AVOIDING GOVERNORS

FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

TRACY BECK FENWICK

With the goal of showing the effect of domestic factors on the performance of poverty alleviation strategies in Latin America, Tracy Beck Fenwick explores the origins and rise of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) in the region, and then traces the politics and evolution of specific programs in Brazil and Argentina. Utilizing extensive field research and empirical analysis, Fenwick analyzes how federalism affects the ability of a national government to deliver CCTs.

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Advance praise for Avoiding Governors: Federalism, Democracy, and Poverty Alleviation in Brazil and Argentina

“This carefully crafted study offers us critical insights on how institutional design affects both governing elites and the poor. It deserves a broad audience among policy makers, academics, and activists.” —NANCY BERMEO, Nuffield Chair of Comparative Politics, University of Oxford

“This Beck Fenwick makes a compelling argument about the conditions that either facilitate or retard one of the most important social policy innovations of the contemporary period, which is the turn toward the use of conditional cash transfers to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Her core interest in how different levels of government interact in the provision of social services has become a question of great import. With respect to the recent literatures on decentralization, federalism, and subnational governments in Latin America more generally, Avoiding Governors is by far the most sophisticated attempt yet to integrate municipal governments more directly into the theoretical frameworks we use to study intergovernmental relations.” —KENT EATON, University of California, Santa Cruz

“This book puts into stark relief an argument that has only been made implicitly so far: that governors are to be avoided if federal governments in Latin America are to successfully put forth antipoverty policies. The question or pursuit is well stated: to examine why Brazil and Argentina had differing outcomes from similarly designed CCTs. The answer the author provides is that differences in federalism are key: While the setup in Brazil is such that the federal government can bypass governors, the national government in Argentina does not have the opportunity within its federal system to truly bypass the provinces and put through national policy in an equitable fashion throughout the territory. Rather, municipalities in Argentina are captured by the provincial level.” —WENDY HUNTER, University of Texas at Austin