© Universität Bielefeld
Welcome at ETACE - Chair for Economic Theory and Computational Economics
Postal Address:
Universität Bielefeld
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Universitätsstr. 25
D-33615 Bielefeld
Contact:
Tel.: +49 521 106-6931
E-mail: etace(et)uni-bielefeld.de
Latest News
New Project
30.11.2022
The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) has granted a new joint research project with the Energy Systems Analysis group of the German Aerospace Center (DLR). The EWaGI project aims at studying sectoral and macroeconomic implications of the energy transition, thereby focusing on heterogeneous firm behavior in response to rising energy prices. The three-year project starts in December 2022. Principle investigator is Philipp Harting.
Conference Presentation
29.11.2022
Herbert Dawid has given at talk on "A market-based analysis of connected and automated vehicles in mixed traffic: Implications of liability and infrastructure for road safety" at the workshop New Research Development on Autonomous Vehicles at the Center for Unframed Thinking at the Rennes School of Business.
New Journal Paper Accepted
18.11.2022
Dawid, H. and M. Neugart (2022), 'Effects of Technological Change and Automation on Industry Structure and (Wage-)Inequality: Insights from a Dynamic Task-Based Model', forthcoming in Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Research Presentation
18.11.2022
Herbert Dawid gave a talk on "Implications of Algorithmic Wage Setting on Online Labor Platforms: A Simulation-Based Analysis" in the Research Seminar Series of the Grenabole Applied Economics Lab.
Research Talk
18.11.2022
Philipp Harting gave a research talk on “Digital Product Innovation and Global Value Chains: an Agent-Based Analysis” at the abm4policy workshop jointly organized by the Bank of England and the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa, Italy)
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed player par- tially shares his private information with the receiver and the latter then, based on her belief about the state, takes action. This ac- tion, together with the state of nature, determines the utility of both players. We consider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion situa- tion where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law. In this repeated persuasion model an optimal disclosure strat- egy of the sender should, at any period, balance between obtaining high a stage payoff and disclosing information which may have neg- ative implications on future payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies under different discount factors and characterize when the asymp- totic value achieves the maximal value possible.