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  • Economic Theory and Computational Economics (ETACE)

    Prof. Dr. Herbert Dawid

    © Universität Bielefeld

Welcome at ETACE - Chair for Economic Theory and Computational Economics

          

Postal Address:
Universität Bielefeld
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Universitätsstr. 25
D-33615 Bielefeld

Contact:
Tel.: +49 521 106-6931
E-mail: etace(et)uni-bielefeld.de

 

Latest News

Conference Presentation

27.07.2022

Herbert Dawid will give a talk on "Implications of Algorithmic Wage Setting on Online Labor Platforms: A Simulation-Based Analysis" at the Annual Conference of the
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE 2022) in South Lake Tahoe from August 8-11, 2022.


New Journal Papers Accepted:

28.06.2022

Dawid, H., Keoula, M.Y., Kopel, M. and P.M. Kort (2022), "Dynamic Investment Strategies and Leadership in Product Innovation", forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research

‰Banas, L., Dawid, H., Randrianasolo, T.A., Storn, J. and X. Wen (2022), "Numerical approximation of a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations arising in innovation dynamics" forthcoming in Journal of Scientific Computing


Computational and Experimental Economics Summer School

09.06.2022

Herbert Dawid is one of the organizers of the 1st BESLAB Computational and Experimental Economics Summer school held from June 12-19, 2022 in Barcelona as part of the Barcelona School of Economics (BSE) Summer Forum. The event includes a 2-day Workshop on Computational and Experimental Economics on June 13 and 14.




Abstract:
We characterise an employer’s optimal design of values for promotion among his workers through workplace culture. Workers compete by exerting effort, and higher effort induced by greater valuations corresponds to higher profits for the employer. Introducing inequalities in valuations makes workers’ values more easily recognisable, reducing their information rent, which in turn increases effort. At the same time, inequalities lead to differences in promotion attainment, potentially reducing effort. We show that if culture redistributes value within or across workers, the reduction in information rent outweighs potential losses due to inequality. Maximal dispersion and maximal discrimination emerge as features of optimal designs. We confirm our theoretical predictions in an empirical application.
 

 

 


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