International Migration And National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin***

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Acknowledgement

This project is a collective effort by a large group of people. It was initiated by SPL (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) - was elaborated in close collaboration with the Migration and Development Research Group (Radboud University Nijmegen)- and developed into a joint effort aimed at gaining a better understanding of the link between international migration and national development as seen from the perspective of the countries of origin in the South (to counterbalance the northern bias in the current practice of policy making).

The project not only brought together a group of academic researchers from different institutions (including the ASC and CEDLA, NIDI, Utrecht University, Oxford University, and the Human Resources Development Centre (Lagos, Nigeria), but also involved policy makers from different Dutch Ministries: important contributions were made by different departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SPL, DCO and DPV) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. We are grateful for the very constructive collaboration which developed during the course of the project and the positive exchange of views, which helped to bridge the gap between policy making and academic research.

On the more personal level, we would like to thank Marjan Wind (SPL) for having initiated this project and her active role as a bridgehead within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while at the same time promoting the involvement of other ministries. Marieke van Renssen and Désirée Ooft for their positive input in helping us to keeping our project in line with policy trends and changing priorities. Jan Verboom (of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment) for taking the risk of becoming involved in foreign affairs and development matters, while helping migration policies to become more consistent. Collaboration not only between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, but also with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as well as cooperation at the international level (e.g. the EU) and linking up with civil society, is a necessary ingredient for the formulation of appropriate migration policies. International migration is a complex and dynamic process, leading to political, cultural and socio-economic change, and resulting in the global rearrangement of strengths and weaknesses. Migration for development is a multidimensional policy field that cannot dealt with in isolation.

We are very grateful for the productive manner in which our project was accompanied and monitored by the above group, and we would like to thank everyone who has kindly provided us with the valuable information that enabled us to do our research and write this report. We wish to thank, in particular, the embassies for their support during the field missions and for
responding to our questionnaire, and the migration and diaspora organisations who kindly shared their views and responded openly to our interviews. We would like express our special gratitude to Jean Munro (Nigeria), Babacar Ndione (Senegal) and Koki Muli (Kenya) for their participation in the field missions and their committed fact finding, despite the severe time restrictions. We very much hope that the project has generated the type of knowledge needed to obtain a better balance in the migration and development debate by giving more emphasis to the viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin.

On behalf of the research team

9 december 2006, Annelies Zoomers
0. BACKGROUND

Antecedents

In May 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration and Development Research Group (M&D) at Radboud University started to explore the possibilities for collaborating on the theme of international migration, which became an increasingly important policy theme in the course of the final decade of the last century, both in relation to the need to deal with questions of integration (how to deal with migrants in Dutch society), and, especially, in relation to efforts to incorporate migration issues as a new element in Dutch development cooperation, and also in anticipation of the participation of the Netherlands in the UN high-level dialogue on 14 and 15 September 2006.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was aware of the increasing growth rate of the world's migrant population, acknowledged the need for a better understanding of the root causes of migration and the need to contribute to policy formulation for optimizing the link between (international) development and migration, in particular, for the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (and also from the perspective of achieving the millennium development goals).

The M&D research group at the Radboud University, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, elaborated a proposal for a joint project with the title ‘International migration and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin’, which was aimed at gaining a better understanding of the implications of international migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). This project was started in May 2006, and aimed to gain a better understanding of the link between international migration and national development and to present policy recommendations on how to stimulate migration for development.

The project consisted of a number of research activities, including desk research, field missions and an international experts’ meeting, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was carried out with the active participation of policy makers. In the course of the process, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment also decided to participate and agreed to contribute to the project by co-financing activities.
Purpose of the project

The purpose of the project is to explore (1) current perceptions - as seen from the perspective of the countries of origin - of the links between international migration and national development, and (2) current trends in policy making aimed at minimizing the negative effects, while optimizing the development impact. What are the dominant view and policy initiatives in the different countries of sub-Saharan Africa?

Various/ multi-faced angles and perspectives are explored with the help of the following questions: What is the sending countries’ view of the rapid out-migration of skilled and unskilled labour? What is the sending countries’ perception of the advantages and disadvantages of temporary and/or circular migration as against permanent migration? What is their perception of return migration and how is this linked to national development. What are the implications of international migration for national development and poverty reduction strategies (as reflected in PRSPs)? How is migration perceived from the regional perspective (ECOWAS, etc.) and what kind of initiatives are currently underway to optimise the development implications?

To what extent are sending countries actively involved in formulating migration policies; What kinds of efforts are currently made (by government and civil society) to overcome the negative consequences of the brain drain and the shortage of human resources? What experiences do countries have in involving return migrants in development projects, co-development etc? How do countries respond to migrant recruitment practices? What are the current concerns with respect to the gender and generational aspects of migration and how are these responded to? What are the current bottlenecks in migration management and how could capacity building help to optimise the link with national development? How do sending countries deal with the issues of security and protection of migrants (at home and abroad) and with civil rights?

What is the role of governments and migrant organisations in mobilizing knowledge and technology available in the diaspora towards the home country? What kind of agreements are currently signed between sending and receiving countries, and what are the implications for development? What bottlenecks are perceived and how could donors contribute to optimizing the link between international migration trends and national development?

Most attention was paid during the project to Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria, but some attention was also paid to a large number of other countries (Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Cape Verde, Tanzania, Mali, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Botswana,
Congo and Ghana). During the project, interesting comparisons were made with relevant cases from other continents, e.g. the Philippines, China, India and Mexico.

Project activities and methodology

The project, consisting of desk research, field missions and an international experts’ meeting, was carried out between May and December 2006, and started with the following activities:

**Desk research**

- Inventory of policy documents/ state and donor policies with respect to international migration, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
- Statistical analysis of migration streams, inventory of migration routes, with an emphasis on temporary/ circular migration;
- Inventory of policy initiatives through a questionnaire distributed among the Dutch embassies in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Interviewing migrant and diaspora organisations related to sub-Saharan Africa operating in the Netherlands.

Additional data collection took place during **field missions** to Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Kenya (between June and September 2006). During these missions emphasis was placed on local perceptions and current policy initiatives relating to international migration.

Finally, **we organised an International Experts’ meeting** in collaboration with the Human Resources Development Centre (Lagos, Nigeria) which took place on 23-24 August at the Radboud University. This brought together an international group of scholars and policy makers from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America and Europe. Their written contributions and the discussions generated relevant information about perceptions and policies (see Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers [2006]). The proceedings of this meeting were used as an input to the Dutch contribution to the high-level dialogue on Migration and Development on September 14-15 in New York.
The present Report aims to give an overall overview of the complete output of the project. For a complete overview of the project output, see the Working Paper Series Migration and Development (reports 1-14). These reports are available on the websites of the Radboud University and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.minbuza.nl).

**Project team**

The project was carried out under the coordination of Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA, Radboud University) and Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University), and involved an international and multidisciplinary team of researchers (geography, anthropology, economics, demography) affiliated to various institutions.

More specifically, the following persons were actively involved in the various activities:

- 5 junior researchers (Joep Kusters, David van Moppes, Roald Plug, Joris Schapendonk, Marleen van der Veen, Radboud University) (Desk research/interviewing migrant and diaspora organisations, and organisation of the experts’ meeting)
- Prof. Aderanti Adepoju (Human Resources Development Centre; Lagos, Nigeria); co-organiser of experts’ meeting.
- Dr. Annelet Broekhuis (IDS, UU, Utrecht) Field missions to Burkina Faso and Senegal (the latter in collaboration with Babacar Ndione)
- Prof. Leo de Haan (ASC, Leiden) Resource person (experts’ meeting)
- Dr. Hein de Haas (Oxford University, Oxford) Field mission to Nigeria (in collaboration with Jean Munro)
- Dieudonné Muhoza and Pierre Claver Rutayisire (Utrecht University) Field mission to Rwanda.
- Dr. Ton van Naerssen (Radboud University) Desk research (migration and diaspora organisations)
- Dr. Marcel Rutten (ASC, Leiden) Field mission to Kenya (in collaboration with Koki Muli).
- Dr. Ernst Spaan (NIDI, The Hague) Desk research
Prof. Annelies Zoomers (CEDLA/ Radboud University), co-organiser of experts’ meeting and general coordination of desk research and field missions.

This team worked in close collaboration with Marjan Wind (SPL), Marieke van Renssen (DPV), Desirée Ooft (SPL) based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jan Verboom (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment). During the project, we discussed the preliminary results at working meetings. Policy makers participated actively during the experts’ meeting. The final results were presented and discussed during a lunch lecture at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 21 2006. This meeting was attended by over 100 policy makers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministries of Justice and Economic Affairs, and other institutions (OIM, ICCO etc.).

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RESULTS

1. Introduction

This project focuses on achieving a better understanding of the implications of international migration for national development from the perspective of the sending countries (with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa). More specifically, it is concerned with the question of how a coherent international migration policy can contribute to the fight against poverty.

For a long time policy makers paid little attention to migration. The most attention in development cooperation was paid to the encouragement of local development and, where attention was paid to migration it was generally viewed as the opposite pole to development: out-migration was regarded as an expression of poverty and development projects were intended to contribute to the reduction of outmigration.

This situation has recently changed. There are various reasons why international migration is now high on the agenda. On the one hand, it is a consequence of increasing problems with the multicultural society in the receiving area, combined with a fear of invasion. On 1 September 2006 the website of the Algemeen Persbureau (AP) carried the report: There seems to be no end to the explosion of migrants from Africa. In the past two days over 800 migrants have arrived in the Canary Isles. 9,000 have already been intercepted in 2006. In August their number was higher than in the whole of 2005. There is an increasing impression that migrants are streaming in from all sides and that there is a growing need to check migration flows. Whereas the emphasis was initially placed on restrictive (and anti-migrant) policies,
there now appears to be a shift towards selective policies (including circular migration): because of the increasing ageing of the population in the receiving countries, there is a growing realisation that a call will have to be made in the not too distant future on migrant labour.

Another, more positive, reason why more attention has recently been paid to migration is the growing conviction that international migration cannot be seen in isolation from development, and that, with the right policies, an important contribution can be made to development1.

With regard to the question of whether international migration can or cannot contribute to sustainable development and combating poverty there are at present two opposing views2. According to the optimists, international migration offers good possibilities. They point in the first place to the remittances which are seen as a new or additional source of finance for development. According to estimates by the World Bank (2006), these remittances amounted to no less than 167,000 million dollars3. They are estimated to benefit some 500 million people, or 8 percent of the world population. The amount is greater than the official development aid. According to Adams & Page (2003), through remittances, migration has a direct effect on the reduction of poverty: an increase of 10 per cent in a country’s share of international migrants leads to a 2 percent decline in 1$ a day poverty4. In addition to the financial remittances, a positive value is also attributed to the social transfers (the flow of information and ideas): countries of origin are said to be able to benefit from brain gain, not to mention the positive effects of return migration. Migration is viewed as positive factor, because it leads to a balance on the labour market5 and because international labour migration is expected to contribute to the banishment of inequality and to lead to a better distribution of the advantages of globalisation. Migration impacts positively upon all stakeholders, as evidenced by the fact that sending countries and the migrants themselves benefit, because migrants find jobs, develop their skills, earn some money and remit part of it to their countries of origin, while destination countries benefit from the skills and labour they receive from migrants.

Alongside these there is a group of pessimists who particularly emphasise a number of negative aspects and threatening dangers. They point to the fact that international migration can

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1 The World Bank (2003) put emphasis on importance of remittances and played an important role in stimulating the debate on migration and development by the organisation of several conferences, together with DFID (UK).

2 de Haas 2003; de Haan 2005.


5 Jones 1992: in Mafukidze 2006:105
lead to conflicts in the host countries, but also stress particularly the negative consequences for the areas of origin, especially the loss of labour and intellect. They point out that it is generally the best and the brightest, the young, able-bodied people who leave first. Where migrants do decide to return to their home country, this is mainly a reflection of failure. Return migrants are likely to be the old, sick and unsuccessful and skills brought back are unlikely to be of much help. The poorest with the worst training and the disabled without networks therefore remain behind and those who fail are the first to return. This has unavoidable negative effects in the sending region. To the extent that these are compensated by money transfers, a high measure of dependency is created, while conflicts can easily arise between migrants and non-migrants, and undesirable patterns of regional inequality.

Although there are therefore opposing views, a growing consensus is now emerging that although international migration does not automatically lead to favourable effects, it can contribute to development and poverty reduction provided an appropriate and consistent policy is pursued. International organisations (UN, IOM, ILO etc.) and national governments of numerous countries are now actively involved in optimizing the link between international migration and national development. There are many different initiatives aimed at streamlining international migration and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and governments of sending and receiving countries are increasingly involved in streamlining their attempts in managing migration in the right directions.

However, much of what is happening today is taking place on the initiative of the receiving countries, and is dominated by the wish to control or restrict migration and to protect their borders. Little is known about how governments in the sending countries perceive migration, whether they see international migration as a positive or negative force in their attempt to achieve national development, and about what kind of policy initiatives are currently taken to optimise the development impact while restricting the negative consequences.

Before presenting the local views and policy initiatives, we will first provide the necessary information about the characteristics of migration (2) and recent trends (3), as an essential basis for further analysis.

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6 de Haan 2005.
7 UNFPA 2004.
2. The characteristics of international labour migration: towards a typology

This research project has focused in particular on international labour migration (the movement of persons, i.e. non-nationals or foreigners, across national borders for purposes other than travel or short-term residence\(^8\)). Little attention will be paid to other groups, such as refugees, internationally displaced persons and/or asylum seekers\(^9\) although it is difficult in practice to make a clear division\(^10\).

The number of international labour migrants is currently estimated at between 175 and 200 million\(^11\), about 3 percent of the world population. If we try to obtain a picture of the direction of the international migration flows, we find that there is a limited number of dominant destinations, i.e. the classical immigration countries (the United States [US] and Canada), a number of countries on the Persian Gulf (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) and, lastly, a number of European countries (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy). Viewed from a distance, migration streams seem to flow from the poor south towards the richer northern countries, although there are considerable differences in the type of migration and the opportunities for integration and upward mobility.

- The US/Canada.

The migration flows to the United States and Canada derive - as one might expect – mainly from Mexico and the Caribbean (over 20 million Mexicans and Cubans live and work in the US), although there has recently also been a marked growth in the migration of highly skilled people from China and India. After the granting of the H1 visa, migrants can quite easily settle with their families and, as long as they have work, there is a good possibility that the visa will be extended.

\(^8\) Messina & Lahav 2006: 1. 
\(^9\) Skeldon 1990; Mafukidze 2006:104 
\(^10\) This section, and the analysis which follows is based on Zoomers 2006 
• Gulf states (such as Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates) and the Middle East.

The flow of migration to the region of the Persian Gulf originates mainly from South and Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), but also increasingly from North, Central and East Africa. It consists mainly of the temporary labour migration of unskilled men, but increasingly also of other groups, for example, a growing migration by women, particularly from Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. In addition, Saudi Arabia searches in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana for highly-skilled labour (female nurses and doctors). Recruitment takes place mainly among Muslim populations, and there is a considerable flow of Somalis and Ethiopians across the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East (van Moppes 2006). There is now also migration from West Africa (Burkina Faso) to the Gulf States (Broekhuis 2006). There is no possibility of visa extension in the Gulf States, so that each time a migrant’s contract expires, he/she has to leave the country. There are therefore no opportunities to settle permanently and migrants enjoy no right of family reunification. Recently, the growing presence of foreign labour appears to be leading increasingly to problems, especially in relation to worker’s rights, e.g. in wages, education and health, as demanded in the free trade agreement negotiations (Rutten 2006: 24).

• EU (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy).

A large part of the migration flows to countries of the European Union (EU) derives from North Africa and Turkey and is a direct consequence of migrant worker programmes (up to 1974) and the subsequent family reunification. After a period in which immigration was largely determined by refugees and asylum seekers, the EU has recently been confronted with migrant flows from sub-Saharan Africa (especially Nigeria 72,000; Senegal, 77,000 and Cape Verde 43,000), Asia and Latin America. Most of the migrants enter via Spain and Italy (once emigration countries themselves), but the influence of the colonial past and/or cultural ties appears clearly in the ultimate division of the migrants over the different EU countries: West African migrants go mainly to France; Latin Americans migrate relatively frequently to Italy and Spain; and Asians migrate proportionately rather more to the United Kingdom.

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12 Lucas 2004: 5.
The Netherlands plays relatively only a modest role as a migration destination. The majority of EU countries occupy an intermediate position in comparison with the US/Canada and the Gulf States. Where restrictive policies are operated, possibilities exist for family reunification and settlement; each country employs different definitions and pursues a different policy. The situation is heterogeneous as far as the circumstances of migrants (including integration and deportation policies) are concerned.

Viewed from the receiving countries, there therefore appears to be, at first sight, a relatively comprehensible situation in which globalisation has been translated into a worldwide migration system with richer receiving regions (receiving countries), on the one side, and poorer sending countries (countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America), on the other side. Thus from the perspective of the receiving regions there appears to be a situation in which the migration flows follow a relatively fixed pattern. An international migration system generally includes a core receiving region, which may be a country or group of countries, and a set of specific sending countries linked to it by unusually large flows of immigrants. These migration flows are often matched by a reversed flow of remittances.

If we look at international migration from the perspective of the sending countries, however, a different - more diverse - picture emerges (Zoomers 2006). The majority of migration flows are found not to be directed towards the core receiving countries just referred to. Only a limited number of countries are characterised by South-North migration. By far the majority of emigration countries are found to be the subject of South-South migration; in other instances we encounter diasporic states (states with a large migrant population fanning out over many countries).

**South-North Migration**

Examples of countries with South-North migration directed at one of the above core regions include Mexico (to the US); Morocco (to France, Germany etc.); Senegal (to France or Spain); and/or Ecuador (Spain). It concerns a limited group of countries with a clearly structured flow towards specific receiving countries with, in the case of the EU, the majority of the

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migrants entering via Spain and Italy, and/or settling in the former mother country (colonial ties).\textsuperscript{14} Countries with directed South-North migration enjoy the advantage that thanks to migration they have been able to strengthen their negotiating position with EU countries and gain access to additional resources.\textsuperscript{15} Negotiations increasingly take place between the sending and receiving countries (readmission and migrant quotas). Historical ties are selectively re-established. Compared with other countries, they sit close to the fire and are able to benefit from new, as yet modest, work opportunities in the core regions. The migration puts them in the picture.

What is interesting or, rather, problematical is the fact that these countries with strong South-North migration (such as Senegal, Morocco etc.) – but also diasporic states like Kenya or Nigeria (see below) - are often seen in their own region as interesting destination and/or transition areas, and perform an important function as reception areas for South-South migration (see below). In order to satisfy the demands imposed by the northern countries (admission and deportation policies), these countries are often constrained to act more stringently against the inflow from their neighbours. Mexico, for example, is obliged by the US to keep its southern border closed and to act against illegal immigrants, which has immediately negative consequences for intraregional relations and is also at odds with the striving for free mobility within the region (Ecowas, AU, Mercosur etc.). In order to qualify for legal migrant places, many of these countries are required to seal their borders hermetically and to act more stringently against illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries. In this sense, many of these countries have a northern agenda.

\begin{quote}
 European states seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or rejected asylum seekers. Nigeria is known as one of the most cooperative African states on this issue and has readmission deals with Italy, Spain, Ireland and Switzerland. Nigeria has asked for immigration quotas in exchange for collaboration in readmissions. Nigeria is rather willing to cooperate in increasing bor-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Other examples of countries with important South North migration are Kenya and Nigeria; but given the dispersal of the population ‘overseas’ we decided to classify these countries as diasporic states (see below).

\textsuperscript{15} Where international organisations (such as OIM, ILO etc.) are currently undertaking initiatives to increase the development effect of migration (reduction of transaction costs of remittances; encouragement of brain gain/ limitation of brain drain etc.; combating illegality etc. (programmes such as MIDA, TOKTEN etc.) these are often highly concentrated in countries with south-north migration.
der control and readmission (de Haas 2006).

Since European countries have started to put pressure on Nigeria to collaborate with readmission policies, the Nigerian state appears to have begun more active emigration policies by negotiating immigrant quotas in exchange for collaboration (Nigeria's own immigration policies are rather restrictive - most non-ecowas foreigners have to obtain a visa to come to Nigeria (de Haas 2006).

Pressure from the European side and their more rigid immigration legislation, however, are forcing the African states to manage their migration flow more strictly and also to implement decisions formulated in many sub-regional (ECOWAS, UEMOA) conventions and agreements (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 10).

South-South Migration

In many countries - notably in sub-Saharan Africa – there is mainly South-South migration. These are often relatively poor (landlocked) countries. Examples include Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (with migration to Ivory Coast, but also towards Nigeria and Senegal); Lesotho and Mozambique (with migration to South Africa and Botswana); and Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo and Rwanda, where continuing conflicts have caused a large part of the population to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). In Latin America examples include such countries as Paraguay and Bolivia, from where, until recently, large numbers emigrated to Argentina; Nicaragua (with migration to Costa Rica); and Honduras (mainly migration to Mexico). Asian examples are Indonesia (with a population of more than one million in Malaysia) and Myanmar (with one million living in Thailand). There is also considerable migration from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam to destinations within the region16.

A high proportion of the migrants being discussed here have a relatively bad time in the receiving countries. Compared with migration to the northern countries, the possibilities for earning remittances are often limited in south-south migration. People migrate on a temporary basis in order to earn a supplementary income in the event of a crisis (circular migration); they often do not have the necessary documents, are illegal and have generally to be content with low-paid work (sometimes they take up the places left by the emigration of the country’s own population), or the migration is of the type known as “eat away” migration (see

Broekhuis 2006 for the situation in Burkina Faso). Migrants enjoy very little protection, either by their own government, or by the government in the receiving country, and cases of disguised slavery are regularly found (such as recently in Argentina, when it was discovered how a business treated Bolivian migrants). Migrants are often the victims of discrimination and xenophobia - even in their own region - (as recently in Ivory Coast, but also in Botswana, Argentina and South Africa). The migrant population is sent back with great regularity from the neighbouring countries to the country of origin (as happened with the Burkinabé from Ivory Coast and the Ghanaians from Nigeria). Many Bolivians and Paraguayans have also returned from Argentina to their own countries as a consequence of the economic crisis (Zoomers 2006).

Diasporic States (countries with a huge and dispersed overseas population, with a large number of expatriates)

The migrants originating from diasporic states are by far the most numerous. As a result of outmigration over a long time covering several generations, a substantial part of the population (including the elite) has now become dispersed over a large number of countries throughout the world. The numbers involved are impressive (in any event many times greater than the flow of south-north migration)\(^\text{17}\). The Asian diaspora is estimated at more than 70 million. The largest is the Chinese diaspora - over 35 million (widely dispersed over South East Asia, but also the rest of the world). The figure for India is 20 million, that for the Philippines over 7 million, and Korea has a diaspora of over 3.5 million. Other examples are Malaysia with a diaspora of 5 million, Vietnam (1 million) and Pakistan. The Latin American diaspora is estimated at over 25 million. If we ignore Mexico and the Caribbean (which are oriented mainly on the US) and Argentina and Ecuador (relatively strongly oriented on Italy and Spain), we find that the countries mainly concerned are Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, from where a group of over 8 million has fanned out over a large number of countries: not only the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy, Israel and Japan, but also over the neighbouring countries\(^\text{18}\). African examples of diasporic states are South Africa,

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\(^{17}\) This diaspora also includes refugees and is partly composed of south-south migrants.

\(^{18}\) Germana 2005.
Nigeria\textsuperscript{19} and Kenya, but also on a more modest scale smaller countries such as Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia and the Cape Verde islands\textsuperscript{20}.

In contrast to the group of South-South migrants described above, these migrants relatively often constitute a well-off elite, including a considerable group of transnational entrepreneurs\textsuperscript{21}. In a growing number of countries (including China, the Philippines and India\textsuperscript{22}) the national government is pursuing an active policy to involve the diaspora in the national development. In many countries, however, policy in this field has not yet crystallised out so clearly. Although it is customary to speak of migrants, we are referring here to what is often a consolidated group of well-to-do expatriates, the majority of whom have lived for many years outside their own countries, in some instances even for several generations, and many have succeeded in building up a successful new livelihood in the receiving country. Many countries have very little information about their diaspora and it is only relatively recently that the diaspora has been seen by governments as development potential (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006).

The above classification makes clear that, where migration is concerned, it is no longer sufficient to divide the world into origin and destination regions and to connect the two groups with arrows to indicate the migrant and capital flows. There is a wide variety of ways in which countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibilities of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with fresh restrictions.

The most favourable are the circumstances of the diasporic states: thanks to migration over many generations, they can call on a considerable overseas population which they can use as development potential. They have not so much to suffer under restrictive policies; the ma-

\textsuperscript{19} Nigeria plays a key role in African migration (the country has 140 million inhabitants). It is an example of an important emigration country (of the type diasporic state with a considerable diaspora in the EU [UK and the US]), but also important populations in South Africa and the Gulf states. The expatriate population is relatively well-educated and established. At the same time, it is an important destination and transit area for the neighbouring states, and an important member of ECOWAS and the AU. Nigeria was for a long period an immigration country, but is now characterised by emigration to Ghana and Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa (de Haas 2006)

\textsuperscript{20} Sheffer 2003: 104-105.

\textsuperscript{21} Van Naerssen, Spaan, Hillmann 2005.

\textsuperscript{22} This is also the case in Mexico which was mentioned as a country with South-North migration.
The majority of the migrants are already living in the reception region and are, more or less, successfully integrated, so that they have relatively good possibilities for investment. Countries with South-North migration enjoy the advantage that they are clearly in the picture and can relatively easily negotiate about projects, readmission or migrant quotas. They sit close to the fire compared with other countries and so are able to profit from temporary requirements for migrant labour.

This stands in contrast to the countries with mainly South-South migration, which are largely at the mercy of the policy of receiving countries in their own region (often therefore neighbouring countries), where conflicts are relatively quickly translated into inter-state problems; where problems of discrimination or xenophobia (which also arise in the north) remain relatively invisible, because the media pay attention mainly to tensions in the northern countries.

3. Migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa and recent trends

The heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes. Because of rapid changes in the volume and direction of migration there is a growing complexity which is difficult to capture in a typology of migration countries.

If we analyse the dominant migration routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Fortress Europe (van Moppes 2006), just as the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin American migrants on their way to the United States, there is a restricted number of gateways towards the EU. There are currently six main routes from sub-Saharan Africa, leading to three major departure areas (van Moppes 2006):

- A large stretch of Africa’s west coast, including northern Mauritania (notably Nouadhibou), Western Sahara and southern Morocco. The Canary Islands, especially Fuerteventura, are the main destination for migrants arriving from these areas.

- Northern Morocco. In this area are located the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which form direct destinations on the African continent. In addition, the northern and north-western shores of Morocco are the main departure areas for small boats heading toward the Spanish mainland, notably Andalusia.

- The Tunisian east coast and western parts of the Libyan coast. From these shores the boats head for Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily), or Malta, and/or further north.
The Spanish and Italian territories in and near Africa are thus the main destinations on the way to the EU. After all, arriving on one of these territories means actually landing in the European Union, which opens up a broad range of possibilities of other countries to go to. However, before migrants actually arrive in departure areas like airports, seaports and the coasts of different African countries, they have usually been on a long journey on the African continent in order actually to get there (see van Moppes 2006; also Spaan and van Moppes 2006). Migration destinations are to a large extent determined by historical factors (colonial ties) and there is some degree of consolidation. Migration patterns, however, are becoming increasingly less transparent and are rapidly changing; radical changes have recently occurred in the direction and volume of migration.

In the first place a reversal of migration has occurred in many countries: former emigration countries, such as Spain or Italy, and also Botswana (Gwebu 2006), now act as both immigration and transition areas. Other examples are Nigeria and Kenya, which have developed from immigration into emigration areas (often in combination with assuming a role as a transit area (de Haas 2006; Rutten 2006). An increasing number of countries are affected not only by emigration or immigration, but are also the subject of both at the same time (e.g., Morocco). Another example is Senegal: c. 2 million Senegalese abroad (France, Gabon and Ivory Coast), but at the same time the number of foreigners in the country is estimated at 800,000 (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006). Countries such as Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal increasingly act as transit areas:

**Transit areas**

**Rwanda:**


**Kenya:**

Kenya is a transit country for Ethiopia, Rwandans, Somalis, Eritreans and Asians. Our borders are porous, which makes it easy to sneak in and out of the country Most people do not move through
Jomo Kenyatta Airport, although it is the hub for East Africa and beyond. They simply pass over country towards the border and leave public and private transport some 5 km before the border town. With the help of agents they cross the border and in this way get reach as far as South Africa (Rutten 2006:17). Transit is mainly from Somalia as a refugee to Kenya and then abroad for labour (Rutten 2006: 18). Many of the illegal transit migrants discovered were of Asian origin (Chinese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi passports) (Rutten 2006):

Senegal:

Dakar est un pôle de transit des réseaux illicites de migrants en provenance des pays africains (Nigeria notamment) et de certains pays asiatiques (Inde, Chine et Bengladesh par exemple). Le nombre de pays touchés par ce phénomène augmente rapidement, les routes du trafic se multiplient et se ramifient pour constituer des itinéraires de plus et plus complexes, et la participation de réseaux criminels organisés sur les plans transnational et local, et violation flagrante des normes nationales et internationales, est désormais répandue (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 8).

As a direct consequence of restrictive policies in the core regions (i.e., EU, US etc.) new transition zones and more specific migration hubs have arisen between the place of origin and the place of destination (van Moppes 2006). Cities along the Sahara route, or places with direct boat and flight connection are attractive locations for people specializing in the migration business. Examples of important transition cities - where people stay temporarily to earn money - include Agadez (Niger), Bamako (Mali) and Tamanrasset (southern Algeria). Other examples of important migration hubs include Accra (Ghana); Banjul (The Gambia); Casablanca (Morocco); Dakar (Senegal); Ndjamena (Chad); Douala (Cameroon); Freetown (Sierra Leone); Tripoli (Libya); and Sal (Cape Verde). Finally, the cities of Lagos (Nigeria), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Cotonou (Benin), and especially the capital of Guinea, Conakry, are named as places where travel documents can be easily forged, or where one can buy stolen travel documents (van Moppes 2006).

Migrants are confronted with rising costs and are forced to earn extra money on the way (en route to Europe or the US) in order to finance the last part of their journey. Many continue to linger en route, having rid themselves of their old identity, and remain temporarily at an intermediate location as quasi-migrants. They have been forced to break off the journey en

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route, but can often not go back, because they are afraid of loss of face or are unable to face repaying the sum that relatives and friends helped to advance²⁴. The migrants often find themselves in poor circumstances particularly in the transition zones. These groups are extremely vulnerable to exploitation²⁵. This refers especially to North Africa.

Transit migration

The difficulties of this final stage of their journey into Europe was what kept them in Morocco. When we asked what he needed to reach Europe, one Nigerian migrant replied: money, it is only money. Money or papers, but who’s to give you papers without money? Some people have friends in Europe who will take the risk and send them their papers, then they just get on the boat, no problem, but that is very rare. No, it’s only money. Most migrants are very well aware of the costs of the various means of reaching Europe and could rattle off a price list. One Nigerian women explained the full costs: by air, 3500 Euro, that’s the diplomats’ route; you get the passport and safe passage at the airport. By ferry, 2200 euro, that’s the normal passenger service. A Zodiac across from Tangiers is 1200 Euro; entry into Ceuta is the same, then Las Palmas is 800 Euro (Collyer 2006: 243).

Restrictive policy (in the US, Europe, but also with the migrants’ own region²⁶) has led to an increasing diversity of origin and destination areas. For example, the migration from Nigeria to EU was initially directed at the UK, but more recently, an increasing number of Nigerians have migrated to countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium as well as the Gulf states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations of labour migrants from West Africa (cf. Black et al. 2004:9; in de Haas 2006:3). Migrants from Kenya (originally focusing on South Africa, UK and USA), nowadays also migrate not only to the Gulf states (lowly skilled labour), and the Middle East, but also to Germany (Rutten 2006). The Burkinabé (inhabitants of Burkina Faso, referred to above as a country with predominantly South-South migration) are also migrating increasingly to Italy. The Bolivians, who for a long time migrated to Argentina in search of work, are now migrating in large num-

²⁴ Traditionally the decision for (international) migration rested with the family: the family decided which member should go (in accordance with the theory of the new economics of labour migration). Nowadays migration can also be an individual decision (Broekhuis 2006).
²⁵ Collyer 2006: 145.
²⁶ Examples of countries with a restrictive migration policy within sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana; there seems to be a tendency to restrict or at least control immigration.
bers to Spain. There is also increasing intercontinental migration within the south (e.g. Chinese who migrate to Europe or the US via Kenya). Where previously, migration preferably took place along the more or less well-known routes, travel now preferably takes place to conventional destinations in order to evade tightened border controls as far as possible.

Along with more restrictive policies, there seems to be a rapid increase in human trafficking and illegality. According to de Haas (2006:3) in Nigeria, increasing restrictions and controls on immigration in Europe have not led to a decrease in emigration rates. Rather, migrants are more often undocumented and the itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous. According to a recent study on Kano State, traffickers successfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes e.g. prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006; in de Haas 2006: 4). This has made Nigerian migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and marginalisation. It has also made migration more permanent, because people no longer take the risk of leaving (de Haas 2006).

Human trafficking: examples from Nigeria

In the early 1990, immigration restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly dependent on large loans in order to pay for their journey. This provided an opportunity for traffickers, who enticed young women to migrate with promises of good jobs, and subsequently coerced them into prostitution to repay their migration debt (Carling 2005; in de Haas 2006:4). The initial contact with the traffickers is often made through a relative, friend, or other familiar person, who puts her in contact with a madam who organises and finances the journey. The costs may range from US$40,000 to US$100,000. The migrants and the madam conclude a pact, which is religiously sealed by a traditional priest, which obliges repayment in exchange for a safe passage to Europe (Carling 2005). After repaying their debt in one to three years, women are basically free, and it is fairly common for them to become a supervisor of other prostitutes and, eventually, a madam themselves (de Haas 2006: 4).

The main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children in West Africa are Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, but almost every country in West Africa seems to be involved in the trafficking networks. Other source countries include Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania, whereas Ivory Coast, Niger, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo are countries that mainly import women and children. Trafficked children are usually recruited to work as domestic servants, in the informal sector, or into agricultural work on plantations. However, they can also be sold into slave labour, as in Sudan and Mauritania, or forced to become sex slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men, in Sudan or the Gulf States. Many women are forced into the prostitution or pornography business, and end up in other West African countries, or in the Gulf States or Europe.
Destination countries include Gabon, South Africa, and Ivory Coast; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon; Germany, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Spain and France. The trafficking networks are, however, so complicated that most West African countries are simultaneously source, transit and destination countries for trafficking women and children (de Haas 2006: 25).

In reaction to the restrictive policies, changes have occurred in the manner of travel. Compared with previously, people now travel less often by air (that is reserved to the relatively well-to-do and to those travelling as tourists or students). Less well-off migrants preferably travel overland (cheap) or by boat (they cannot be immediately sent back) (van Moppes 2006). Nigeria forms an example: Whereas labour migration and trafficking to Europe used to predominantly use air links, visa requirements and increasing immigration controls at air and seaports, seem to have led to an increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland routes to the Maghreb countries, and in particular Morocco, from where Nigerians and other sub-Saharan Africans attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea to southern Europe or the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands (de Haas 2006). From Senegal, too, migrants originally travelled mainly by air and now increasingly by boat (if necessary, via Mauritania). The Journal *Nouvel Horizon de Dakar*\(^\text{27}\) gives an appropriate summary of the situation: ‘Après avoir utilisé l’avion, le bateau, le chemin hasardeux des caravanes sahariennes, la traverse suicidaire du détroit de Gibraltar, les barbeles de Ceuta et de Melilla, il ne reste plus que la voie la plus directe: la mer, et le moyen de transport le plus inattendu: la pirogue’ (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006:5).

Important changes have recently also occurred in the composition of the migrant flows. Whereas migration was for a long time a matter for men, now it is increasingly women who take the plunge, whether or not accompanied by their family. Significant portions of females now migrate independently to fulfil their own economic needs (Adepoju 2002: 7 ; in Moppes 2006)\(^\text{28}\). Their proportion is currently estimated at over 50 percent\(^\text{29}\). As a result, radical changes are occurring not only in the division of roles between men and women and in parenthood in general, but also in relations between the generations. In the case of migration the grandparents often play an important role in bringing up the children who remain behind.

\(^{27}\) Courrier International n 814 du 8 au 14 juin 2006, page 38.

\(^{28}\) In previous times, a relatively larger share of women migrated for reasons of family reunion.

\(^{29}\) UNFPA 2006; and Usher 2005.
Increasingly, however, it is also the children themselves who decide to migrate, even before they have completed their schooling. Thus there is not only feminisation, but also rejuvenation of migration flows (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2006).

Lastly, changes have occurred in the occupations and level of skill of migrants. While, formerly, many migrants were wage earners, now a considerable proportion consists of self-employed entrepreneurs. As a result of recruitment (by universities and companies), there appears to be a shift towards higher skilled migrants, although a large proportion still consists of poorly skilled ones (van Moppes 2006). The heterogeneity of the migrant population can be illustrated drawing on the example of Nigeria (de Haas 2006): There is circumstantial evidence that more recent migrants to continental European countries are less skilled on average, and that they more often work in the (formal and, particularly in southern Europe, informal) service, trade and agricultural sectors of the economy. The UK and, in particular, the US (through student and professional migration as well as the Green Card lottery) generally continue to attract the relatively higher skilled workers\(^3\). The Gulf states have also started to attract the relatively highly skilled (in addition to the low-skilled labour).

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In Burkina Faso, inter-continental and intra-continental migration have to be seen as two different strategic household decisions. Households with intercontinental migrants belong to the relatively wealthiest socio-economic group and migration to Europe is part of their wealth accumulation strategy. These households were able to deal with entry barriers linked with capital-intensive economic activities. However, a change from traditional to modern food production systems and to modern cropping patterns did not occur.

Households involved in intra-continental migration, on the contrary, have access to less livelihood capital and their migration decision is a response to push factors. For this group, migration has to be understood as part of a consolidation or survival strategy. Eat away migration is part of the way they save on household expenses (Broekhuis 2006:7).

In general, international migration from Burkina Faso is said to be temporary, partly circular. It can be

\(^{30}\) Hernandez-Coss et al. 2006.

\(^{31}\) 89% of the repatriates lived for more than 5 years in Ivory Coast, and 65% for longer than 10 years (CONAPO 2006).

\(^{32}\) Beauchemin e.a. 2005.

\(^{33}\) Zourkaléini 2005.
concluded from the large numbers of Burkinabé who remained for some generations in Ghana and Ivory Coast that this assertion does not always hold\textsuperscript{31}. However, the (...) survey showed that the young men who migrated to Ivory Coast were indeed circular migrants. These migrants were preponderantly young men without education, who worked before they left for the neighbouring country. They stayed abroad for an average of two years before returning to their home village. Over time the village of origin lost much of its importance as a destination for returnees\textsuperscript{32}. Migrants to other countries had more often an urban background and were unemployed before their departure\textsuperscript{33} (Broekhuis 2006: 8).

Compared with earlier times people are now much better able to bridge great distances in a short time and to maintain intensive contact with the area of origin. In a certain sense the world has shrunk. Where travel formerly meant years of absence, today’s migrants can travel quickly and maintain contacts with several places at the same time. Migration is increasingly transnational and consists of an ongoing series of cross-border movements in which immigrants develop and maintain numerous economic, social and cultural links in more than one nation\textsuperscript{34}. In the case of transnationality people find themselves neither here nor there: they find themselves in several places at the same time, as it were, and try to make strategic use of the differences which exist between countries\textsuperscript{35}. Thus there is a growing group of transnational entrepreneurs who commute intensively in an attempt to profit from the economic opportunities which present themselves in several countries at the same time. They belong both to their region of origin and to their reception region\textsuperscript{36}.

4. Viewpoints in the areas of origin: common issues

In analysing the characteristics of migration in the various countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we found a number of common features that can be summarised under the following headings:

\textsuperscript{34} Jackson et al. 2004.
\textsuperscript{35} Portes 1996
\textsuperscript{36} see Maas 2005, for the Philippines.
Migration is not new: traditional types of population mobility

In most sub-Saharan countries the population has always been one of the most mobile in the world. There are many examples of nomadism, and livelihood systems are based on people’s ability to move in response to seasonal variation and variability of natural resources. International borders imposed during colonial times were often not in line with the natural conditions, nor did they coincide with the territorial claims of different ethnic groups. International migration is therefore man-made, i.e., a reflection of the introduction of artificial boundaries. Some of the international migration forms part of indigenous patterns of mobility (i.e., traditional, seasonal movements within one and the same eco-region). (see de Haas for Nigeria; Rutten for Kenya; and Broekhuis for Senegal and Burkina).

Migration patterns reflect colonial patterns of forced labour

During the colonial period, large flows of Europeans moved in the direction of the Asia, Latin America and Africa and introduced systems of forced labour in order to have sufficient labour in the colonial economy (mines and agricultural estates). In addition to the deportation of slaves to of South America and the Caribbean, there were important population movements to the mining areas and the coastal regions (plantations). In addition, taxes imposed by the French stimulated many Burkinabé to migrate to Ghana as a way of escaping from French colonial rule (Broekhuis 2006). After independence, some of the colonial population left, to be partly replaced by the arrival of a new group of Europeans who moved voluntarily in search of new opportunities overseas. But the dominant migration routes remained the same, with mines and agricultural estates still being important destination areas for African migrants (colonial patterns of circular migration in the direction of the coastal areas). In Nigeria, the dominant movement of internal migration is still towards the densely populated coastal areas, although Abuja in the centre and Kano in the north are also major destinations for internal migrants (de Haas 2006).

Rapid urbanisation and a brain drain

37 This human trafficking laid the basis for the creation of one of the earliest African diasporas (Mafukidze 2006:109).
In the 1950s and '60s most countries had to cope with rapid urbanisation (internal migration) and where Africans decided to leave (international migration) it was often the elite who left. In countries such as Nigeria, there was a large outflow of the elite to Europe and the US (as a response to political change, conflicts and disparities in economic opportunity), which resulted in a rapid brain drain.

**Anti-migration policies**

Where national governments made an attempt to reduce urbanisation or to counter the negative effects of mass migration (brain drain) they usually did so by introducing exit visas (e.g., in Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, as well as Burkina Faso [Broekhuis 2006:8]). In Rwanda, but also elsewhere, people were obliged to pay guarantees (deposits in bank accounts) and family members had to sign before people were allowed to leave the country. Governments did their best to fix people in the countryside, often as part of socialist policies (Tanzania, Mozambique; for the latter, see Raimundo 2006).

**Alternations between immigration (economic growth) and expulsions (crisis)**

In many cases, countries have experienced reversal of migration, in response to economic booms or stagnation. Countries like Nigeria and Ivory Coast, as well as South Africa, Kenya and Ghana attracted migrant labour during times of rapid economic growth, followed by crisis and economic decline, which often went hand in hand with the expulsion of foreign populations. In Nigeria, after a period of rapid growth between 1973 and 1981, economic decline led the government to expel large numbers of West African migrants in 1983 and 1985, including one million Ghanaians (de Haas 2006). Other examples—often combined with political conflicts—include Ivory Coast and Ghana (expulsion of large numbers of Burkinabé) and Kenya (expulsion of Ugandans and other groups in 1984 and 1987) (Rutten 2006). Kenya and South Africa and also Botswana (Gwebu 2006) now have to cope with discrimination and xenophobia.

**Root causes of migration**

The history of migration cannot be seen in isolation from poverty and other push factors that are often described as root causes of international migration. Because of harsh environ-
mental conditions (droughts, less fertile land) and a low technological level, the agricultural sector is unable to provide employment and income for the constantly increasing population numbers (Broekhuis 2006: 7, writing about Burkina Faso). Similar factors are mentioned for Central and East Africa: ecological degradation and disasters (droughts) and the lack of economic prospects and conflict are among the principal causes of migration (see Spaan and Moppes 2006; Rutten 2006).

Recruitment programmes, family reunion and asylum policies

In various countries (Nigeria, Ghana, but also South Africa) emphasis is given to the fact that international migration has started and recently intensified as a direct response to recruitment programmes. Universities and enterprises in the Gulf states and the Middle East, Canada and the US, and different EU countries play an active role in ‘cherry picking’. Current migration patterns cannot be understood without taking into account the history of guest worker programmes, consolidated by the subsequent process of family reunification. Later migration is also a reflection of northern asylum policies. It is stressed that, for a long time, core countries have played an active role in shaping migration flows. The introduction of restrictive policies occurred relatively recently.

Lack of comparable data

Much emphasis is placed in many countries on the lack of data and deficient information about international migration. Within sub-Saharan Africa (but also elsewhere) the comparison of statistics is very complicated. A first factor which should be taken into account when trying to make an assessment of the importance of international migration is that of differences in population size. In a country like Nigeria, with its large population, international outmigration is relatively modest in comparison with massive internal migration (large numbers of IDPs), but it is still considered one of the most important sending countries, with large numbers of Nigerians concentrating in the US or UK.

According to the statistics, there is a clear distinction between internal and international migration, but this is not necessarily a different experience. In many cases, the impact of internal migration (short distance) is not necessarily less than long distance, international border crossings. In the case of Nigeria, for example, taking into account the huge ethnic, linguistic and religious variety, as well as the fact that non-indigenous inhabitants of states face con-
sizable legal institutional discrimination, the characteristics and personal impacts of inter-
state migration may resemble those of international moves, especially within Africa. It is im-
portant to observe that differentials in development within Nigeria are at least as important, if
not greater, than between West African countries. The difference between international and
internal migrants is not always clear, and in many cases conflicts also occur in relation to
internal, short-distance migration.

**Definitional problems**

Another distinction made in statistics, but which is not always visible in reality is that between
labour migrants, IDPs and refugees. Different groups live in different situations. Refugees
who went to Burkina Faso (a restricted group of 1,200 people from Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda,
Eritrea, Somalia and Chad) are allowed to live dispersed in the cities and are not concen-
trated into camps (Broekhuis 2006). This is the opposite to the situation in Kenya, where
people live in camps and are not allowed to work. A Somali, who entered Kenya as a refu-
gee, will lose this special status as soon as he leaves the refugee camp. Refugees become
illegal aliens as soon as they leave the refugee camp (Rutten 2006). In addition, refugees are
sometimes better off than native groups living in the same area: In Kenya, the Turkana living
near a refugee camp receive less support and experience more insecurity than the foreign
groups who are supported by UNCHR (Rutten 2006\(^3\)). Depending upon the definition (mi-
grant, refugee, IDP) or nationality, people have varying chances of receiving support by in-
ternational organisations, but also for buying land or getting a job in government (not possi-
ble for aliens in Ivory Coast).

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The Burkinabé, who were forced to return to their country of origin after expulsion from Ivory Coast,
were never granted the legal status of refugees. After their arrival in Burkina Faso, most of them were
seen as return migrants (i.e., they did not get the status of refugees). At the same time, however, their
children (who were born in Ivory Coast and returned with their parents) were registered as immigrants
(their had never been able to acquire Ivorian nationality. While they are not eligible for official govern-
ment jobs or able to own land in Ivory Coast, they are also not accepted as full citizens in Burkina

\(^3\) see also Horst 2006, for the situation of Somali refugees.
Conflicting images and tensions

In addition to these definitional problems, there are complications related to the image of migrants, and how people look at each other from different sides.

In host countries, migrants are often seen as strangers who are different from local people, who have different habits and attitudes and who came to profit from better living conditions in the host country. In their country of origin they are seen as money makers, a positive image based on the remittances brought or sent home through informal or formal channels. In addition it is expected that migrants will acquire specific knowledge during their sojourn abroad which can be used in their own interest after their return or applied in the interest of their country of origin. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the image of migrants is not so positive (Broekhuis 2006) and there are increasing tensions between the migrant population and the non-migrants. In Burkina Faso there is an increasing competition between the tengas (native people) and the diaspos (children of emigrated Burkinabé who have returned from Ivory Coast and have decided to study in Burkina because of the lower costs and the hope of better job opportunities).

Remittance corridors and geographical restrictions

In the case of international migration, it is acknowledged that the impact of remittances is spatially limited, because most migrants originate from particular areas and concentrate in a limited number of destination areas. This means that migration not only generates patterns of dependency, but also creates patterns of spatial and social inequality.

In Nigeria, for example, most of the migrants who have moved to the EU and US originate from the southern provinces. The Ibo from the southeast and the Yoruba from the southwest, and, to a lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni ethnic groups constitute the majority of Nigerian migrants in the UK39. On the other side (the destination areas), too, the areas involved in international migration are rather limited. 50% of all the Nigerians - and also Kenyans - who

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migrated to the US are to be found in Washington, with the rest distributed between Texas, California, Georgia and North Carolina (Rutten 2006). This means that international migration in reality involves only a limited number of areas; the majority of the population will not be able to benefit from migration.

**New labour opportunities thanks to the ageing of the population in Europe**

International migration is viewed in nearly all countries as something necessary and positive; as long as there are insufficient work opportunities in the migrants’ own country, partly as a result of demographic growth, international migration is a logical response and a human right as long as no better alternatives exist. It is expected that Europe will need extra labour in the years to come as a result of the ageing of the population and that Europe, like the US and Canada, will turn to a more selective migration policy. Europe’s need creates opportunities for labour migration, in particular, for doctors, nurses and technical experts (Broekhuis 2006:5). At the same time, little information is available about Europe’s future labour needs.

**The criminalisation of migrants**

In most sub-Saharan countries illegal or clandestine migration and human trafficking are regarded as undesirable, and many countries are prepared to cooperate in combating them. Besides programmes aimed at combating trafficking in women and children, the combating of illegality, including the forging of documents is high on the agenda.

At the same time, however, it is experienced as a great problem that migrants (including illegal immigrants and victims of human trafficking) are being increasingly criminalised. People are wrongly treated as criminals. In most countries there is understanding for European attempts to counteract unauthorised immigration. The more stringent admittance of migrants is usually not a point of general discussion, nor is it put forward as blameworthy policy, but it

40 Commission European Communities 2003.
41 Introductory speech of Minister for Youth and Employment (Burkina Faso).
42 It is interesting to note that, for a long period of time in Burkina Faso in the recent past, terms like illegal or clandestine migration were not used. It was more common to refer to migration spontane or migration sauvage (Broekhuis Burkina: 2006: 10-16).
does call for a larger allocation of visas. A point of concern, however, is the treatment of migrants in Europe. There was a call from many sides for a more respectful treatment of migrants and for the avoidance of indignity. Some blame was expressed about the failure by most of the northern countries to ratify the ILO Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (Broekhuis 2006:5). There is criticism in many countries of the present deportation policy and the way in which victims are sent back to the country of origin together with the human traffickers in the same aircraft (Broekhuis 2006, de Haas 2006).

5. Issues on the policy agenda: a country overview

The crucial objective of our research was to analyse viewpoint and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. What are the issues that are currently on the migration agenda in the different countries, and how is this linked to the performance of international migration? In the survey that follows we analyse the present situation in different countries, beginning with the analysis of agendas in countries with predominantly south-south migration (Rwanda, Burkina Faso), then countries with predominantly South-North migration (Senegal), ending with the countries classified as diasporic states (Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya, including China, India, the Philippines etc.). It is interesting to note that there is a kind of continuum in the migration agendas of the different countries.

*Rwanda*

In Rwanda, after years of conflict, the population has become dispersed over a large number of neighbouring countries and countries in the EU, where migrants have asked for asylum. The migration agenda is determined mainly by three issues (Muhoza and Rutayisire 2006).

- How can we ensure that people are prepared to return to their country of origin (a considerable part of the population still lives abroad and has insufficient trust to return)?

- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in Rwanda?
- How do we manage to attract the necessary expertise from abroad? Because of the lack of skilled labour in Rwanda teachers and medical personnel are attracted mainly from the neighbouring countries (including Kenya).

**Burkina Faso**

In past years large groups emigrated from Burkina Faso to Ivory Coast to work in the plantation economy there. There has recently been a massive deportation. The migrant population has returned *en masse*, together with their children who were born in Ivory Coast. The following subjects are currently high on the agenda (Broekhuis 2006):

- How do we deal with problems of poverty the rural exodus and urbanisation (Broekhuis, Burkina) and how to provide sufficient employment for young people?

- How to guarantee the protection of migrant rights (how to ensure that the Burkinabé in Ivory Coast are better treated)?

- How to deal with the sudden arrival of return migrants and how to incorporate them without generating conflicts? Burkinabé who were massively deported from Ivory Coast no longer fit within the traditional structures. How to take care of integration of exmigrants in local communities/ how to prevent land conflicts/ how to promote sustainable development of natural resources? How to prevent migrants moving from insecurity to poverty?

- Special attention is paid in this connection to the problems of the second and third generation: Burkinabé children do not have Ivorian nationality (they are second class citizens in Ivory Coast), but are regarded in Burkina Faso as immigrants. How to deal with this second generation?

- How do we deal with increasing tensions between the *tengas* and *diaspos* (children of Burkinabé who have emigrated to Ivory Coast who come to study in Burkina because it is cheaper and because they are not eligible for government jobs in Ivory Coast)?

- How to ensure that the remittances which are sent back from Ivory Coast can be received in the countryside (there are no banks); are used for productive purposes (there are few investment opportunities). Remittances are largely used to repay the costs of migration (including maintaining social obligations).
- How to ensure that the volume of remittances increases and stabilises? At present remittances are relatively small: they decreased from 4.5% (1994) to 1.7% of DGP (2006). Remittances are currently an unstable source of income, both at the level of the state and at the individual household level.

- How to ensure that the image of Burkina is improved so that people want to invest there (in the eyes of its emigrants Burkina Faso is oldfashioned, hot and dry)/ how can remittances be used for employment generation?

- How can migrant organisations be persuaded to become more actively involved in national or local development?
Migrant organisations in Burkina Faso expressed the following list of wishes (Broekuis 2006: 10):

- assistance from embassies and consulates in the case of emergencies and expulsions;
- regulations for social security through bilateral agreements;
- information for potential migrants about rights and obligations in the receiving country;
- information about investment opportunities in Burkina Faso, other possibilities than housing projects; easy procedures for buying land.
- fulfilment of international treaties by Burkina Faso (criticism of other countries is impossible if one’s own country sets a bad example);
- bilateral agreements on migration quotas (Italy mentioned as an example);
- Embassies should collect information about compatriots present in the country;
- Right to vote for migrants; this would ensure the involvement of migrants in developments in their home country;
- Improvement of money transfer arrangements. There was a lot of criticism of the lack of SONAPOST services and the high costs of transfer by banks. Suggestion: development of internet banking!
- Easy procedures for obtaining official documents, including those for the children of Burkinabé abroad.

**Senegal**

Senegal was for a long time an immigration country (mainly for the neighbouring countries), but now there is an important flow of emigrants to the EU. This makes Senegal an example of a country that has to deal both with immigration and emigration, while it acts also as a transition zone. The inflow of remittances is seen as an important part of a strategy for national development. The migration agenda is dominated by very different agenda items (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006):

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43 Counter-argument: a limited number of migrants register at embassies.
- How can more employment be created for the youth?

- How can we benefit more from our population overseas (in France and other EU countries) and how do we manage to increase the volume of remittances (reduction of transition costs). Comment gagner la confiance des emigrants?

- How can we guard our borders better and control the inflow of migrants from the neighbouring countries. How to combat the forging of identity papers?

- How to deal with the problem of undocumented migrants who originate from neighbouring countries and (after deportation) claim to be Senegalese in the EU?

- How to negotiate with Spain and France on the question of readmission and how to best profit from migrant quotas?

- How can we best profit from the funds which are available for migration development (e.g. TOKTEN and MIDA).

Au Senegal, le gouvernement a annoncé une tolérance zéro en matière d'émigration clandestine! Cependant la politique de migration officielle exprime dans la presse ou sur les conférences récentes est de fixer la population sénégalaise avec des programmes de développement qui favorisent l'épanouissement individuel et collectif ainsi l'espoir de prospérité économique. (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 9). On veut éviter le départ des jeunes!

Pour beaucoup de jeunes africains subsahariens, l'enfer est chez soi et le paradis ailleurs. Le message fort envoyé aux gouvernements des pays d'origine et d'accueil est qu'ils se lanceront toujours désespérément la quête de nouvelles stratégies de contournement des politiques migratoires et de franchissement des frontières. (Broekhuis and Ndione, 2006: 12).

**Nigeria**

Nigeria has played an important role for a long time as an immigration country, but at the same time a large part of the population has become dispersed over a large number of countries. It possesses a considerable diaspora, with concentrations in the UK and the US. Within Nigeria the migrants and remittances play only a relatively small role. The GNP and the economy are largely determined by oil, and the migrant population forms a very small proportion of the total population. Nigeria is characterised by a high level of ethnic heterogeneity. A large part of the population is classified as internally displaced (IDPs) and there is a measure
of discrimination and xenophobia. To the extent that attention is paid to migration in Nigeria, it is mainly the following topics that are of interest (de Haas 2006):

- How can we act against trafficking in women and children/combating human trafficking in general, supported by international organisations (OIM). This point has been placed on the agenda partly because Nigeria attaches importance to the improvement of Nigeria’s in the world (Nigeria is very much associated with criminal activities (such as trade in cocaine, financial fraud, money laundering, human trafficking etc.).

- How to improve the image of migration/end the criminalisation of migrants. All undocumented migrants are categorised as illegals and the traffickers are deported together with the victims (see also above). How to improve the rights of migrants in the case of repatriation; repatriation often has the characteristics of deportation (with undocumented migrants are treated as criminals and as not leaving voluntarily). In many cases the traffickers are repatriated on the same charter flight as their victims. Although the readmission agreements with European Countries state that undocumented migrants should be returned on a voluntary basis, many repatriations have the character of deportations, with undocumented migrants being treated as criminals. Undocumented migrants who are apprehended in Europe are imprisoned in detention centres before being deported and aircraft are full of police and security people (de Haas 2006: 9-10). How to solve the problem of fake identity papers (see also Kenya)?

- How to deal with foreign groups, including refugees and IDPs? In a country like Nigeria, there are many foreign groups: from Ghana and Mali, Togo and Benin and Niger (according to recent UN estimates, over 971,000 immigrants live in Nigeria\(^{44}\)), and there are also large numbers of Internally displaced people. How do we deal with problems related to xenophobia (which also affects migrants from neighbouring states)?

- How can we launch the presidential dialogue with Nigerians abroad; and restore trust among the Nigerian diaspora? How do we deal with the high insecurity and crime rates, high level of corruption, and lack of economic reform? How can we make it more attractive for the diaspora to invest their money in Nigeria?

\(^{44}\) UN General Assembly 2006
How can we create more legitimate opportunities for migration? How can we better prepare for exploiting global employment opportunities (brain circulation)?

The issue of trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers is currently an important issue in Nigeria: it is estimated that there are 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes, not only in Italy, but also in the Netherlands and Spain. According to a recent study, traffickers, especially in Kano state, have successfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to traffic children, men and women for different exploitative purposes, e.g. prostitution, begging and all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006). There is some pressure from the US and from donors to combat trafficking (de Haas 2006). Trafficking is also seen as harmful to Nigeria’s image abroad (de Haas 2006:10).

The National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP), works in collaboration with UNICEF and OIM. There is also an anti-trafficking programme for West Africa (PATWA) (de Haas 2006: 11).

Kenya

Like Nigeria, an important part of the population has emigrated from Kenya over a longer period and become dispersed over various countries of the world. This gives Kenya the characteristics of a diasporic state. While the elite have emigrated (e.g. to the US), Kenya - as a safe haven – has played a role as a reception country for the neighbouring countries. Kenya acts as a concentration country for the reception of refugees. Large groups of Somalis currently find themselves in refugee camps, are not entitled to work or to settle freely.

The migration agenda is determined by the following subjects (Rutten 2006):

- How do we treat refugees (and how do we prevent the Somalis taking our jobs?). How do we deal with them in relation to marginal national groups (such as the Turkana)? Refugees are considered to be relatively better off: a range of services and benefits are available from NGOs and UN agencies (provisions like water, education and medical attention receive priority in the camps). As they are not allowed to own cattle or farm, they are given regular food handouts.45

45 Deborah Elijah Agok, a Sudanese women, says the Turkana feel antagonistic because of their own food short-
- How can immigration controls and visa policies be operated to limit illegal immigration (the problems here include: false documents supporting visa applications; false bank statements, letters of reference etc). How do we deal with the Asians who use Kenya as a transition zone? How to close the borders to terrorists (demanded by the US in reaction to the attack on the US embassy). It was concluded in the 2005 mid-term strategy report that Kenya had suffered in the recent past from international terrorism whose roots had to do with the movement of people across boundaries. The revelations in some of the cases of terrorism indicate that Kenya’s immigration services may not have the capacity to deal with the sophistication that goes with international travel today (Rutten 2006:6). It was noted that there was a need to streamline immigration screening procedures for the entry of refugees and to eliminate all discriminatory screening practices (demanded by NEPAD). In Kenya aliens are obliged to register (Rutten 2006:15).

- How do we act against human trafficking and enslavement?

In Kenya, trafficking is considered an important issue: Kenya is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation. Kenyan children are trafficked within the country for domestic servitude, street vending, agricultural labour, and sexual exploitation, including the coastal sex tourism industry. Kenyan men, women, and girls are trafficked to the Middle East, other African nations, Western Europe, and North America for domestic servitude, enslavement in massage parlours and brothels, and manual labour. Chinese women trafficked for sexual exploitation reportedly pass through Nairobi, and Bangladeshis may pass through Kenya for forced labour in other countries. Burundian and Rwandan nationals engaged in coastal sex tourism may have been trafficked for this purpose. Lastly, Asian nationals, principally Indians, Bangladeshis and Nepalese, are trafficked into Kenya and coerced into bonded labour in the construction and garment industries (Trafficking in Persons Report 2004), in Rutten 2006:3; (There has been a human trafficking unit in Kenya since 2004).
- How can the diaspora be deployed strategically in national development? After President Kibaki won the 2002 election he called upon Kenyans to return home. This was mainly addressed to those intellectuals who had opted to go abroad for political reasons during the rule of President Moi. At the same time, the new government announced its intention to create 500,000 jobs annually. However, this ambition was not met. Estimates are that only some 50,000 jobs were created in the first six months after it came into power. Kenya was apparently not yet in a position to welcome home its community abroad. Moreover, there was a growing realisation that the Kenyan diaspora was becoming a significant player in Kenya’s economic development through the remittances sent home from abroad (Rutten 2006:20).

- How can we ensure that highly qualified labour is strategically deployed? In Kenya there is a special office with the task of promoting the strategic deployment of expertise overseas.

Examples of issues in other countries

(China, Leung 2006; India, Raghuram 2006; the Philippines, Baggio 2006; Ghana, Manuh 2006; and Mexico, Marchand 2006):

- How do we increase the flow of remittances/ and ensure that the money is used for social and/or productive projects in the collective sector (Tres por Uno; Mexico)?

- How to reduce the dependency of a country on remittances (Cape Verde) and how to reduce/compensate the negative effects of the brain drain (Ghana)?

- How to maintain the contacts with the diaspora in the longer term, i.e. how to ensure that second and third generations also continue to be involved (China, India, Korea)?

- How do we improve the living conditions of the migrants overseas; How to prevent abuses?/ how to prepare the migrants better for living abroad (Philippines, Mexico)?

- How do we make the best use of diaspora organisations and migrant organisations for the development of the country of origin without this leading to fragmentation/ proliferation (the Philippines has over a thousand organisations worldwide)?

- How to ensure that the diaspora is prepared to invest in the mother country (China, India, Korea)? how do we ensure an attractive investment climate?
6. A summary of concrete policy initiatives

Reviewing migration as a policy issue, it becomes clear that, since colonial times, the stimulation and/or controlling of migration has been an important strategy for encouraging economic growth (through, for example, systems of forced labour). Since independence, African states have tried to respond to the brain drain and urbanisation by issuing exit visas and obliging people to remain in the countryside (Mozambique, Rwanda, etc.). In some countries, it is thus only recently that people have been free to move and this should be taken into account when trying to assess international migration. Where the volume of international migration has increased, this is the result partly of time-space compression and the technological revolution, and partly of the neo-liberal reforms and processes of regional integration, which have stimulated the free movement of capital and goods. Neo-liberal policies have also resulted in the collapse of local economies which, together with ecological problems, have reduced the opportunities for local development.

In spite of the growing concern of governments with migration issues, and the large range of topics that are currently on the policy agenda, most of the sending countries have no consistent migration policy. In most instances there is a laissez faire approach, with no obstacles being thrown up in a systematic manner to limit international migration or measures being taken to strengthen migration. While there have been great efforts at the regional level in recent years to secure the right of free movement, residence and establishment (in Africa, ECOWAS, UEMOA, AU; in Latin America, MERCOSUR, ALCA etc.), the implementation has been subject to many restrictions: most conventions, treaties and agreements have proved to be dead letters without ratification by national parliaments or their translation into national laws (Broekhuis 2006)\(^46\). In sub-Saharan Africa the efforts to achieve the free movement of persons has led in a certain sense to reduced possibilities for controlling migration, and human traffickers have been able to profit from this.

In recent years a great many arrangements have been made by northern countries (EU) with individual countries, for example, between Nigeria with Italy; as well as between South Africa and Namibia, Botswana, and Tanzania and DR Congo etc.; and Senegal with France and

\(^{46}\) Soulama 2005
Spain (Rutten 2005). There is a growing number of bilateral arrangements between countries to control migration, in some cases, combined with co-development programmes. At the same time, there has been some intensification of recruitment, not only from the US/Canada/ the EU or the Gulf States, but also within sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, high school and elementary school teachers were recruited throughout the 1990s in such places as the Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi and Congo (Rutten 2006: 19). Today, recruitment is strong, especially in South Africa. In the negotiations between the sending and receiving countries conditions are often imposed relating to border controls, which can have a harmful effect on the relations between neighbouring countries.

As far as the link between international migration and combating poverty is concerned, international migration is referred to only to a very limited extent at the level of the individual countries in the context of PRSPs (van der Veen 2006). There is generally no systematic policy. Migration is either referred to as a negative force (e.g. Nigeria) or related to positive developments, but there is no systematic approach and international migration has not so far been cited as a structural element for combating poverty. Migration is still primarily seen as a development failure rather than a constituent part of broader social and economic transformation processes (de Haas 2006: 12-13). The boxes below show how migration is regarded in the various countries and the sub-themes to which it is related (see also van der Veen 2006, and Black 2004).

Nigeria

Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), better known in Nigeria as NEEDS (see NNPC 2004), mentions internal migration, which is generally seen as a force disrupting social cohesion in village societies and causing urban unemployment. Migration is strongly and one-sidedly associated with trafficking, forced child labour and prostitution. In addition, Nigeria’s PRSP perceives internal migration as a force which potentially contributes to urban unemployment and urban pollution and waste management problems (NNPC 2004:12 + xix). Migration of the educated workforce to urban areas would also cause the ageing and deepen the poverty of rural populations (NNPC 2004:32), and is indirectly blamed for the decrease in the level of security through social dislocation caused by massive rural-urban migration, and the breakdown of societal values, leading to fraud and community unrest (NNPC 2004:95). The perceived solution to these problems is to develop rural areas to stem rural-urban migration through rural development schemes (NNPC 2004:70). The PRSP proposes implementing an integrated rural development programme to stem the flow of migration from rural to urban areas (NNPC 2004: ix). Nigeria’s PRSP warns that if rural development strategies fail and internal migration continues, the rate of urban unemployment could become unmanageable. The implications
for poverty and crime, conflict, and the maintenance of democracy are grave (NNPC 2004: 43) (de Haas 2006:12-13).

Nigeria’s PRSP draws a clear link between democratisation and economic growth, on the one hand, and the role of emigrants and donors to national economic development on the other. Some momentum for change has been building since the transition to democracy in 1999. Increasing numbers of Nigerians in the diaspora are willing to return and contribute to the economy, and many of the donor agencies that boycotted Nigeria during the military era have returned (NNPC 2004: 13). The PRSP also aims to continue to actively strengthen links with Nigerians and other Africans in the diaspora, to deepen technical and business ties with the rest of the world, and improve export market penetration, especially in textiles, food and cultural artefacts (NNPC 2004: 83); de Haas 2006: 15.

Burkina Faso

Burkina does not pursue a real migration policy. Migration enables households to supplement their income, to diminish income falls and spread risks; in more favourable cases savings as result of migration can be used for investments in economic activities. Increase of South-North migration is expected as result of globalisation processes and is expected to contribute to the wealth of households involved and the country as a whole. The costs for individual migrants and their families of this high migration prevalence in terms of suffering and risks and disruption of family life are occasionally mentioned. During the symposium some participants put forward the possible effects of migration on social cohesion. But this aspect did not consider families and local societies which had to deal with the absence of a large part of their members, but at the integration of rural internal migrants and repatriates in host communities and their access to natural resources as threats of existing social cohesion. (Broekhuis, Burkina).

Senegal

Pour mieux gréer et rentabiliser les efforts des sénégalais vivant à l’étranger dans sa contribution au développement du pays, les pouvoirs publics ont mis en place diverses institutions successives dans le temps et développé plusieurs stratégies politiques liées au return et la réinsertion des migrants.: de promotion et de protection des Sénégalais de l’extérieur; (ministère des sénégalais de l’extérieur). (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006)

Kenya

The PRSP mentions the need to increase surveillance and strengthen immigration points at the border
points of entry in order to curb the large influx of refugees and the proliferation of illegal firearms. (Rutten 2006:2)

Summarising the types of programmes that are currently under way, we can say that they are usually a combination of the following measures. (Some of the measures are supported by Dutch development cooperation (indicated in the listing by **)).

*Policy priorities in the sending countries (also prioritised on the migration and development agenda of receiving countries/ donor agencies)*

- Increasing the flow of remittances/ensuring a more productive investment of the money through forms of co-financing (co-development in West Africa/ Tres por Uno in Mexico).

- **Measures aimed at encouraging brain gain and limiting brain drain; encouragement of return often linked to northern programmes (MIDA, TOKTEN; in Senegal, Ghana, and also Burkina Faso). While in many sending countries there is an interest in how an impulse can be given to brain gain (without the expectation of return), many donors and receiving countries place the emphasis mainly on return and/or limiting the brain drain. Donors try through programmes such as MIDA and TOKTEN to create possibilities for bringing expertise back to the region of origin, although the numbers are very modest and the success is limited (and the number of beneficiaries is not in proportion to the total number of migrants and/or expatriates."

France launched the idea of co-development in the 80s/early 90s. This idea was adopted as a new development strategy by European leaders at their summit meeting in Tampere (Finland) in 1999. Follow-ups to this idea were given in Cotonou 2000, the Paris Seminar in 2000 and at the Dakar Conference in 2000. The MIDA project (Migrations pour le développement en Afrique) was launched in 2001 in Libreville (Gabon) by 20 African countries. Key elements of this project are: involvement of private and public sectors, initiatives and financing by African countries themselves with the assistance of OIM; encouragement and facilitation of the return of qualified nationals.

Le TOKTEN est un autre projet de mobilisation de l’expertise de l’extérieur en vue de leur transfert dans le pays d’origine, par le biais de missions d’intervention de courte durée. Sur la base des demandes exprimées par rapport aux besoins des structures publiques et privées au Sénégal, le projet iden-
tifie les cadres qualifiés répondant aux profils de ces besoins et organise leurs voyages. Contrairement au projet Initiatives de codéveloppement qui se limite en France, le TOKTEN cible tous les pays d’accueil des Sénégalais, notamment les pays développés du Nord.

- **Capacity strengthening/ improvement of border controls, intended to limit immigration from neighbouring countries.** Investments are made within the framework of this policy and with financing from northern countries in the training of customs officials and equipment to sharpen border controls. This is employed in Kenya in order to keep a better check on internal migration (e.g. by Asians) and to keep out undesirable aliens. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, the borders are highly porous; migrants respond to strengthened border controls by taking alternative routes (at a higher cost and risk) they linger for a longer time in transition zones. This approach generally does not lead to a reduction in the number of illegal immigrants, partly because it does not solve the problem of overstaying (people enter legally on a tourist or student visa, and stay longer than permitted). As soon as the stamp expires the holder becomes illegal and often there are no possibilities of leaving the country legally.

- **Combating human trafficking (mainly of women and children, partly linked to the problem of forced labour).** Many anti-trafficking policies are financed and carried out in collaboration with donors/ receiving countries (including the ILO). Different emphases are placed by the sending and receiving countries. The sending countries are critical of the receiving countries because they find that illegal migrants are not treated with respect. Most Nigerian stakeholders, in particular, those in non-governmental positions criticise the anti-trafficking policies of the European states, because they do not differentiate between traffickers and their victims, who are instead collectively labelled as illegals and subsequently expelled. They stress that serious anti-trafficking policies should address trafficked men and women as victims and protect their rights. A blanket repressive approach will work counterproductively, because it increases the strong reciprocal relationship between traffickers and their victims, who have career perspectives once they have paid off their debts and so have some prospect of improving their livelihoods in the longer term.

Nigeria:

According to the ILO, there are at least 660,000 forced labourers in sub-Saharan Africa, of whom
130,000 are victims of trafficking. However, the study revealed that 80 percent of forced labour in the region is for economic exploitation and 8 percent for commercial sexual exploitation (Ehindero et al. 2006); in the Haas 2006:5).

The ILO office in Abuja is active in anti-trafficking, although with an emphasis on forced labour. Since 2004, ILO’s Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL) has implemented the Programme of Action to combat trafficking in West Africa (PATWA) by addressing the structural aspects of the demand and supply of trafficking in persons and the consequent forced labour in West Africa. The ILO collaborates with government (Ministry of Labour), unions (National Labour Union) and employers (National Labour Consultative). The IOM office in Abuja has conducted a project on Trafficking of Women and Children, but funding has now ended. The Nigerian president has appointed a Special Assistant to the President on Migration and Humanitarian Affairs. Her office has established a technical committee of government ministries and agencies\(^47\), which are currently discussing a coherent policy on migration and development. Members of civil society do not seem to be actively involved in the process. This process is facilitated by the Abuja office of IOM.

**Kenya:**

In Kenya there are district advisory children’s centres providing psychosocial services, medical and educational assistance and foster programmes for vulnerable, orphaned or abandoned children who are at risk from trafficking (Rutten 2006).

IOM provides training on the issue of human trafficking. In spite of this support, Kenyan migration officials have also pointed fingers at IOM, UNHCR and the US embassy for handing out visas for family reunion which, they claim, trigger human trafficking into Kenya. Migration in the name of family reunion can easily result in human trafficking. The US embassy, IOM and UNHCR issue visas even if these people have entered Kenya illegally. They do not allow the Kenyan authorities to prosecute them for being in Kenya illegally. IOM does not want us to prosecute because it is too costly for them, as people will have to stay longer when tickets might have been arranged for them. Thus IOM breaks the law on human trafficking and gets away with it. According to Ministry of Labour officials, the IOM programme to bring back Kenyans was a top-down programme brought to the East African community when Ugandans wanted to return home, but not so much the Kenyans and Tanzanians. IOM sets the

\(^{47}\) The committee consists of the ministries of Finance, Education, Justice, Science and Technology, Intergovernmental Affairs and Youth Matters, Women’s Affairs, Health, Foreign Affairs. It also includes the following agencies: the central bank of Nigeria, National Commission for Refugees, NAPTIP, National Population Commission, Nigerian Labour Congress, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), National Planning Commission and the National Human Rights Commission.
agenda; we dance to their tune.

Policy priorities in the sending countries together with the diaspora (partly supported by receiving countries/donor agencies).

- The institution of a ministry of diaspora/minister for diaspora (starting initiatives in Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, Argentina); intensifying contacts with the population overseas. (comment gagner la confiance des emigrants?)

- Starting up cultural programmes etc.; spreading information; granting the franchise to the population in the diaspora. (is currently being discussed in several countries, including Kenya and Nigeria)

- Programmes aimed at improving the investment climate – aimed at attracting investment, e.g. by offering tax concessions etc. (examples: China, India and Korea; starting in Senegal).

Policy priorities in the sending countries (not on the migration and development agenda of receiving countries/donor agencies)

- Protection of the rights of migrants; the ILO Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Family Members (not ratified by most of the northern countries)

- How to create youth employment (e.g. in Senegal, Burkina)? Part of conventional development policies, but not on the migration and development agenda.

- Encouragement of immigration and return, e.g. in Rwanda. Le gouvernement Rwandaise encourage l’immigration des experts et des investisseurs étrangers. C’est dans le souci d’attirer ces investisseurs qu’un environnement favorable a été créé grâce à la mise en place d’un code particulier d’investissement. Forms part of the refugee agenda, but usually from the perspective of the reception region.

- Exporting the labour surplus/the development of remittance corridors. In different countries active attempts are made to facilitate emigration (providing services/institutional reforms) while an attempt is made to maximise the positive effects (e.g. the Philippines, Kenya, Ecuador); How can we best capitalise on future labour
needs and how can migrants be better prepared for their task (improvement in quality)? In countries like Kenya there is an active policy aimed at exporting highly skilled labour (there is a special office for outplacement). In the Philippines, too, there is a tendency to target the training of professionals for work abroad. Not supported by receiving countries (not on their agenda; it is associated with threatened invasion)

- Reducing the dependency on remittances/ promoting a greater stability (Cape Verde, Kenya); not on the migration and development agenda of donors.

Policy priorities in the receiving countries/donors (not so much in line with priorities in sending countries)

- **Encouragement of circular migration** (is presented as a win-win situation, because it makes migration possible without the threat of an invasion). From experience with migration to the Gulf States (strongly regulated migration with temporary labour contracts) it can be stated that there are nevertheless increasing tensions. There is a demand for this form of migration (as a means of supplementing income), but it offers no solution to the group which is mainly interested in career migration. The thought of return migration plays in the background of discussions on circular migration. This leads many sending countries to react with suspicion.

- **Anti-migration campaigns/ information to make people aware of risks and dangers.** Emphasis is placed in discussions in the receiving countries, and by donors, on the need to stop the brain drain (not often referred to in the sending countries) and the need to inform people about the risks of migration (in the sense of anti-emigration policy). In most of the sending countries these issues do not stand very high on the agenda. Where countries are confronted with a brain drain, they generally look for the solution in compensation programmes (people must be free to go, migration cannot be stopped). They are convinced that anti-migration propaganda does not work. They simply say: ‘east, west, home is best. But this is the wrong message. You won’t stop people from going. You should instead inform people how to migrate legally, so as to create a balanced opinion. Migration is not really a bad thing’ (de Haas 2006: 12), although it is acknowledged that many people lack information about what to expect at the other end and are therefore vulnerable to exploitation.

- **Policies for improving migration data.** It is mainly from donor circles that resources are currently being provided for the provision of reliable information (migration statis-
La conception de cet observatoire repose sur une valorisation scientifique des données administratives, collectées par des outils qui permettent un accès à l'information en temps réel. Depuis 2002, des systèmes de collecte d'informations, créés part le l'informatisation et de la mise en réseau des postes frontaliers, des juridictions et des agences consulaires du Sénégal sont mis en place par l'IRD et la direction de l'informatique de l'Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD) du Sénégal, en partenariat avec les Ministres de l'Intérieur, de la Justice et des Sénégalais de l'extérieur. Ces dispositifs sont appelés Observatoires sectoriels. L'ensemble s'appuie sur des compétences nationales et une coopération sud-nord (Broekhuis and Ndione 2006). At the same time it can be noted that insufficient attention is being paid to problems relating to the definition of migration (or more specifically the paradigms underlying such concepts as newcomer or alien, IDPs, refugee, circular migrant, and the consequences which a particular designation have for a person’s development chances. This less statistical and qualitative dimension remains underexposed, but is of great importance (more important than the precise quantification of the numbers of migrants).

** involvement of migrants - diaspora organisations. There has recently been a growing interest from the sending region in making contact with the diaspora. Governments in reception zones and donors are trying to involve migrants actively in the formulation and/or implementation of policy in their region of origin. In the process they address the migrants and such diaspora organisations as exist in the reception region. By doing this, they are trying to benefit of the ‘overseas’ development potential (see section 7), but the problems should not be underestimated. Many migrant organisations are not expert in the field of development, are often not representative or politically coloured, and/or are sometimes seen from the perspective of the sending countries as defectors. Whether a contribution can be made to development through the support of diaspora organisations depends on the quality of the available expertise, and the extent to which the activities of the diaspora organisations worldwide can be harmonised with each other (in the case of the Philippines, for example, there are c. 1000 organisations [Baggio 2006]). In the worst case projects carried out by such organisations interfere with the mainstream policies carried out by the national government or local organisations.
7. Intermezzo: African diaspora organisations in the Netherlands and development

During our research, while focusing on the perspective of the sending countries, we also interviewed migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 2006) in order to learn more about their views and perceptions, and to explore the opportunities for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to link with development-oriented MOs in the Netherlands in order to optimise the contribution of MOs to local, regional and national development in the countries of origin. Based on an earlier inventory of some 150 organisations (van Heelsum 2005; 2006) and additional research\(^{48}\), we made a selection of 67 African development MOs\(^{49}\), and interviewed representatives of the most important of them, focusing on Burkina Faso, Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Cape Verde Islands, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda (the analysis which follows is based on van Naerssen et al 2006; see Kusters et al 2006 for an overview of the selected organisations)\(^{50}\).

The African development MOs are diverse in character. This applies to their size, their reach, the budget available, the types of projects and the political and economic context in which these projects have to be realised. The majority of the MOs are under ten years old and their members are mostly first generation immigrants. They are supported by a variety of Dutch organisations and institutions such as municipalities and Dutch CFAs. There is less involvement of private business (although there is some). MOs are more or less informed or otherwise find their way in the maze of funding organisations.

To the extent that MOs are actively involved in carrying out development activities in their countries of origin, projects are mostly local and small-scale. They are particularly represented in the sectors of education and health care. Nevertheless, the reach of small-scale projects can be large, as in micro-credit and awareness-raising programmes. The question of the sustainability of the projects is hard to answer, since most of them have been started only recently. Much depends on the local situation. Usually the relation with the local environment

\(^{48}\) We compiled a list of all development MOs on the basis of information from the CFAs, internet and other sources of information, after which we checked whether these organisations still existed. It turned out that many MOs had ceased their activities or could not be reached.

\(^{49}\) We limited our research to development MOs, i.e., the MOs with the clear objective of contributing to development in the countries of origin, as registered at the Chambers of Commerce.

\(^{50}\) See for further details working papers Migration and Development series, reports 12 and 13.
has been established at an informal level and good relations with family members and village chiefs are important. The reasons given for not engaging with local authorities at the formal level are corruption and inefficiency.

The MOs are of opinion that they have to improve their capacity to have a larger impact, but they also point out that much of their work is on voluntary basis. As their assets – or relative strengths - they mention strong motivation, knowledge of the culture in the country of origin, being well informed and speaking local languages. Nevertheless, some comments on this added value should be made. The real asset (or strength) of the MOs is that they possess social networks and knowledge at the local and regional levels, but not much at the national level. Social networks constitute useful social capital, but they might also constrain development, since linkages and obligations might lead to less objectivity and efficiency. Local knowledge and local relations are, of course, important, but it should also be acknowledged that they are no substitute for professional and technical skills. Finally, people’s perception of emigrants in the home countries is not always necessarily positive.

There are indications that there are differences in attitude between first generation and second generation migrants. With the latter, personal ties with people of the home country are less strong, which has both advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage is that the second generation is usually less engaged in individual remittances, but the advantage is that they are inclined to social remittances (i.e., projects in the sphere of development). The second generation of MOs (a minority) seem to be more assertive and demanding a place in the development circuit.

The success factors of African MOs are in principle the same as those of Dutch development-oriented organisations. Apart from factors dependent on the specific regional or country contexts, the major factors that contribute to success are adequate anticipation of the demand, visible short-term results, ownership of the project by the target group, and professionalism of the project initiators. Project failures are mostly due to the lack of these success factors. The question is whether the strong assets of MOs, namely social contacts and local knowledge, constitute an added value compared with similar Dutch development NGOs. During the interviews references to this added value were made in the relation to the start of the

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51 A development project is successful if it is sustainable, contributes to welfare improvement and empowerment of the target group. For large-scale programmes one can add the contribution to the realisation of the millennium development goals (MDGs).
projects. However, the degree to which local knowledge and social capital are decisive for the success of projects is not clear.

African development MOs are well aware that ‘development’ is more than erecting a building or the donation of computers to students. The need to involve the community is a common wisdom and the complexity of ‘development’ is acknowledged. However, one has to start somewhere and the resources are limited. Education is often considered as a good starting point and there is usually a demand for it. With the support of Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), some MOs are involved in peace-building processes. However, this does not alter the fact that only a small number of MOs are explicitly involved in issues of good governance and democratisation (mostly in the form of information campaigns). Initiatives in this respect deserve strong support, the more so since these are issues that the MOs themselves consider as crucial for the development process and that are high on the agenda of Dutch development cooperation.

African MOs expect advice and financial support from the Dutch government and CFAs. There is a lack of understanding and appreciation of the country policy of Dutch development cooperation. Greater attention, more dialogue and a stronger involvement in Dutch development policy are desirable. At the same time, MOs want more understanding for the circumstance that they are often dependent on volunteers.

The CFAs are important for the MOs. They encourage professionalism among the migrants and their support enables programmes and projects to be implemented on a larger scale. Nevertheless, there exists widespread and outspoken criticism of CFAs. It seems that mutual communication could be better. The two representatives of two CFAs we interviewed recognise that there are tensions between CFAs and MOs as the following quotations of CFA representatives show:

A great problem of the CFAs and the migrant organisations is that both sides are arrogant. They both think that they know it all, instead of cooperating to share knowledge and join forces.

Migrant organisations differ from each other, so we should not generalise. But what they say about our bureaucracy, our lack of decisiveness and the like, unfortunately, is true. Another difficulty is that our choice of a selective group of countries is difficult to explain.

The MOs are usually embedded in a larger system in which internal and international emigration is a way for many Africans to improve their household or family livelihood. Among the African MOs in the Netherlands it appears that there is not much knowledge of migration policies in the country of origin, nor is there an inclination to influence or exert pressure on
this policy (in the way that the Mexican and Philippine diasporas do). One suggestion repeatedly made was that information should be provided to change the rather optimistic picture of migrants’ lives in Western countries.

It is interesting that a change has occurred worldwide in the relationship between the governments of countries of origin and the MOs. Emigrants are no longer viewed as ‘defectors’ but as ‘countrymen abroad’, who can contribute to development. Ghana is a case in point. The country supports initiatives of knowledge transfer, including the MIDA (migration and development) programme of the ‘Ghana Health project’ coordinated by IOM-Netherlands. Another example is Cape Verde, which aims to encourage migrants’ investments and is considering cooperation with the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) in order to start return migration programme. Mention was made in our interviews of the representatives of Burkina Faso and Kenya in the Netherlands who have undertaken efforts to link with MOs. In other European countries there are other, larger-scale, examples of cooperation between governments and their diasporas, such as the French co-développement programmes (since 1997) and the ACCORD initiatives in the UK.

8. Final reflections, recommendations and suggestions for follow up

This brings us to the final question: How can consistent migration policies contribute to combating poverty? At this moment, several ‘sending’ countries are looking at ‘migration and development’, but there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically result in poverty alleviation or sustainable development.

Much will depend on the type of destination where migrants decide to go. People moving to the Gulf States will – in comparison with migrants who move to other destinations - have fewer possibilities for upward mobility than those who migrate to the US/Canada or the EU (and where conditions are better for establishment, family reunification, etc.). Within the EU there are wide differences between countries in the possibilities for integration and becoming full citizens, which will determine to a large extent whether migrants will be able to benefit from migration or not. In comparison with other EU countries, the Netherlands is not viewed by many migrations as the most ideal destination, partly because of the language, but currently also because of the integration policies. Where people do arrive in the Netherlands, this is sometimes transit migration (there is currently an exodus of Somalis from the Netherlands to the UK).
At the country level, the development potential of migration will greatly depend on the way countries are incorporated into the migration system. This has direct consequences for the possibility of being able to profit from migration. Diasporic states and countries with directed South-North migration generally find themselves in a relatively favourable position, while the countries with south-south migration appear to be increasingly faced with restrictions. In the case of south-south migration, migrants often travel without the required documentation, they are vulnerable to exploitation – do not receive protection; job opportunities – as well as salaries - are usually unfavourable in comparison with the northern destinations; the flow of remittances is small in comparison with the flow of money coming from the northern states, and much of the suffering remains invisible (northern countries have biased views, focusing in particular on the consequences of South-North migration).

To the extent that receiving states/donors are currently implementing ‘migration and development’ policies, these are mainly aimed at controlling dominant patterns of south-north migration. The areas of origin are treated as ‘sending states’ without taking into account that many of these countries also play a role as immigration and/or transition areas. EU countries and a selected group of emigration countries are currently negotiating readmission and/or migration quotas (bilateral agreements), often without taking into consideration the negative consequences for intra-regional relations (i.e., restriction of migration from neighbouring states).

Migration has clearly risen on the agenda in bilateral relations between Nigeria and the European states, who specifically seek Nigeria’s collaboration in the readmission of undocumented migrants or rejected asylum seekers of Nigerian citizenship. Some countries are hesitant to concede to demands from the Nigerian side for certain quotas of legal migrants in exchange for cooperation on readmission, as Italy is doing (de Haas 2006: 9).

In addition, there is another paradox: regional organisations (ECOWAS, AU etc.) aim at facilitating ‘free movement of persons’, but also acknowledge the need to control migration. Processes of regional integration seem to have given more space to human traffickers and have restricted the possibilities for states to control migration.

Restrictive policies – and more intensive border control in northern countries - have often been unable to solve the problem of illegal migration, but have – instead - resulted in a more complex situation. Migrants are forced to spend more money and time, take higher risks, and
are more dependent on smugglers than before. The likelihood of international migration helping to combat poverty is less favourable than before. Migrants are increasingly attracted to criminal activities (to earn large amounts of money in a short time); the migration agenda has become mixed up with anti-terrorism; and human trafficking has intensified.

International migration might have helped groups of people to escape from poverty, but we should not forget that, in many cases, the impact tends to limited, even in the most favourable circumstances. Where migrants do manage to send remittances to their areas of origin, these flows are usually geographically concentrated (and benefit only small numbers of people). Flows of remittances help to create ‘islands of wealth’, but will in many cases not contribute to ‘national’ development. Another problem is the variability of remittance flows and the lack of sustainability. Even if remittances are stable in the short run (first-generation migrants sending home significant amounts of money on a regular basis), this seems to be decline in the course of time (second or third generations often lose interest and feel less committed). Experience shows that migration streams from particular areas will usually not last longer than about 20 years, and that the intensity and direction of migration will very much depend on economic growth, which will vary in time.

Even though migration is nowadays described as a strategy aimed at spreading risk (common in the ‘new economics of migration theory’), it often results in new vulnerabilities.

There is a considerable group of migrants who – due to migration - suffered downward social mobility: they fell ill (malaria), were involved in an accident or became victims of robberies or exploitation; well-educated women working as domestic servants will often not be able to fully exploit their capabilities. Another negative dimension of migration is the intensification of land conflicts and rising land prices (use of remittances for the purchase of land). International migration – along with the liberalisation of land markets and the use of internet - has opened the door to a real estate boom. International migrants – and also tourism entrepreneurs – are increasingly appearing as a new category of absentee landowners.

Where attempts have been made by policymakers to maximise the positive impact of international migration or to restrict the negative implications, most of the sending countries in sub-Saharan Africa do not yet have well-established policies. It is a new policy field and there is a wide variety of topics which very much depend on the particular position of countries. In our analysis (see 6) we showed that there is some overlap between the ‘migration and development’ agendas of northern and southern countries (increasing the flow of remittances, combating human trafficking, improving border controls, stimulating brain gain etc.) but this is very much dependent on the country under consideration, and that, within the South, there
are considerable conflicts of interests between countries. We also showed that – where northern countries or donors invest in ‘migration and development’ programmes (MIDA/TOKTEN) - the number of beneficiaries is small in comparison with the total migration flow. From the perspective of the sending countries, it seems unrealistic to expect migrants to be willing to return as long as there are no comparable employment or educational opportunities. In many sending countries, the focus is not so much on ‘return’; instead, policymakers are searching for ‘long distance’ types of support by migrant populations. While they accept that people should have a right to move freely, they aim to get the diaspora involved by inviting them to send money or make investments. In general terms, in donor policies there is a bias in favour of countries with south-north migration and little is done for the countries experiencing south-south migration.

Recommendations

In order to improve the development impact of international migration and to make international migration more relevant to development, we have the following recommendations:

A. Improvement of current policies (supported by donors and northern countries):

- **Anti-trafficking** measures (programmes to stop the trafficking of women and children) should continue to receive high priority (supported by sending and receiving countries). At the same time, however, the sending countries are unhappy that victims and traffickers are treated equally as criminals. Priority should be given to stopping the criminalisation of the victims (and to focusing more on the traffickers). Legalisation of the victims is seen as an important requirement making anti-trafficking more effective.

- **Anti-migration** policies and/or intensification of border controls as a strategy for restricting illegal migration is not effective. Rather than investing in strengthening border controls (capacity building, technology etc.), more attention should be paid to problems of ‘overstaying’.

- Where receiving countries show an interest in facilitating circular migration, it is necessary to examine critically previous experiences (guest worker programmes) and the development implications of current migration towards the Gulf States. The ageing population in Europe might offer opportunities for Africans on the European labour
market, but little is known about the particularities of future labour needs, and how such migration can help to promote essential productive investments and knowledge transfer. A better orientation towards the international labour market is needed if the country wishes to profit more from international migration. It is also important to anticipate better the growing competition between different migrant groups (how is it possible to guarantee that migrants from sub-Saharan Africa will be able in the long run to compete with migrants arriving from Asia and Latin America?).

- It is recommended that an analysis be made of to what extent MIDA-TOKTEN initiatives (aimed at brain gain/brain circulation) form part of mainstream development policies (PRSPs and sectoral plans), and analyse to what extent these are in conflict with ‘traditional structures’. What is the capacity of local institutions to facilitate ‘reintegration’ and or the return of people, and what is the impact of ‘foreign expertise’? What kind of institutional adaptations are necessary (e.g., property rights, inheritance rights etc.). Who is responsible for the people moving in and out, and what are the social security implications for these groups? What are their rights and obligations of circular migrants and who is responsible (the government of the sending or the receiving country)?

- Where support is given to migrant and diaspora organisations, it is important to also consider supporting such organisations in the countries of origin (e.g., in Burkina Faso there are numerous migrant organisations). Northern government and donors could continue to help migrant organisations to establish contacts with the area of origin, but also diaspora organisations in other countries, thus facilitating communication and information flows. (For more specific recommendations related to MOs in the Netherlands, see C.)

B. New orientations:

- Greater priority should be given to the problems of countries with South-South migration, and to those of transition areas/migration hubs (how to improve the situation of transit migrants? In doing this, sufficient attention should be paid to the Asian-African (and potentially Latin American) connection.

- More emphasis should be given to supporting national governments and/or local groups (in sending countries) to establish links with their diaspora. Many sending
countries are interested in intensifying relations with countries with substantial migrants group, but the financial means of their governments are limited.

- More attention could be paid to the worldwide problem of discrimination and xenophobia (including in the South). Rather than continuing data collection—and deepening the contrast between how migrant and non migrant populations get along (as is currently done by different donors), it is necessary to make a critical review of the paradigms used (aliens, 'immigrants', expats) and to assess how, in different countries, this categorisation contributes to stigmatisation, exclusion etc.

- More attention should be paid to the negative implications of the boom in bilateral agreements (readmission, migration quotas) for the intra-regional patterns of collaboration and/or interstate relations within the south.

- Given the growing interest in circular migration (see above), it would be interesting to collect more concrete information about how to monitor ‘urgent labour needs’ (not only in the North, but also within the South in relation to HIV-AIDS etc.). How can we match demand and supply, and make circular migration more relevant to African labour requirements?

- Priority should be given to providing more and better information to different categories of migrant groups. How can we inform migrants before their departure about the conditions in host countries; inform women and children so that they do not become victims of traffickers, AIDS and other diseases; inform people about visa requirements etc. (and the need to formalise their presence); economic investment possibilities; assessing the future labour needs; obtaining information about new laws and international treaties. etc.

- It is urgent to initiate a discussion about the new role of embassies and consulates—they are currently providing visas and passports, but what is their future role in distributing information (see above); in providing assistance in the case of emergencies and expulsions; in preparing agreements to improve social security etc?

- More attention should be paid to the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, in particular the ‘ecological refugees’ (together with political conflicts, one of the root causes of forced migration). Early warning systems and spatial planning could help to prevent forced migration.
It is important to mainstream ‘migration and development’ policies in the direction of anti-poverty strategies. The current emphasis on ‘migration and development’ should not result in the reallocation of money in favour of the migrants. The majority of the population (97%) is geographically stable; they are quite reluctant to leave their homes and villages or towns. More explicit attention must be paid to how to control population growth and/or improve local employment opportunities, especially for the youth.

Suggestions for collaboration with the African diaspora in the Netherlands (see van Naerssen et al 2006; and Kusters et al 2006):

- There are several hundreds of initiatives of Dutch civil society in the field of development cooperation with non-Western countries. These NGOs are mostly locally or regionally based, their projects are small in scale and their funding sources diverse. The development-oriented African MOs fit into this pattern. Although they possess specific assets such as knowledge of foreign cultures and languages, there is no reason to give them a privileged position in development cooperation and acquiring funding. The major criterion for funding should be the professional qualities of the those implementing and the quality of the project. The aim of development is not here, but there, in the home countries of the MOs.

- Migrants have a relative advantage by being rooted in more than one society. This ‘transnationalism’ offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential should be exploited, and optimised by dialogue, information on funding opportunities, capacity building programmes etc. Special attention should be paid to the second generation of migrants (and how to keep them involved).

- African MOs in the Netherlands are small and greatly rely on volunteer work. While acknowledging the value of the volunteer work, Dutch Development Cooperation agencies could facilitate and increase the quality of the work of MOs by organising training and exchange of experience sessions; and also by supporting MOs in the monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes currently carried out in Africa. This should preferably be done by independent institutions (i.e. not linked to the funding agencies).

- During the past few years a dialogue has started between Dutch development agencies and MOs. Return migration and mostly small-scale projects are now on the
agenda. The latter could be broadened by examining and encouraging social remittances, transnational entrepreneurship, private investments and tourism in countries of origin. Special and careful attention should be paid to the opportunities for MOs to engage in programmes in the field of good governance and democratisation in the countries of origin.

- African MOs could learn lessons from Asian and Latin American MOs, in particular, with regard to lobbying the African national governments for migrants’ rights and facilitating social remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives and programmes in other European countries.

- Projects of MOs in all African countries should be considered for funding and other forms of support (i.e., not restricted to the partner countries).

- Dutch CFAs and MOs should search for better ways of communication. It is a good thing that both sides acknowledge a certain field of tension in this engagement. Problems should be discussed at regular meetings, which could contribute to the diminution of mutual misunderstandings and to increasing the effectiveness of the programmes. More efforts need to be made to stimulate the learning process of working together.

- The possibilities for ways of co-operation between Dutch development agencies, African MOs in the Netherlands and governments of the countries of origin should be explored and expanded. Apparent examples are the dialogues with the embassies of Ghana and Cape Verde.
Appendix 1: Suggestions for follow-up research (in line with the policy recommendations):

1. **Migration hubs and transit migration**

   We can conclude from our research that - especially in North Africa, but also in other areas - some areas develop into migration hubs and have to deal with a large concentration of migrants - often originating from neighbouring countries - who do not settle to stay, but are intending to make the ‘final jump’ to Europe as soon as they have made the necessary arrangements and collected sufficient money. Many of these migrants seem to live in extreme vulnerability, being excluded from two sides: they are no longer considered citizens in their areas of origin (they have tried to shed their old identities), but are also not accepted as citizens in the area of destination. They are not under protection and are ‘footloose’ with respect to institutional support systems. Policy formulation in this field (how to deal with transit migrants and transition areas) is necessary in order to protect this category of people, who often do not have the possibility to return – nor are they able to move on. This research will also focus on how migrants perceive the pros and cons of different migration destinations (reputation of the Netherlands and other EU countries as destination areas). Attention should also be paid to the new Asia-Africa connection and the role of Africa as transition area for Asian migrants moving to the EU/US.

   Selection of research location and implementation in collaboration with Prof. Aderanti Adepoju, preferably at various locations simultaneously.

2. **Migration as a booming business**

   New types of services and economic activities related to migration, in the areas of origin and destination. Migration is currently a ‘booming business in the sense of generating new types of services and economic activities, facilitating the communication between areas of origin and destination (internet cafés, couriers, financial services), but also contributing to import and export business, including tourism. Parts of these new economic activities are transnational and help to strengthen transnational relations. In the discussion on international migration, little is known about the economic significance of migration-related activities, and their contribution to business development, economic innovation and, lastly, national development. This research will result in a better understanding of the economic impact of international migration, and the selective way in which the benefits are distributed between the ar-
eas of origin and destination (what areas receive the most favourable impact?). To what extent does international migration generate impulses for new economic activities; what are the consequences in terms of complementarities, dependency and competition? Special attention will be paid to the link between tourism and migration.

Research location:s Amsterdam, Madrid, sub-Saharan Africa (to be selected)

3. The image and reputation of various EU-countries as areas of destination

Currently, many people from sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America move towards EU countries, and there is a clear diversification in the range of migration destinations. Whereas people previously showed a preference for the colonial ‘motherland, today they migrate to a wide range of possible destinations. Different countries have different reputations in respect of possibilities for getting work, and also in regard to discrimination, and the possibilities for being accepted as full member of civil society and/or family reunification. Some countries are seen as the ideal destination – and other areas are perceived only as transition areas (Somalis leave the Netherlands, for example, and migrate to the UK). The Netherlands is not only a final destination, but also a transition area and migration hub.

This research will contribute to a better understanding of image-forming (how do people assess the opportunities at different destinations); what is the image of migrating to different destinations and what kind of expectations do people have? To what extent do we see differences between the migrants and the stayers; how do migrants and ‘stayers’ communicate (email, telephone etc.) and to what extent is there a gap between image, expectation and reality; how does this influence migration decisions? Special attention will be paid to the expectation that, as a consequence of their ageing population, EU countries are in need of migrant labour, especially in the field of medical care.

4. Migrants as competitors and rivals

As a consequence of increasing migration, there is an increasing heterogeneity of different migrant populations. In addition to groups of expatriates who have become fully integrated and full citizens in the destination areas, there are migrants who are currently coming in search of work or in the framework of family reunification, or to obtain political asylum. In addition to this kind of diversity (based on the purpose of migration), there is an important dis-
tinction between the different generations. The various EU countries use different definitions of the above categories, which has important implications for their development possibilities.

This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the heterogeneity of migrants and, more particularly, of the extent to which this is translated into patterns of competition and/or solidarity. In order to have a better idea about whether international migration from sub-Saharan Africa will contribute to sustainable development in the long run, it is extremely important to have a clear idea about how different groups of migrants compete – and the extent in which African migrants are capable of defending themselves against the arrival of migrants from Asia or Latin America. To what extent do migrants from different areas of origin have their own ‘niches’, how do they compete and what are the consequences for their capacity to build sustainable livelihoods? What are the urgent labour needs (not only in EU countries, but also in SSA), what are the varying abilities of different groups to benefit? How are migrant groups stigmatised and how does this influence their position on the labour market? How do recruiters deal with the strengths and weaknesses of different migrant groups, and what are the implications?

Research location: The Netherlands-Spain

5. Embassies, diplomatic relations and the institutionalisation of migration

International migration has important implications for diplomatic relations between the countries of origin and destination. More than in previous times, embassies fulfil a role for civil society – they have a responsibility in providing citizens with visa and passports. At the same time, however, many countries have developed into diasporic states with immense populations overseas; it is only relatively recently that national states have become interested in establishing closer links with this expatriate population and using this potential as a motor for the development of the mother state.

Governments are taking the initiative in establishing ‘ministries of the diaspora’ as a way of involving the diaspora in national development. The contact between embassies and the diaspora is often very limited - there is often a lack of trust – and the range of services tends to be limited (visas, passports etc.).

This research will focus on the following questions: What are the implications of international migration for the role of embassies and how do they respond to the need for new services? What is their role in the establishment of bilateral agreements (EU - sub-Saharan Africa) and
what are the consequences for diplomatic relations? How does international migration affect diplomatic relations? How can embassies and consulates play a positive role in providing necessary information and facilitating communication?

Research location: visiting several embassies (Bolivia and Ecuador, Philippines, China, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso).

6. International migration, land speculation/ foreign-fundia and land titling

International migration will – as a result of sending remittances - will often result in land speculation, rising land prices and, in some cases, even a real-estate boom. Because of the lack of alternative investment opportunities, migrant remittances are often used for the purchase of land (even at a long distance; migrants often do not return). This is leading increasingly to the existence of foreign-fundia (land owned by foreigners, as a new type of absentee ownership); people in northern countries, including tourist operators, buy large tracts of land, which they use for building homes, and also hotels or tourist estates. Recent processes of land privatisation, Internet communication – and migration – are contributing to a real-estate boom, and this is reflected in rising land prices.

At the same time, donors are investing large amounts of money in projects aimed at the cadastral registration of land. It is not so clear to what extent land titling and cadastral projects can help to control above trends, nor is it clear whether land titling programmes are sufficiently focused on dealing with the consequences of migration. What are the implications of land titling for circular migration? Is there a need for more flexible types of land ownership (renting, leasing, etc.), given the importance of flexible international migration? How do land titling programmes deal with ‘mobile’ populations? What kind of property regime is most appropriate, given the high population mobility? What are the implications of migration for inheritance legislation? What are the consequences of international migration for land speculation and absenteeism?

Research location: To be defined, in an area with strong migration.

7. Migrant and diaspora organisations (in relation to civil society)

Increasing emphasis is being placed in current policy on migrant and diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. Less attention is usually paid to the organisations in the countries of ori-
gin (organisations established by returned migrants etc.). The problem of diaspora and migrant organisations, however, is that they are often representative bodies and may have little expertise relevant to development. How can these organisations be used to stimulate development in the area of origin in such a way that it forms part of mainstream development policies and respects ‘local’ priorities (participatory approach).

Research location: to be determined.
Appendix 2: Ideas for PhD projects

The following PhD projects form part of the ongoing research programme ‘Global Mobility and Place’, which will be carried out as part of the Humboldt programme of Human Development. The projects are approved projects, but implementation depends on the possibilities for co-financing. Candidates need to be selected in the course of 2007.

Project 1: International Migration and European Borders

This project will start at the macro level by making a comparative analysis of migration flows at the European ports of entry, focusing on people arriving from Latin America, Asia and Africa. Research will concentrate on questions such as where do people enter and why, the influence of changing or varying border and immigration policies, and the role of borders, institutions and sources of information. At the micro level, the project will analyse the migrants’ active role in searching for the loopholes at the EU borders, and their responses to different institutional settings. What is the rationality or irrationality of migration and bordering practices, and what are their consequences? What is the significance of borders for highly skilled and unskilled labour? What is the link between border regimes and legalisation statelessness?

Key words: migration flows (highly skilled versus unskilled); border regimes and immigration policies; information flows and perceptions.

Research location: EU ports of entry/departure ports in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Project 2: Migration and Home: settlement and removal in the EU

During recent decades, EU countries have adopted different attitudes on how to deal with different groups of immigrants. Depending upon their location and also their labour needs, the various countries have adopted different policies with respect to settlement and integration. This project aims to make a comparative analysis of settlement and removal in different countries of the EU. Attention will be paid to the influence of the various institutional settings on how migrants seek attachment to place and the creation of locality. How do we deal with designations such as alien or guest in relation to how people link to places?

Key words: settlement/ removal, identity, attachment to place, creation of locality; citizenship.
Research location: comparative research in a selection of EU countries.

Project 3: Migration and Transnational Networks: diasporas within the EU, new networks and the impact for development

The EU is home of different diasporas: large numbers of migrants from Latin America, Asia and Africa maintain contacts with their home countries. Nowadays, governments from their home countries plan to use these diasporas because they send home remittances or are potential sources of investment in their countries of origin. This project will analyse the role of diasporas in the creation of global and local linkages, and focus on the question of how to make diasporas more beneficial for development? Attention will be paid to the two sides (the EU and the sending economy). Key words: diasporas, networks, flows of capital, goods and information, development

Research location: specific migrant groups, focusing on external networks.
References

(References to project output are mentioned in the text; additional references are mentioned in the footnotes)


Working papers Migration and Development series

(Radboud University Nijmegen, Migration and Development research group, Department of Human Geography), reports 1-15.


