realisers, M-Meinongians must allow whole pluralities of worlds to serve as imagination-realisers. Yet this isn’t an ad hoc manoeuvre, as using nonactual POWs for this purpose is neither ontologically extravagant nor mysterious. Given that the M-Meinongian’s worlds are plausibly taken to be Meinongian, two questions arise: first, Meinongian worlds must, just as other Meinongian objects, instantiate properties—but which ones, exactly? Second, given any answer to the first question, why these properties, and not others instead? The answer to the second question, I claim, is easy: there’s no reason other than my imagining it so. In a genuinely Meinongian fashion, any Meinongian POW, together with its respective metaphysical picture, is just as decent a Meinongian object as any other. So formulating the following Modal CP, which incorporates not just a single POW, but a plurality of POWs, is a plausible, and indeed natural, extension of MM.

(MCP⁺) For every world-involving characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a set of worlds $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in some or all of $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising POWs.

The actually existent golden mountain, then, instantiates-in-@golden mountainhood in all and only POWs that realise the situation about the object and world envisaged, which doesn’t include @POW. Moreover, MCP⁺ plausibly individuates Kroon’s object. And generally, as long as one is imaginative enough to introduce some Troublemaker, this act of imagination must merely be regarded as involving a world-involving characterisation, which thus, given MCP⁺, singles out a suitably individuated Meinongian object.

Now, after having retraced the essential steps of my argumentation, here’s the final conclusion of this thesis:
(Conclusion) If MM is true, then it must be extended by adding MCP⁺.

Lastly, let me stress that my argumentation shows that somehow, given MM, any object can be individuated, as long as MM incorporates further Modal CPs that yield appropriate imagination-realisers. Imagine, for example, the actually existent golden mountain, i.e., the golden mountain that instantiates-in-@-in-@POW golden mountainhood. Which object is this, given that nothing instantiates-in-@-in-@POW golden mountainhood? Well, if MM is extended even further, we can say that the actually existent golden mountain is the object that instantiates-in-@-in-@POW golden mountainhood in all and only imagination-realising pluralities of POWs.

But remember where we started: naive Meinongians hold that Meinongian objects are just ordinary objects that lack existence; and M-Meinongians hold that (non-world-involving) characterisations single out objects that are correlated with functions from worlds to identities; but now, given that different POWs are imagination-realising in the case of imagining objects whose characterisations are world-involving, adherents of Extended MM hold that such objects are correlated with functions from POWs to functions from world-identities to identities. Then, given that different POWs can instantiate different metaphysical properties, depending on the POW that serves as such a function’s primary input, the identities can turn out to be of different kinds: for example, in a POW in which worlds are containers, identities are genuinely transworld-identical individuals in McDaniel’s sense, like bare particulars; or, in a POW in which worlds are maximal spatiotemporally isolated mereological sums of objects, they’re world-bound individuals in Lewis’ sense. So while Meinongianism started out as simple and intuitive, given the problems discussed, it has been complicated beyond recognition.

Extended MM, then, introduces objects that are hardly tameable beasts—but tameable nonetheless, at least until our imagination fails to handle them. What does it tell us about the Meinongian programme in general, and its Modal specification in particular, that extending MM in the required way, first, forces us to give up most of what made Meinongianism attractive in the first place and, second, leads to such an Anything Goes mentality? I invite you, dear reader, to decide for yourself.
Abbreviations

(@IP) A property $P$ is @-indexed iff there’s a property $Q$ such that for every object $o$ and every world $w'$, $[o$ has $P$ in $w'$ iff $o$ has $Q$ in $\@]$. 

(@IP') A property $P$ is @-indexed iff there’s a property $Q$ such that for every object $o$ and every possible world $w'$, $[o$ has $P$ in $w'$ iff $o$ has $Q$ in $\@]$. 

(ACT) For every world $w$, $[w \Vdash ^+ \text{actually}(\varphi) \iff \@ \Vdash ^+ \varphi]$. 

(ACT') For every possible world $w$, $[w \Vdash ^+ \text{actually}(\varphi) \iff \@ \Vdash ^+ \varphi]$. 

(B1) An impossible world $w$ can be such that, in $w$, something instantiates golden mountainhood in $\@$ only if $w = \@$. 

(B1') An impossible world $w$ can be such that, in $w$, something, in $\@$, instantiates golden mountainhood only if $w = \@$. 

(B1'') An impossible world $w$ can be such that, in $w$, something instantiates golden mountainhood in $\@$ only if $w = \@$. 

(B2) No impossible world $w$ is such that $w = \@$. 

(BC) No impossible world $w$ is such that, in $w$, something instantiates golden mountainhood in $\@$. 

(C) MM is false. 

(Collapse) X-Meinongianism collapses into Nonactualism or Abstractualism. 

(DCP) For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, either (i) instantiates existence and $P_1, \ldots, P_n$, or (ii) doesn’t instantiate existence, but encodes exactly $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. 

(Diversion) X-Meinongianism can be unduly imagination-diverting. 

(Extravagance) X-Meinongianism is ontologically extravagant. 

(M1) Some objects don’t exist.
(M2) To exist is to instantiate existence.

(M3) Nonexistent objects have properties.

(MCP) For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising worlds.

(MCP') For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising worlds, but at least in one world.

(MCP') For every non-world-involving characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising worlds.

(MCP^+) For every world-involving characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a set of worlds $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be worlds from $w_1, \ldots, w_m$.

(MCP^+) For every world-involving characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of properties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ and a set of worlds $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, instantiates the properties that follow from $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ in some or all of $w_1, \ldots, w_m$ in all and only $C$-imagination-realising POWs.

(MI) Every characterisation $C$ can be used to single out an object that uniquely satisfies $C$, be it existent or not.

(MM1) In @, some objects don’t exist.

(MM2) To exist is to instantiate existence.

(MM3) In @, Meinongian objects only instantiate properties that aren’t existence-entailing.
Every characterisation singles out a unique object in thought, be it existent in @ or not.

**Mysteriousness** X-Meinongianism is ontologically mysterious.

**NCP** For every characterisation C, C semantically yields a set of properties \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\) such that some object, be it existent or not, instantiates \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\).

**P1** AGM individuates an object.

**P1’** AGM individuates an object: the actually existent golden mountain.

**P1”** @GM individuates an object: the actually existent golden mountain.

**P2** AGM individuates an object only if AGM semantically yields a distinctive property set, \(P_{AGM}\), and nothing else.

**P2’** AGM individuates the actually existent golden mountain only if AGM semantically yields a distinctive property set, \(P_{AGM}\), and nothing else.

**P2”’** Given MM, @GM individuates an object only if @GM semantically yields \{golden mountainhood\} and \{@\}.

**P3** AGM semantically yields \(P_{AGM}\), and nothing else.

**P3’** AGM semantically yields \(P_{AGM}\), and nothing else.

**P3”’** Given MM, @GM yields \{golden mountainhood\} and \{@\}.

**P4** MM implies MCP.

**P4’** MM implies MCP’.

**P4’’** MM implies MCP’ and MCP’’.

**P4”’** MM implies MCP’ and MCP’’.

**P5** MM implies that the object characterised as AGM instantiates every \(P_{AGM}\) member in every AGM-imagination-realising world.
(P5') MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates every \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \) member in all and only AGM\(_2\)-imagination-realising worlds.

(P5'') MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds, which can only be \{@\} members.

(P5''') MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain, and only the actually existent golden mountain, instantiates golden mountainhood in \( @ \) in all and only @GM-imagination-realising POWs.

(P6) \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \) includes golden-mountainhood-in-@.

(P6') \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \), fulfils conditions i-iv.

(P6'') \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \), includes golden mountainhood, being R-related to the imaginer, where \( R \) is existence-entailing for both of its relata, and being such that the imaginer experiences her surroundings from within.

(P7) Any object instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in any world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

(P7') An object instantiates golden-mountainhood-in-@ in any possible world only if it instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

(P7'') The actually existent golden mountain can instantiate every \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \) member only in @.

(P8) Nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @.

(P8') Nothing instantiates every \( \mathcal{P}_{AGM} \) member in @.

(P8'') Nothing instantiates golden mountainhood in @ in @POW

(P9) No world is AGM\(_2\)-imagination-realising.

(P9') No world is @GM-imagination-realising.
(P10) Given MM, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in all and only AGM-imagination-realising worlds.

(P10') Given MM, the actually existent golden mountain instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds.

(P11) Given MM, the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates every $P_{AGM}$ member in all and only AGM-imagination-realising world.

(P11') Given MM, the actually existent philosophising cat instantiates golden mountainhood in all and only @GM-imagination-realising worlds.

(P12) MM implies that the actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are identical.

(P13) The actually existent golden mountain and the actually existent philosophising cat are not identical.

(RCP) For every characterisation $C$, $C$ semantically yields a set of nuclear properties $P_1,\ldots,P_n$ such that an object $o$, and only $o$, either (i) instantiates existence and $P_1,\ldots,P_n$, or (ii) doesn’t instantiate existence, but, of all nuclear properties, exactly $P_1,\ldots,P_n$. 
Bibliography


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