

Aufrüstung in Europa: Dynamiken und Probleme

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Gliederung

Einleitung: Sicherheitsdilemmata

1. Unsicherheit: die Intentionen Russlands
2. Unsicherheit: die Verlässlichkeit der Verbündeten
3. Unsicherheit: die Art des zukünftigen Krieges

Implikationen

Einleitung

Europas Aufrüstung ist der Versuch, ein **Sicherheitsdilemma** zu navigieren ... das wie andere Sicherheitsdilemmata auch Entscheidungen im Kontext mehrfacher Unsicherheiten erfordert:

- neben einem „**dilemma of interpretation**“ hinsichtlich der Motive und Fähigkeiten der anderen Akteure
- gibt es nämlich auch ein „**dilemma of response**“ hinsichtlich der besten Antwort auf die Situation und insbesondere die Rüstungsdynamiken




1. Unsicherheit

Wie sollte sich Europa am besten gegenüber Russland verhalten?

Das Grundproblem: je nach Russlands Absichten ist eine andere Art von europäischer Reaktion am besten

- falls Russland nur seine Sicherheit verteidigt (wenn auch proaktiv), Europa aber stark aufrüstet, entsteht eine gefährliche Sicherheitsspirale
=> Zurückhaltung als richtige Strategie
- falls aber Russland tatsächlich aggressive Absichten verfolgt, schadet eine zu zurückhaltende Aufrüstung der Sicherheit Europas
=> verstärkte Abschreckung als richtige Strategie



Rede Putins auf der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2007

“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”



2014

2022

Strategisches Konzept der NATO 2010

“Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century”



2014

Wales-Gipfel 2014 der NATO

“We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”

2022

US-Austritt aus INF-Vertrag 2019

2014

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


Quelle: Borger / Sabbagh 2019

Russischer Truppenaufmarsch Ende 2021

Potential for 175,000 Russian Forces Near Ukraine: Evidence of Recent Artillery, Equipment, Personnel Movements and Planning

03 December 2021




Quelle: Harris / Sonne 2021

Russischer Entwurf für einen NATO-Russland-Vertrag 2021

“Article 4: The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

Article 5: The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.

Article 6: All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.”





2014

2022

Strategisches Konzept der NATO 2022

“The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment.”



2. Unsicherheit

**Wie gut können sich die Verbündeten
innerhalb der NATO aufeinander verlassen?**

Das Grundproblem: wechselseitige Fragen der Verlässlichkeit

- USA beklagen mangelnde Bereitschaft der Europäer, sich an NATO-Aufgaben zu beteiligen -> machen die Höhe der Verteidigungsausgaben zum Gradmesser der Verlässlichkeit
- die Europäer wiederum sind zu höheren Verteidigungsausgaben bereit, fürchten aber gleichzeitig, von den USA nicht mehr (ausreichend) unterstützt zu werden

Wales-Gipfel 2014 der NATO

“Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.



Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:

- halt any decline in defence expenditure;
- aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
- aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.”





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
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Quelle: NATO-Generalsekretär (2019): 36



Top 15 defence budgets (USDbn), 2024^{†‡}



^aOMB adjusted figure. ^bNational Defence budget plus military R&D funding, military pensions, paramilitary forces' budgets, and other MoD-related expenses such as housing. ^cIncludes 'Sondervermögen' (special fund) allocation, military pensions and military aid to Ukraine. ^dIncludes Armed Forces Pension Scheme and military aid to Ukraine. ^eExcludes Armed Forces Support Fund.

[†]At current prices and exchange rates. [‡]Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria.

Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2024, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spending levels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant in a number of cases. US Foreign Military Financing not included in figures. Dashed line reflects an estimate for the value of the Chinese and Russian defence budget in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms to take into account the lower input costs in these countries. These PPP figures are not used in any regional or global totals in this publication and should not be used in comparison with other international data.

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2014

2022

Den Haag-Gipfel der NATO 2025

“Allies agree that this 5% commitment will comprise two essential categories of defence investment. Allies will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually based on the agreed definition of NATO defence expenditure by 2035 to resource core defence requirements, and to meet the NATO Capability Targets. Allies agree to submit annual plans showing a credible, incremental path to reach this goal. And Allies will account for up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base. The trajectory and balance of spending under this plan will be reviewed in 2029, in light of the strategic environment and updated Capability Targets.”

2014

2022



2014

2022

Rede Steinmeiers zum 80. Jahrestags des Endes des Zweiten Weltkrieges

„Und deshalb spreche ich von einem doppelten Epochenbruch – der Angriffskrieg Russlands und der Wertebruch Amerikas –, das ist es, was das Ende dieses langen 20. Jahrhunderts markiert. (...)“

Wir müssen militärisch stärker werden, aber nicht um Krieg zu führen, sondern um Krieg zu verhindern. Nicht um Diplomatie zu ersetzen, sondern um sie glaubhaft zu machen – mit einer aktiven Außenpolitik, die Diplomatie nicht denen überlässt, die nur eigennützige Machtinteressen verfolgen.“



3. Unsicherheit

**Auf welche Art von Krieg sollte
sich Europa vorbereiten?**



Das Grundproblem: Auseinanderfallen von altem Erfahrungsraum und neuem Erwartungshorizont

=> wachsende Sorge vor möglichem NATO-Russland-Krieg, aber auch zunehmendes Bewusstsein, dass der vermutete nächste Krieg nicht wie der im Kalten Krieg imaginierte Krieg sein wird

RAND Wargames 2016



Quelle: Mueller (2016): 55






Figure 1. Number of Main Battle Tanks of Large European Powers



SOURCE: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Military Balance*, 1990–2020.


Eine neue Art der Kriegsführung


“The new capabilities that Ukraine and, belatedly, Russia are developing have accelerated a shift away from the exquisite precision strikes that have dominated Western military thinking since the 1990s toward what military analysts now term ‘precision mass’ — the ability to deliver accurate fires at unprecedented scale through inexpensive, expendable platforms. (...) This fundamentally alters the arithmetic of air warfare from scarce, precious assets to abundant, expendable tools of war.” (Gady 2025)



2014


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Quelle: Kurmanaev et al. 2025

EU (2025): Defence Readiness Roadmap mit folgenden Prioritätsbereichen:



Quelle: Europäische Kommission (2025): 3

Implikationen

- Krieg wieder denkbar in Europa, gleichzeitig weiterhin Debatten über mögliche Art des Krieges -> Kombination von neuem Erfahrungswissen mit Foresight-Techniken wird wichtig(er) werden
- Russland hat sich deutlich stärker auf Krieg (inkl. entsprechender Wirtschaft) eingestellt als die Europäer, die zudem stark aufholen müssen
... weshalb es in den nächsten Jahren ein Verwundbarkeitsfenster geben könnte (was eine kombinierte kurz- und mittelfristige Strategie erfordert)
- das Überwinden des Sicherheitsdilemmas wird gleichzeitig immer schwieriger

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