Welcome (back) to Germany!
The return of the guest-worker and its implications

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Abstract

We might suspect that the German nation has arrived back where it once started. The guest worker regime is having a comeback. Once again, immigrants contribute to the wealth of the German nation. The current perception of migration in the German media tends to the fact that there is a close link between economic productivity and the integration into society. Being a good migrant is characterized by being an economically productive individual. This is represented in German media discourse with the label “the new guest workers”. Here, the question of whether immigrants are culturally integrated or not is subsequent to economic considerations. Of course, not all immigrants are considered to be “new guest workers”. The perception of immigrants is highly differentiated, and can be distinguished into two groups. At the upper end, highly qualified migrants represent economic power and creativity. The low qualified are discussed in terms of their ability to integrate or assimilate. The article examines the role of the nation by defining the movement of people across space. Observing how the nation defines good vs. bad movement enlarges our ability to analyze regimes of mobility and migration. Thus, the empirical study presented here dissects the question ‘what qualifies a good migrant today?’ in the German discourse on immigration during the time of the (2008?) economic crisis. It will also reveal how liberal democratic states practices legitimate exclusion today. The new guest workers narrative also demonstrates the boundary blurring of race and ethnicity and the shifting a new form of inclusion and exclusion, which is called “identity liberalism”. By understanding this symbolic boundary of the dualistic evaluation, we can expand our knowledge how the ability to move across borders become a crucial criteria by which class is defined and class privileges upheld.

Keywords: Migration, Integration, Citizenship, Guest-Worker
1. Introduction – How to manage the liberal paradox?

If we are to take the big picture into consideration the deep economic recession (2008) has made the “liberal paradox” (Hollifield 1992) even more visible than before. In recent years, scholars have described this paradox as modern capitalism demanding the opening of borders for goods, services, and peoples in the economic sphere, whereas in the political field demands closure (Portes and DeWind 2006). The liberal paradox can be best observed in the field of cross-border movement during the current economic crisis. We know from previous studies that developed countries depend structurally on low and high-qualified immigrant labour, and historically the alien labour in western European countries was ‘wanted but not welcome’ (Zolberg). Those immigrants that were “wanted” in a most general way, that is, as an external labor supply, in order to reduce the price of wages in the receiving labour market. This stemmed from the national labour market’s motivation to be more competitive. Additionally, recent studies from the US show that there is a positive covariance between immigration and innovation in science and technology. As the number of visas for highly skilled migrants has increased, so have the amount of patent applications (Foley and Kerr 2013). “Not welcome” in a way that alien labour represents an undesirable “otherness”. And of course, in order to protect the national welfare state (Freeman 1986), which is today closely connected to the competition state (Cerny 1997). This demonstrates that members of a bounded community, like the national welfare state, need a sense of solidarity to ensure that other members of society participate in welfare (Kaufmann 2009).

The following analysis looks at the issue of symbolic boundaries, which determine that some migrants are more welcome than others. The article asks how the movement of people across state borders in Germany is normatively evaluated in current public debates. Therein, this study focuses on the subject of how contemporary western states select immigrants in a legitimate way. It contributes to the lively debate on the boundaries of the liberal state (see overview (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, and Zolberg 2011). Generally speaking, the following analysis makes use of the particular universalism, which is described as “the main form in which western states practice exclusion today” (Joppke 2010):137). The legitimate selection of immigrants has shifted away from the openly discriminatory group-level exclusion to an individualistic skills approach. The blurring of racial, ethnic and religious boundaries is enforced by the human rights discourse that stigmatizes group-level exclusion, but sanctions
individual-level exclusion based on language, culture and human capital (Bail 2008b). In 
other words, the liberal state is only for liberal people (Joppke 2010).

As previous research suggest, it’s not only important to study the content of boundaries - for 
instance liberal vs. traditional, but also the distribution of such representations. Roger 
Brukaker referred to an “ease of activation” or the degree “with which they slot into or 
interlock with other key cultural representations” (DiMaggio 1997 cited in (Brubaker 2009): 
34). Therefore, the case of Germany will be used as the empirical base for the analysis of 
how the supra-national discourse of the liberal human rights is attached to national 
circumstances. I concur with the observation of a dualism in the normative evaluation of the 
cross-border movement, which is called migration vs. mobility (Faist 2013). Migration/Mobility 
is a new pair of unequal categories that are highly important for status, resources, and 
power. The perception of these two categories leads to a hierarchization of labour migrants 
and highly skilled mobiles. The abstract distinction between mobility/migrations is in 
Germany characterized by the positive perception of the “new guestworkers”, which are the 
highly skilled mobiles and the negative perception of the migrants that are typically discussed 
under the integration foil. In this paper I’m arguing that the new guest workers represent in 
the German discourse on immigration a symbol for the ‘identity liberalism’ (Tebble 2006), by 
which symbolic boundaries are drawn. It describes the characteristically progressive values 
of liberal life, which reflects a distinctive mode of liberal nationalism. The roots of this modern 
community are no longer a common ancestry, traditional customs, or an exclusive territory. 
Necessary is merely an intersubjectively shared values horizon, which is reflected in a 
collective practice in the life of the people (see liberal community in Brumlik and Brunkhorst 
1993). Moreover, the deep economic crisis and the perceived demographic change have 
helped facilitate this distinction. These developments have been slightly overlooked by the 
migration research in Germany. Previous research has not paid enough attention to how the 
liberal-universalistic logic of individual rights and anti-discrimination has entered the domain 
of membership definition in Germany.

Exploring the symbolic boundaries in the case of Germany enables us to pay closer attention 
to the function that boundaries play in defining the limits of universalistic liberal states. The 
configuration of symbolic boundaries is one crucial factor for the integration of immigrants 
into a host society. The sociology of citizenship emphasizes that the struggle over 
classification and recognition is highly related to institutional boundaries like citizenship, 
which are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal 
distribution of resources … and social opportunities (Lamont and Molnár 2002): 168).
2. Citizenship, Migration and Symbolic Boundaries

What qualifies one as a good migrant? This first and foremost normative question requires at first glance a philosophical answer. However, the results of migration research can add substantial value to an answer if we consider the function of crisis and the function of newcomers for the visibility of norms more precisely. In general, social norms become highly visible in the process of socialization of new members in organizations or here, in politically defined communities (Schein 1984). In respect to migration, symbolic boundaries become obvious when migrants cross state borders. In this case of border crossing, states have used immigration policy(ies) as a tool(s) in promoting a particular national identity (Zolberg 2009). Integration policies and debates have also served to answer the question, “who are we?” The focus on the boundary work of ‘us against them’ is one step to analyze norms and culture of a society. The function of crisis should also not be underestimated in this respect.

Theoretically, the ‘unsettled times’ (Swidler 1986) initiated by the financial crisis provoke a widespread (public) uncertainty because the stability of the social construction of reality through routine is at risk (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Crisis such as the current economic depression is a catalyst for new interpretations and dynamics. Because of the increasing desire for clarity, transparency, and order, it requires a classification of new and different situations/phenomena that present themselves. This is accomplished by drawing influence from proven and confirmed schemes. Only when the given social order has been irritated and discursively problematized, can the social order actually be traced in their presence. In regards to immigration in times of crisis, Saskia Sassen argues that society has encountered similar situations many times before. She refers to the fact that in each immigration cycle, “we have incorporated vast numbers of immigrants so that today we are actually a mix: the they have become the us over our five centuries of intra-European migrations” ((Sassen 2013): 36). The boundary drawing is contingent; therefore the question must be: how have the modes of inclusion and exclusion changed?

For example, taking the migration-security nexus into consideration, the most empirically striking case are the attacks on 9.11, which had a huge transformative potential on the politics of migration and especially citizenship. Since the 1990s scholars have observed more liberal citizenship laws and policies, especially in Europe (Joppke 2010; Bauböck 2006; Green 2012; Hansen and Weil 2001; Howard 2010). They have described a broad liberalization process, which includes: the introduction of the territorial principle of ascription (jus soli); the principle of descent (jus sanguinis); and the more widespread tolerance of dual and mul-
These developments have been supported by an “all important exogenous variable that has shaped the evolution of citizenship […] the de-legitimization of racism and extreme nationalism in the West after World War II, and the parallel rise of universal human rights norms” (Joppke 2010: 149). But some scholars refer to restrictive trends that have recently been witnessed in this overall liberal framework, “Since 2001, the emphasis has shifted clearly away from opening up access, albeit gradually and not uniformly throughout Europe, towards a thickening of citizenship, with many countries successively introducing assimilatory elements such as language and citizenship tests, integration courses and citizenship ceremonies” (Green 2012:174).

These politics of citizenship are in fact influenced by an international crisis caused by the terror attacks on 9.11. Joppke’s example of Great Britain is instructive. In Britain the civic integration in post-2001 Europe has become obligatory and liberal-democratic norms are much needed to be shared by all, especially by Muslim migrants and ethnics (Joppke 2010). Here, the access to citizenship is coupled more firmly to national identities and the recent restrictions to citizenship is interpreted as a result of the failure of multiculturalism: “[S]everal European governments have pronounced multiculturalism to be a failure and opted for more aggressive means of integrating immigrants into their societies” (Triadafilopoulos 2011: 861). Currently, it is not a Question of ‘Who has Access?’, but rather under what conditions does someone with eligibility obtain citizenship? (Goodman 2010): 754). These conditions are very much influenced by public ideologies (Favell 2001) and public debates involve struggles over interpretations of symbolic boundaries. Citizenship laws are indeed crucial social boundaries but they are based on and interact with symbolic boundaries that are necessary for the creation, implementation, stabilization, and legitimation of social exclusion through citizenship. The symbolic boundaries need to reflect socially accepted norms (Sackmann, Peters, and Faist 2003) because “only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon they can take on a constraining character …[and] become social boundaries” (Lamont and Molnár 2002:168).

The modern state (as a political-legal community) that defines its membership based on citizenship is usually called a nation-state. It indicates that they are symbolic communities, which are centered on their self-understanding of a community of citizens. However, there are usually more symbolic elements that are not directly related to political-legal associations (Peters 1993). Citizenship is not only defined in juridical terms but also in moral terms. Both define who is a member of the society (Yurdakul and Bodemann 2007). The symbolic boundaries of citizenship are for instance located and represented in the media (coverage?) about (on) national identity. In contemporary public debates in Germany, as in other immigra-
tion countries in Europe and North America, the issue of national identity looms large. Old immigration countries in Western Europe\(^1\) share a strong linguistic and cultural boundary (Bail 2008a). The German nation and its national identity had been understood as especially exclusive when it comes to issues such as migration, integration and citizenship. As a consequence, research suggests that immigrants face restrictions rather than open access when it comes to the allocation of status and rights (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008).

The discourse is drawing the attention to the social integration of immigrants whose dispositions, principles, worldviews, and competences are allegedly at times incompatible with liberal-democratic values and norms. Debates abound over such issues as the compatibility of Islam with democracy and gender equality; the relationship between migrants’ cross-border ties and national loyalty in dual citizenship; and transnational political claims-making of migrants. These debates have been inextricably related to and discussed in terms of “non-integration”, “failed integration” or “disintegration”. The ‘unsettled times’ of 9.11. were a welcome opportunity to witness the return of nationhood in the broad liberalization process. Does this mean that arguments taking place in global, post-modern, transnational, or cosmopolitan literature (which suggest that inclusion is generated beyond national identities) are not valid anymore? Indeed, belonging still matters and historians have pointed out those xenophobic responses to crisis that are especially high in regards to (breaches of) security (Schrover 2010). But what about the current economic crisis? Is this a welcome opportunity to witness the legitimate mode of excluding people by a liberal-universalistic logic of individual rights and non-discrimination, as Joppke suggests? The case of Germany takes us through various unsettled times and reveals in detail how integration into imagined community was practiced over time.

2.1 Symbolic boundaries in Germany’s present and past

Since 1913, the citizenship law had legally defined membership in terms of language, culture and ancestry. In 2000, the situation changed and Germany no longer coupled state membership to an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation. During this time it re-characterized the German nation and its identity in order to reinvent itself more often and in a more fundamental way than any of its neighbors. To understand how boundaries are drawn up depends

\(^1\)Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia. See Bail 2008: 55.
largely on how Germany imagines its national identity. Consequently, the question of whether the nation is defined on the basis of ethnicity or democratic decisions plays into current debates on immigration and integration.

As many studies showed, Germany is a country of immigration - a fact that was officially denied by the polity for a long period of time (Faist 2007). The way in which the nation was able to perpetuate the fiction of being a non-immigration country when in fact millions of immigrants had settled there is specific to Germany’s nature (history?). Debates and politics that frame immigrants as competitors for scarce goods and abusers of the social welfare system, have successfully established and supported the view that immigrants are culturally different.

2.1.1. From the perception of guest workers to the disintegrated Muslim

After Second World War, the hopes and observations of various intellectuals lay in the fact that a new constitution and constitutional patriotism will be developed. Jürgen Habermas assumed that the universalistic values of the nation generate an inclusion beyond race and ethnicity (Habermas 1987). Another well-known position comes from T. H. Marshall, who stated that “free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law” generate a unified civilization (Marshall 1963):47). If one considers the policy towards migrants and foreigners in West-Germany since its foundation in 1949, then one might also agree with Habermas and Marshall. Policies for the integration of migrants act generally integrative. Thus, in the course of history the (social) rights have been expanded and immigrants have been integrated into the welfare state. With the adoption of the new Law on Citizenship in 2000, which replaced the Reichs- and Nationality Act (RuStAG) from 1913, the jus soli principle was added to the existing ius sanguinis, so long as the parents have lived in Germany for at least eight years. Becoming a German by naturalization is now also possible under 8 years instead of 15. In addition, dual citizenship was not generally accepted, but there is now a rule of option. In Germany born multiple nationals must decide at the age of 18 to 23 their nationality.

However, a great ambivalence between real politics and public debates exist. If we remember the fact that between 1945 and 1989 the net immigration into the federal republic of Germany amounted to more than 18 million people, a real discussion about the issue of migration started about 40 decades after the second world war. During most of that time, the foreigner remained a foreigner and was not perceived as either a friend or as an enemy (Bauman 2013). Also interestingly, the 13 million displaced persons from the former eastern
territories had not been discussed in terms of ethnic boundaries between residents and displaced. The incorporation has been unproblematic and ethnic Germans were Germans.

During the 1950s and 1960s, it was the time of full employment and the German economic miracle. The view was established that the decision for the admission of immigration was equivalent to the decision for or against economic prosperity. The perception was clearly that immigration promotes national wealth. The immigration policy was characterized, in essence, as a temporary residence for work purposes in order to organize the return trip to their respective home countries. The migrants were labeled as "guest workers", because their stay were thought to be only temporary. This picture fits well into the identity construction after the second world. Michael Foucault describes post-war Germany as a special case. The founders of the German Federal Republic faced the problem of inventing a nation that does not have a general democratic will from which the founders could derive a model for democracy. Foucault ascribes a certain finesse to the founding fathers of the new state. The Ordo-Liberals, under the late Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, founded the new German state on the basis of economic freedom. The new German nation-state was therefore always bound to be an economic state (Foucault 2004). So the question, what constitutes a good German citizen and an outsider is closely linked to economic productivity. More than elsewhere, being a good citizen depends on the value of individual productivity. Together with the emphasis on cultural achievements in literature, arts and science, the social market economy was one of the pillars to construct a national the identity in the phase of the reconstruction of the nation. It remains a benchmark for political, economic and social reforms to the present day.

With the beginning of the economic recession in 1966/67, the recruitment of guest workers started to decline. The oil crisis and the economic downturn in 1973 resulted in the same year with a complete recruitment stop and until 1973, about 2.6 million foreign workers were employed in the Federal Republic. With the economic decline came a differentiated perception of guest workers, which was visible in public debates. Matters of residence were no longer were discussed, but instead the social status of the guest workers. The imposition of the recruitment stop urged family reunification. It was at that time the only authorized form of immigration. As the guest workers brought over their families to Germany, the social origins of the migrant workers were increasingly the subject of debate. At this time, the German nation was astonished to realize that: "they have called for workers and people came" (Frisch 1975). Due to reunification of the guestwork's family, the problems of migrant children in school and in the education system became the center of public attention. This marked the beginning of the debate on the immigration policy. Four decades after the war, Germany had
again debated the issue of assimilation and integration. But racist discourses and the forced assimilation disappeared. So far, strangeness was accepted as such, as long as the stranger remained a stranger. The Christian Parties of the CDU and CSU successfully (semantically) connected domestic problems like high unemployment with immigrants. They created the idea that Germany has a foreigner problem, i.e. that Germany actually had too many foreigners. “The boot” is full was one of the famous metaphors to describe the situation. So, the issue was framed that the stranger became with his aspiration to education and social rights increasingly a competitor for scarce goods, such as jobs, housing and social services. They were perceived a as threat to the ethnic homogeneity of the German nation. As the migrants were now identified not only by the geographical mobility but also due to their social mobility, the ethnicizing process of the foreigners begun. The CDU/CSU drew the line between us versus them and demanded that immigrants assimilate culturally. The symbolic use of immigration in political conflicts was facilitated by the ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship and they reinforced each other. That’s why the fiction of non-immigrations could be uphold (Faist 2007).

Up to then, the politics on the social integration focused primarily on a temporary stay and were driven by the assumption that the immigrants are going to return to their home country as soon as possible. There was no uniform nationwide immigration policy and the cities were left alone with the educational problems of the migrants. Until well into the 1980s, central migration policy guidelines contained the recruitment stop, restricting family reunification and the promotion of willingness to return.

A new impetus was given to the topic in the late 80s and early 90s through an increased amount of refugees, asylum seekers and expellees. In particular, the public unease with the lack of concepts of German politics played a major role. The themes of "labor migration" and "asylum seekers" were increasingly mixed and the "foreigner issue" was politicized and a huge ideological debate was conducted. The issue went from low to high politics. Central Questions were at that time: In What kind of society do we actually live and in which do we want to live? An opposition to cultural assimilation view was the starting multicultural debate, which rejected the issue of a foreigner problem. Instead of evaluating the different culture negatively, they emphasized the positive effects for the society. Regardless of being good or bad, the debate highlights the importance of a cultural understanding of the German nation.

In the Early 90s within the process of German east and west unification the issue of the national identity urged again dramatically in the foreground. An obvious racism revealed itself in attacks against foreigners. One example are the riots in the former East Germany city Rostock, which lasted for several days. Right-wing extremist attacked a building where asylum-
seekers from Vietnam and other countries were living. Hundreds of local residents gathered to cheer the attackers and the police did little to detain the attackers. This example illustrates well the classic argument. The national identity is a powerful instrument for defining and localization of "disoriented" people who had to be satisfied with the great changes and uncertainties of the modern world (Smith 1991). However, the 90s also marked a turning point in migrations politics, from a rather reactive to an active management approach for migration. Integration has become central tasks of economic, social and cultural policies.

Since the Islamist attacks of 9.11., migration politics and debates are closely coupled to security issues and the debate about Islam forms a new aspect in the integration discourse. The problem of foreigners turned into a religions problem. Turkish immigrants are now Muslims. The debate focuses on the migrants who are already in the country but lack the will to integrate or who do not even have the capacity to integrate. The fears and accusations concern migrants who devote their lives at the margins of society to Islam and establish Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The fear of building an insular religious society within the German society was projected with the term parallel society. The assimilatory claims especially from the CDU/CSU gave the debate a new drive. They assert that Multiculturalism has failed in Germany and immigrants have to adapt to the German guiding culture.

Paradoxically, it remains unclear to the immigrants what the German culture is all about. It is not clearly defined in most public debates; apart from some very general ideas, such as competence in the national language and loyalty to the democratic constitution. One might suspect that the German nation has arrived back where it once started. The unifying bond is the German language. However, more clearly defined, is what the German nation is not. The integration debate is associated inseparably and discussed within the terms non-integration, failed integration and disintegration. The debate is full of assertions, assumptions and issues, such as the compatibility of Islam with democracy or with the of gender equality. At the very general level the discourse draws a boundary between the binaries liberal and modern vs. illiberal and traditional. The consequences for the migrants are well investigated. Cultural Ranking, symbolic exclusion and generalization are only few mechanisms, which come along through this point of view. Among others, this discrimination results in an unequal access to the labor market. Especially young men with immigrant background have significant disadvantages to get an apprenticeship, despite their high education and regardless of their linguistic and social integration compared to young men without a migration background (Diehl 2009 et al.). The rhetorical construction of the backwardness and the boundary drawing along the german language has a unique function. Ernest Gellner points out that the major social systems such as the strong labor market, the German economic miracle after the Se-
cond World War and the welfare state have lost their integrative power. The German lan-
guage and the german educational system have now a growing importance for social cohe-
sion (Gellner 2008).

2.2. Diverging perception of immigrant groups

The history of migration in Germany has shown that a differentiated perception of immigrants
began. Driven by the inertia effects of once established interpretations schemes (for instance
guest-workers, foreigner issue e.g.) a differentiated categorization of migrants is more likely.
Hence, empirical discourse studies have proven that such differentiation actually occurs.

Before the crisis, an empirical analysis of public debates about immigration into Germany
concludes with the remarkable observation of two discourses in the German public, each
treated separately. It seems that the large number of reports, which focus on a supposed
threat to the cultural national identity in Germany, is largely unaffected by the discourses on
the demographic needed immigration of highly skilled workers (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke
2004). Unfortunately, a continuing empirical analysis for this economic crisis is not available,
but concerning recent development in scientific debates, it can be expected that the distinc-
tion in the public is upheld.

The new research on mobility regimes shed light on how scholars evaluated diversity and
mobility positively. They are arguing that „there are several different intersecting regimes of
mobility that normalize the movements of some travelers while criminalizing and entrapping
the ventures of others“ (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013): 189). Accordingly, the view was
criticized that the world culture is created through elite travelers, better understood as cos-
mopolitans, which could handle difference and reject ethnic separations. Thomas Faist
pointed out how the distinction between labour migrants and highly skilled mobiles reproduce
social inequalities. The spatial movement of the highly skilled mobiles is considered to be
economically efficient and desirable, whereas the labour migrants are rather negatively con-
noted (Faist 2013). In his view, mobility is a new norm that secure life chances to highly edu-
cated and professional people. Moreover it is a depoliticized issue. The core of the public
debates centers around the positive or negative repercussions for economic competitiveness
of national economies, be it claims about “brain gain” or “brain drain”. Whereas migration is
often connected to highly moralized debates on belonging. Considering Migration, it seems
that nothing is left but integration. In the case of Migrants with lower social status cross bor-
der relations are associated with non-desirable downward mobility, coupled with the risk of
social segregation and disintegration (Esser 2006). People with limited financial resources and low cultural and social capital, which extends beyond the immigrant enclaves, it is assumed that they do not benefit from cross-border relations. Instead, transnational practices in public discourses and in academic debates sometimes also viewed as an expression of ethnic segregation (Friedrichs and Triemer 2008); (Halm and Sauer 2006). Bi-Culturalism and Bi-Multilingualism act implicit integration retardant.

In essence, on the one hand, for people with higher incomes and for those who hold degrees from tertiary educational institutions, geographic mobility and transnational networks are often regarded in public and academic debates alike as a social asset, an element of upward social mobility. On the other hand, persons with lower social status are considered to have barely any transnational ties; or if they do – as in the case of migrants – transnationality is associated with downward mobility, coupled with the risk of social segregation and disintegration. It seems that the categorization along culture pertains to the ranking of low-status immigrants, while categorizations in terms of economic utility are reserved for highly-skilled immigrants.

2.3. Summary – cultural integration doesn’t matter if...

Indeed, the integration of immigrants has turned into a question of incorporating or rejecting creeds and principles but not for all immigrants. The highly skilled are loosely coupled and the low skilled are tightly coupled to integration debates. In the case of highly qualified the individual background like their competence or skills are more important than in the case of the low qualified, which are discussed in public debates under terms of group ascription. At this point the main research problem strives out of the question: Under which circumstances is the socialization (Vergesellschaftung) dependent on the discourse on integration (Vergemeinschaftung)? When does the activation of culturalistic view occurs and when does it not?

What needs to be shown, are the terms and conditions under which the different perception in the discourse are institutionalized. The following empirical study is focused on the highly skilled “entering” the national discourse about immigration. Keeping in mind that the boundary making as practice of categorization always depend on the alter-ego relation, the empirical study focuses more on the us instead of the them. It strives to describe the highly qualified more precisely. The study leaves out the other side of the liberal identity construction, which was subject to previous studies, for instance the relationship between Muslims and the liberal state (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, and Zolberg 2011; Hansen 2011).
So instead of affirmatively following the well-known labour migration and integration debate (devalue of labour and contribution to the neoliberalisation of labor markets, (Bauder 2006), it is more fruitful to me (in the first step) to analyze how the term highly qualified guest workers is used in a concrete example and what kind of boundary work is it actually doing. It's worth knowing, from whom we are actually talking, when we speak about migration in the public discourse and whom do we not consider.

3. Analyzing the discourse on immigration

The methodology in this study depends crucially on the research question and the assumptions applied to it. If the assumption in the hold true that the evaluation of cross border movement is used ambivalent and will vary depending on the context, the research heuristic must lead up to the question, under what conditions. In this case the most important empirical question is: In what context and in what category distancing mechanisms are used to draw boundaries?

In a nation state the control over the means of symbolic production is generally obtained by the majority group. They have a privileged access, more than any minority group and can produce thereby the assumed characteristics of a minority group. However, also small organizations can have serious effects on the mainstream, if they activate a confirmed schema. One of the few studies which operate with big data on public opinions has shown how public discourses responded to exogenous events like the terror attacks on 9.11. The fringe effect (Bail 2012) suggests that angry and fearful fringe organizations which deploy the ‘Muslim as enemies frame’ has become one of the most influential mainstream groups in the US-media.

The minority group is now in a dilemma, which was prominently described in the post-structural approaches by interpellation (Althusser 1977), the process of subjectifying (Butler 1991) and performativity (Austin 1972). In order to reply to the accusations of being not integrated, the minority group needs to obtain a social role, which was created by the majority group, which probably mean that they have to self ethnicize in order to react to this attribution. Thus, the group is socially constructed by the performative act, such as “Muslims are not integrated!” Indeed the object is denied but at the same time it is brought the four (Butler 1991)

The answer, that is, accepting the interpellation, makes the group to an intelligible member of society. That means that the adaption of a social role is the main condition for being able to
speak in a discourse about integration. Once a meaning or attribution is manifested in the discourse, it's even harder to change it. Pierre Bourdieu has referred repeatedly that manifested meanings, terms and norms have strong inertia effects which show how persistently a social order is (Bourdieu 1982, 238).

It's the power of the denomination that produces real consequences and the discourse manifest the meanings. The control over the definition of situation, social roles and the recognition of capital is as important as the access to and control of material resources. That's why the classification, definition and description of integration vs. disintegration does not simply represent and describe social reality but also help to create perceptions of that reality and its interpretation. According to Bourdieu, categorization is a struggle to impose definitions of divisions within society and, hence, of making and unmaking social groups. Categorization does not describe social order but rather shapes and reshapes power relations.

If these available categorizations are used in decisions in policy-making, they then link directly to political structures and decision-making (Foucault 2004: 187).

This study focuses on the insiders; those who are ascribed to be included. With the help of the research program "The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse" (SKAD) the newspaper texts will be analyzed to see how the discourse of the highly skilled is operating.

The sociological discourse analysis can be characterized as a research perspective in the tradition of the hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, which focuses on the objectivity of the symbolic order and its communicative construction. It reconstructs the origins of collectively shared knowledge, whereby the production of knowledge is situated in discourses. Knowledge is a consolidated, relevant and objectified sense of an individually repeated sense-making process. That's why an empirical sociology of knowledge has to deal with what is regarded as knowledge in a society, and it must examine the basis of which processes a certain stock of knowledge is socially established as reality. Likewise, the national identity would be a social stock of knowledge relevant to the observation of transnational phenomena.

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3 This work relies on the assumption of Benedict Anderson, that the nation-state as an imagined community with a particular cultural community is only possible due to the reproduction and circulation of written communication. Accordingly, the empirical bases of the research are texts and reports of mainstream newspapers.
An empirical analysis of discourse is nothing more than to ask for the selection criteria of a selected meaning out of a horizon of meanings. The selection of meaning is regulated by rules, which are supposed to be discovered in a discourse analysis.

According to Reiner Keller I define discourse, following Foucault “as regulated, structured practices of sign usage in social arenas, which constitute smaller or larger symbolic universes (Keller 2012): 58). The function of Discourses can be best described as stabilizing meanings: “Discourses can be understood as attempts to freeze meanings or, more generally speaking, to freeze more or less broad symbolic orders, that is, fix them in time and by so doing, institutionalize a binding context of meaning, values and actions/agency within social collectives” (ebd.: 59) In Essence the SKAD has the goal to examine:

“Discourses as performative statement practices and symbolic orderings, which constitute reality orders and also produce power effects in a conflict-ridden network of social actors, institutional dispositions, and knowledge stocks. It is emphasized that discourse is concrete and material; it is not an abstract idea of free-floating line of arguments. This means that discourse appears as speech, text, discussion, visual image, use of symbols, which have to be performed by actors following social instructions, and therefore discourses are real social practices. SKAD research is concerned with reconstructing the processes which occur in social construction, objectifications, communication, and the legitimization of meaning structured in institutional spheres and issues arenas” (ebd.: 59).

3.1 In the making: The discourse of highly qualified in German media

With the adoption of Anderson’s assumption, the study is confronted with the problem of large amounts of text, and therefore plausible reasons should explain on which decisions the delimitation of study periods and articles is based on. At the beginning, my analysis focuses primarily on the quantitative aspects of the discourse on immigration. Many discourse analysts have repeatedly pointed to the importance of quantitative aspect in order to obtain a first indication on pilings, series and regularity, the so called dominance structure of a Discourse. After this, a deep structural analysis of few articles is following. So to speak, I enter the research field on the one hand with a large N-Study and on the other hand with a line by line analysis of few articles in order to move to the center of the discursive field.

I have started with a corpus-linguistical analysis of the weekly mainstream magazine and their online editions in Germany. This include Focus, Spiegel, Stern and Die Zeit. In order to select the required article, an electronic database that provides an identical search for all se-
lected newspapers is needed. This offers the advantage to use the same keyword combination to all newspapers. The database LexisNexis has been used for this purpose. I collected all articles in the phase of the economic crisis from 2008-2012 which contain the buzzword Migrant*. All in all I have 1975 articles in my sample.

I’ve started with a co-occurrence Analysis. In a linguistic sense, it can be interpreted as an indicator of semantic proximity. It allows us to see which words are significant in connection. In order to capture the different meanings attached to the words, which describe Immigration to Germany, I have analyzed the words Migrant (engl. Migrant), Zuwanderer (engl. Immigrant), Aulander (engl. Foreigner). These words are all very similar in its meaning but I want to capture their actual usage in a concrete context. My research focus was guided by the latest state of the art, which concludes with the remarkable observation of two discourses in the German public, each treated separately. It seems that the large number of reports, which focus on a supposed threat to the cultural national identity in Germany, is largely unaffected by the discourses on the demographic needed immigration of highly skilled workers (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004). As a result of this, I wanted to find out which words are actually representing the different discourse fields. In Figure 2 the results of the co-occurrence analysis are represented. All three words have a common strong relation to the meaning of “more”, “a lot” and “against”. But also the difference is becoming clearer.
Interestingly, the most frequent words connected to the Word “Migrant” have tendency towards a cultural categorization, for instance “Turkish” and “Muslim”. The word “Ausländer” is highly related to the meanings of “against” and “criminal”. We can find a more economic connotation of the term “Zuwanderer”, which is highly connected to the words qualified and highly-qualified.

In a second step, I continued with the deep structural text analysis. The main challenge was to blind out all the previous results in order to “avoid” a strong bias in the sampling.

For the purpose to determine the appropriate scope of the empirical material, the grounded theory provides a useful methodological tool box (Strauss and Corbin 1996). The Grounded theory supports the transparency and the controlledness of the research process. The scope of the data collection is based on the theoretical saturation, which is reached when the given categories are not further differentiated in their feature via an additional involvement of data and if no more new categories can be found on the given and extensible data material (Glaser and Strauss 2005).

The initial phase was characterized by gaining a first orientation. I entered the field of research with free-floating attention. I perceived everything and collected everything that is also
possible for every informed ordinary person. At this stage, I have noticed two leading articles in *Der Spiegel* that contained an explicit normative evaluation of high-and low-skilled migrants. I decided to look at these two articles as my starting point of the analysis and to use from now on the qualitative sampling and theoretical sampling in order to collect more articles. The basic idea is that a sample is not - as it often is - equal to the case determined at the beginning of the investigation, but rather designed little by little according to the theoretical aspects, which emerge in the course of the empirical analysis.

In the following, I will briefly describe how the first data collection has occurred: After the open coding of the two articles within the meaning of Grounded Theory, it was evident that the articles often refer in their argumentation and in the justification of facts to the migration studies of the OECD. I decided to take a closer look on the articles that explicitly refer to the migration studies by the OECD. This had a decisive advantage for me, because then I tried to transfer the selection bias into the “media”. Thus, it is ensured that the article selection is not immediately intransparent and depending on the content interests and prior knowledge of the researcher. Just to give an example of how a randomized themed article selection can reproduce a media bias: When the German headscarf debate will be investigated, then already the article selection decides mainly the outcome of the study. The result is that a dichotomy exists between foreign Muslims as victims and the German hegemonic discourse as a perpetrator (Rauer 2008).

In order to select the required article, likewise before the electronic database *LexisNexis* has been used for this purpose. The articles were selected by using the keyword OECD * Studies * Migration*. The time-period was also limited from 2008-2012. Based upon the theoretical samplings the analyzed articles were selected corresponding to the degree of their theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin 1996). This was done especially in orientation to the principle of maxi- and min contrast. First, these articles were selected, which are in the highest contrast to each other, so that the full range of content is visible. Then the minimum contrast is applied: If for example a relevant category (Integration) didn’t seemed to be fully captured in their features and dimensions, then similar articles were used for additional data. This method ensures to grasp the structure of a discourse phenomenon. Until now 19 articles have been analyzed and the study is still in the making.

Nevertheless the first few results of the open and axial coding in the meaning of the Grounded Theory are revealing the process of problematization of the discourse phenomena “the new highly skilled guest workers”. It describes the definition, classification and categorization of the problem. Van Dijk argues that discourses on migration focus on problems, either the immigrants create problems or they have problems (van Dijk 1992). In the case of the new
highly qualified new guest workers it’s demonstrated that these immigrants have problems and do not create problems. For instance, the developed category “Culture” is showing that the usual and general observation of culture “turns around”. Instead of looking at the compatibility of the migrant culture, the German culture is at the stake, for example having a “Welcome Culture” for migrants. Germany has a deficit. It’s needs to get modern and provide a culturally open environment to attract the highly skilled. Thereby, the discourse claims that this problem is our Problem and we have to find a solution.

By linking the discursive field of immigration to economic consideration such as economic growth and labour market or even demographic problems of the nation, the problem is not denied but expanded and legitimized. The connection with other topics makes it easier to understand and evaluate the problem. For instance, the wealth of the nation depends on the economic growth and the new guestworkers contribute to growing affluence, thereby the new term guestworker is connected and coupled with a well-established and conventional stock of knowledge. Once again the interpretative schema of the guestworker is activated, which means immigration of guestworkers is equal to economic prosperity. On the one hand the economic reality of the immigrants is especially highlighted and on the other hand some features of the immigrants are not mentioned. It’s a striking fact that no issue of cultural problematization or integration issues arise, which is very typical about the german discourse on migration. Moreover the new guestworkers are more considered to be the us instead of the them. The characteristics are described to be the young, brave and educated elites, which represent the united Europe. Thus, they share the same culture and won’t attract attention of being something different when living in German cities. These descriptions entail also a short biographical note of few select new guest workers, which refer to the same challenges every young EU-citizen have to face in this world during the current economic crisis, for instance the insecurities on the job market, the change of residence through workplace change or studying abroad. The orientation on the same values normalizes the immigration of the new guest workers into Germany. Through this precise characterization a communitization (Vergemeinschaftung) is made because culture, as a interpretative pattern serves for group formation.

As mentioned before, the relationship of the new-guestworkers and integration is similar addressed as in the former times of the 1960s. The topic of Integration only arises in the field of economic integration into the labour market. That’s why politicians need to reduce the barriers and hurdles for the entree into the labor market. The exchange of guest worker between different European countries enhances the European integration, which is basically meant to be an economic integration. Valentin Rauer argued that surprisingly the millionth guestworker
in 1960s is not seen as a sign of successful integration of immigrant workers, but as a sign of successful development policy in Europe (Rauer 2013). Today, Germany supports again young European people to find a job and thus Germany curry out successfully development aid for less economic powerful countries in Europe. The extraordinary importance of the guest-worker does not derive from the integration of guest worker in Germany but from the integration of Europe.

In summary, Table 1 shows the phenomenal structure of so the called new highly qualified “Guest Workers”. It refers to the discursive attributions for a discourse subject, which is described by determining the nature of the problem, cause, description of characteristics, causal relationships, responsibilities, moral judgment and consequences.

Table 2 Phenomenal structure of the new guest workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Concrete Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causes</td>
<td>Immigration of Highly Qualified as an “Economic Issue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (Financial) Crisis in South Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Germany as an Role Model of Economic Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration of Highly Qualified as an “Demographic Issue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Immigration not a but Problem but a Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>Politics/Government/National administrations (must develop and ensure a good policy to attract Highly Qualified from abroad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for action/</td>
<td>High Problem Level, The Problem is a political Issue, which need to be solved immediately. The barriers to immigration must be reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Positioning</td>
<td>Political Parties in Germany, Economic Firms, Representatives of economic and pragmatic reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Positioning</td>
<td>Government shows a lack of consciousness for their responsibility to ensure the future of German wealth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 Discussion: The Return of the Guest worker and its implication

The international migration is tightly controlled by the national states, which are competing in a global race for tax money. Since the important work of John Meyer we know that States want to be modern. Following the self-description of the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, the EU strives for being ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with maximized human capital, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.

In 2005, before the crisis, Eleonore Kofman predicted in her article “The Reassertion of National Identity” that the selection of migrants through management systems will derive from their utility to the economy: “The right to migration and eventual citizenship is increasingly restricted to the highly skilled; for other workers a new guest worker system is being implemented. This dichotomy is most clearly drawn in Northern states such as Germany and the UK” (Kofman 2005: 463).

It’s not new, that being a worker is qualified as a good citizen, if we take T.H. Marshall into consideration. Jasmin Soysal demonstrates what is actually the new case, as she is addressing the new social project in Europe (2012). Her work is important because she draws a connection between work and social justice: “Work no longer implied as a socially organized condition but rather as an individual positioning in the labor market as expressed in the Human capital conceptions” (Soysal 2012: 5). The individual citizen is carrying the burden of being responsible of social cohesion. The individual productivity and the active participation in society secure a good society and the case of migrants they have to earn the citizenship (Joppke 2007). Soysal also points to several policy developments like Blue Card Initiative from the EU, which reflect this new shift and she explains which people represent the norm: “The Mobility of the global professional class (e.g. employees of international finance and IT Companies, scientific research agencies, and artists) is seen as imperative for a competitive and productive economy” (Soysal 2012: 7).
Indeed, considering the empirical data, we might suggest that Inclusion/Exclusion is generated on an individualistic mode and it seems that this modus is enforced by the economic crisis. It’s the individual performance in in liberal open society, which seems to be the mode by which people are selected to be suitable and adaptable for membership of the German society. It can be demonstrated that the individualistic modus of inclusion is likely expressed in Germany by the new guest worker narrative. By coupling it to the old guest workers narrative in Germany it gains a plausible sense making in the discourse. The new and old guest workers are economic powerful narratives in the discourse and today the new guest workers pertain also the same culture by which a normalization of this type of immigrations is achieved. Still, it’s not the end of the study but it seems that the discourse on immigration during the economic crisis focuses more on the people who we want to have and not at those who we don’t want to have.

This would explain the current symbolic boundaries in the discourse. The IOM Survey and several case studies reveal that a consistent increase in public hostility towards migration during the economic is not up for debate:

“Opinion poll data and research in selected European countries shows that the economic recession did not necessarily increase public concern about migration. In some countries where migration was already an issue of high salience in the pre-crisis period, the economic recession did not increase public concerns about migration; rather, it replaced migration as a focus of concern. In contrast, in more recent countries of immigration where migration was still viewed positively, public attitudes towards migration tended to harden during the economic crisis” (Koehler et al. 2010): 4

The same opinion is shared by the Study of Godenau et al “Labour Market Integration and Public Perceptions of Immigrants: A Comparison between Germany and Spain during the Economic Crisis”, as the say:

“The economic crisis has made parts of the population more skeptical about immigration. However, there appear to be no links between the severity of the crisis and public debates on migration. Although Spain was definitely harder hit by the crisis than Germany, and immigrants were more severely affected, public debates on migration and integration issues seem to be at least as fierce in Germany as in Spain.” (Godenau et al. 2012): 71).

We do not experience, that anti-immigrat attitudes are increasing because of the economic crisis. Indeed this contradicts with general assumptions about discrimination. Theoretically, as unemployment is rising, the labor market must be understood as a market with scarce goods which is now subject to a higher degree of competition, especially in a deep economic
crisis. Although in modern states this competition is ultimately organized universalistic, that means, there are formal, equal and transparent access rights. But precisely because of this basic formal equality, competitions are then discharged to ascriptive characteristics, so to speak to the visibility of strangers like race, religion and culture (Nassehi and Nassehi 1999).

The main question still remains unanswered: Are the new guest workers a convenient escape of the liberal paradox? The highly qualified guest enabled the society to open up the borders and justify the enrichment by economic arguments and by the individualistic cosmopolitan culture. The specific notion of guest-workers highlights on the one hand the importance of economic capacity and power but on the other side it widely ignores the importance of cultural integration. The expectation on today’s Guest-workers is clear. They do what they are supposed to do: they work, they fit into the society and then they leave. Kristin Surak argues that these expectations are becoming the norm for migration per se and any deviance or exception of the rule needs further explanations (Surak 2013). Interestingly, if the guest-worker regime is the norm to perceive migration, the norm doesn’t conflate with quantitative amounts. According to the ILO, 20% of all international migration are guestworkers, just a little bit more than the total amount of refugees.

Thus, it is easy to construct a few arguments to demonstrate that this development has serious consequences for membership, citizenship, and belonging and also at a very general level for the integration of society.

First, the highly qualified new guest workers find open borders rather than constraints because they contribute to the wealth of the nation. Thus, the mobility infrastructure of the skilled people is more likely to have no national borders than in the case of low qualified people.

Second, temporary guest workers ease the burden of the welfare state budget, because they cannot claim to have all the rights of the citizens in the welfare state. Thus, the state would not contribute for instance to the education and training of the workers but gains the advantages like tax money.

Third, the access to a society, which produces and shares social goods like the welfare state, needs to have boundaries in which the distribution takes place (Walzer 2006). The idea of a symbolic boundary in Germany was long time defined by an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation. The impetus in the discourse about the highly qualified guest workers is not driven by the national identities of cultural homogeneity and external closure but rather by the individual participation on the world culture and on the economic prosperity. This is clearly a generalization of values beyond the old national identities. On the other hand, the nation ap-
appropriate the values by emphasizing once again the German contribution to the economic prosperity of the European union. It’s the German nation that supports the young people to find jobs and a good living.

These developments promise on the one hand the disappearance of ethnicized and racist discrimination in public discourses but what are on the other hand the consequences?

Although the attempts of the integration debate could be understood as a modus to simulate the German society as an entity which is held together by a common culture (Nassehi 1999). Then, the guiding culture debate is a kind of compensation for the loss of significance of the previous integration systems. Nevertheless I argue that these debates lack in the future a sensible justification while the criticism of the human rights discourse is growing. But still, the crucial question is then, of course, if there is a consensus of values, which enables the modern society to make the necessary degree of unity? What is the sense of solidarity that people need to have to share public goods in a community? Do we experience in this case a new definition of the boundaries of a national community and thus a new form of reciprocity of rights and duties in citizenship? Only those who have individually contributed to the social goods can participate in the rights or from the public goods of the community?

The interpretative schema of individualism is logically not tied to one nation state and at this point it cannot be answered conclusively to what extent the transnational/global culture of individualism is appropriated by the nation or overlaps with other properties of the nation (Ezli et al. 2013). But I assume that every western liberal nation appropriates these values in their own way. The Guest-worker narrative accompanied with the economic recession makes it very clearly in the case of German.

The integration in highly individualized societies is realized through the value of the individualism. The freedom of the individual is the most abstract value at all and if it’s operationalized by the economic freedom it can even be measured and thereby a integration capacity can be assessed. The big advantage of such integration measurement is obvious. It reduces the complexity dramatically because the economic performance (valued by money) is the only medium which quality is measured in a quantitative way (Deutschmann 2009). Then, the underlying logic of the boundary is the binary of individual vs. collective which is expressed in the media by the popular boundaries like liberal vs. traditional.

4 highly individualized society and decomposed in self-referential subsystems
In general, it means, it’s in legitimate strategy to exclude people, which lack economic performance without engaging in race, class, nationality or gender talk because everybody is judged equally. Nevertheless these mechanisms of inequality do still exist and still operate in the background but the focus is shifted from a collective view into a private self-responsible individual. The best example how these mechanisms work are studied by Bourdieu and Passeron in their famous education study in France (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990).

4. Conclusion

The current economic crisis – once again- embraced the topic of national sovereignty and identity. Within the national borders, governments need to demonstrate their capability in controlling the domain of economic power such as debts, growth and labour. Needless to say, migration also needs to be tightly controlled by the nation states but the question is how do they do that? The debates on integration of immigrants have showed that inclusion and exclusion is contingent, depended on the context. The current academic literature on migration in Germany can take us only so far in defending or criticizing the use of the term integration (Rauer 2013). The sociology of citizenship is a useful tool to see not only the shadows of modernity” (Wimmer 2002) but also how people get included and excluded in liberal states by liberal norms. During the economic crisis, I argue that the inclusion/exclusion is orientated by the individualistic turn, facilitated by the crisis and by the old guest worker narrative in Germany. The research of Joppke shed light on this dimension and the new emphasis on the distinction between migration and mobility is a promising way to analyze how nation legitimately select their migrants.

In the first place the study sought to reveal the distinction between labour migrants and highly skilled made by the public and also by the scientific community. While the labour migrants are ‘wanted but not welcome’ (Zolberg 1987), the highly skilled are ‘wanted and welcome’ (Faist 2013) as they represent in times of economic crisis a key to innovation and creativity in a knowledge based economic surrounding. In the case of highly skilled, the absence of integration or any cultural coding is striking. Despite the curiousness of these results, it is important to stress in the future the (discursive) social mechanisms, which lead to the outcome of these two categories, so that we can say more about the legitimation and de-legitimation of across border movement. Which mechanism regulates that cross border movement is seen on the one hand under the term mobility and on the other hand under the term migration?
The consequences for life chances are very crucial in a way the movement of people across borders is being perceived - either as form of economic utility or as a social adaptation to an imaginary society. Especially, when opportunities for cross-border interaction and mobility is the most important factor determining positions in the hierarchies of inequality of the global Age (Beck, cit in Faist 2013). Being not on the move, so to speak being local is a sign of social deprivation and degradation (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). I wonder if the argument is true that we are applying the powerful narrative of Robert Park “Migration is an agency of progress” (Park 1928) more to highly qualified mobile persons (2012) and reserving the frame of “The Stranger as an Anomaly” from Alfred Schütz more to the low qualified migrants (Schuetz 1944).
References


