We meet every two to three weeks to discuss classics, recent and our own work in the philosophy of psychiatry. We focus on issues within the philosophy of science as well as conceptual and metaphysical issues. The colloquium is attended by BA students, MA students, Ph.D. students, and faculty members. If you are interested in participating or would like to be kept up-to-date, please contact Fabian Hundertmark.
This semester we meet on Thursdays at 14:00. You may either join us in the X-building (usually) in room A4-113 or via Zoom:
Meeting ID: 694 5822 2719
Passcode: Zachar
Since we are now well connected to the philosophy of psychiatry community and many of us have our own research projects in this area, we will discuss much work-in-progress by guests and members of the colloquium during the summer term of 2024. However, if there is great interest, we will also discuss published papers or book chapters.
20.06.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Sam Wren-Lewis and Anna Alexandrova (only text) |
Mental Health Without Well-being |
18.07.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Fabian Hundertmark (in person) |
What health is: The Blueprint View |
01.08.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Georg Repnikov (only text) | Does Schizophrenia Exist? A Deflationary Perspective |
29.08.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Jonida Kodra (in person) | Hearing voices: are all auditory verbal hallucinations actual hallucinations? |
26.09.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Sander Werkhoven (in person) | Mental Health and Intentional Activity |
10.10.2024 14 – 16 (CET) | Ema Sullivan-Bissett (in person) | Monothematic Delusions and Proper Functions |
24.10.2024 14 – 16 (CET) | Ilir Isufi (in person) | Self-diagnosis of psychiatric conditions as a threat to personal autonomy |
07.11.2024 14 – 16 (CET) | Sascha Fink (in person) | Psychedelic Assisted Psychotherapy: Transformative Experiences and Informed Consent |
21.11.2024 14 – 16 (CET) | Craig French (in person) | Mental health pluralism |
05.12.2024 14 – 16 (CET) | Hannah Altehenger (in person) | Climate Change and Moral Emotions |
Date: May 28 - 29, 2024
Location: Bielefeld University, Germany (Main Building V2-105/115) and online via Zoom
The Bielefeld Workshop on Philosophy of Psychiatry 2024 aims to delve into the philosophical underpinnings of psychiatric theory and (research) practice, exploring a plurality of perspectives and debates within the field.
This workshop offers a platform for philosophers of all backgrounds and career stages to come together, exchange ideas, and foster discussions. It is an opportunity to connect and bring together the growing community of philosophers of psychiatry, including master students.
To register, please send an email to fhundertmark@uni-bielefeld.de by the 24th of May.
Speakers:
Commentaries:
This event is funded by the DFG Research Training Group 2073, the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), and the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP).
The preliminary program can be found here and a poster here.
26.10.2023 14 - 16 (CET) | Awais Aftab (in person) |
The Rise and Fall of Kraepelinian Psychiatry |
9.11.2023 14 - 16 (CET) | Roberta Locatelli (in person) | A disjunctive account of mental disorder |
23.11.2023 14 - 16 (CET) | Drew Johnson (in person) |
A Framework for Assessing the Status of ADHD as a Disorder of Attention |
14.12.2023 14 - 16 (CET) | David Lambert (in person) | Report from an internship in a psychiatric clinic |
17.1.2024 12 - 14 (CET) | Jacob Stegenga (in person) (different date) | ‘The drug worked for me’… But Did It? |
1.2.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Fabian Hundertmark and James Turner (in person) | Ahistorical malfunctions do not exist |
15.2.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | James Turner and Fabian Hundertmark (in person) | Trial talks for "Function and Dysfunction in Medicine and Psychiatry" |
29.2.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Elly Vintiadis (in person) | Mental disorders as processes: A more suited metaphysics for psychiatry |
14.3.2024 14 - 16 (CET) |
Karen Neander (only texts) |
The Concept of Mental Illness Functional Analysis and Species Design |
18.4.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Tad Zawidzki (in person) | Skilled Metacognitive Self-Regulation toward Interpretive Norms: A Non-Relativist Basis for the Social Constitution of Mental Health and Illness (under review) |
25.4.2024 14 - 16 (CET) | Marko Jurjako (in person) | Mental Dysfunction, Brain Dysfunction, and the Role of the Personal/Subpersonal |
The first four sessions of the summer term were used to prepare the workshop Mental Disorders and Modal Properties, which took take place on the 12th and 13th of June at the HU Berlin. This preparation took place with members and fellows of the Human Abilities Research Center as well as participants of the workshop.
Abstract of the workshop: There is an emerging trend to think about mental disorders in terms of modal properties, such as dispositions, capacities, abilities, or skills. Sanja Dembić (2021) and John T. Maier (2021), for example, understand "addictive disorder" as a specific kind of disability or inability. Dembić (2023; ms), Tad Zawidzki and Garson Leder (2023) argue that mental health and disorder, more generally, should be understood in terms of skills or abilities. Johnathan Fuller (ms, chapter 3) argues that mental disorders generally are dispositions. While all of these approaches have some crucial commonalities, a unified picture of specific mental disorders and mental disorders, in general, remains to be found. The goal of this workshop is to bring together scholars working within these approaches to share ideas, find common ground, and discuss remaining controversies.
6.4.2023 2 - 4 pm (CET) | Barbara Vetter and Romy Jaster (paper only) |
Dispositional accounts of abilities |
27.4.2023 2 - 4 pm (CET) | Sophie Kikkert (in person) | (Dis)ability, Normality, and Intrinsicness |
11.5.2023 2 - 4 pm (CET) | Fabian Hundertmark and Marlene van den Bos (in person) | Functions and Dysfunctions: A Selected Disposition Approach |
25.5.2023 2 - 4 pm (CET) | Pablo Hubacher Haerle (in person) | Intention, Modality and Human Kind |
After the workshop, we discussed published papers, but also the work-in-progress of guests and members of the colloquium:
14.6.2023 (Wednesday) 4 - 6 (CET) | Sascha Fink (in person) | a paper on Psychedelics in Psychotheraphy |
29.6.2023 2 - 4 (CET) |
Sam Fellowes (paper only) |
How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences |
13.7.2023 2 - 4 (CET) | Robert Chapman (paper only) | The reality of autism: On the metaphysics of disorder and diversity |
27.7.2023 2 - 4 (CET) | Cristina Amoretti (in person) and Awais Aftab (paper only) | Comments on Anneli Jefferson's book "Are mental disorders brain disorders?" |
17.8.2023 2 - 4 (CET) | Daniel Montero Espinoza (in person) | The Heterogeneity of Symptom Measurement in Psychiatry |
15.9.2023 (Friday) 12 - 2 (CET) |
James Turner and Fabian Hundertmark (in person) |
Swampman goes to the doctor |
28.9.2023 2 - 4 (CET) | Vladimir Markovic (in person) | Morality and mental disorders intertwined: distinguishing between pathological and non-pathological malevolence |
In the winter term of 2022/2023, we read Justin Garson's new book, Madness: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford, 2022). In a careful examination of texts ranging from antiquity to Darwinian medicine, the author contrasts two paradigms. According to the paradigm of madness-as-dysfunction, madness is viewed as disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other diseases, occurs when something in the mind or brain is not functioning as it should. Garson contrasts this prevailing view with a paradigm he calls “madness-as-strategy." According to this paradigm, madness is neither a disease nor a defect, but a designed trait. At the end of the semester, we had Justin as a guest.
Furthermore, we invited Hariett Fagerberg to talk with us about disorders as domino dysfunctions.
1.9.2022 | Fabian Hundertmark (talk) | Presentation on functions, dysfunctions, and mental disorders |
22.9.2022 – in X-A2-103 | Sanneke de Haan (paper only) | An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry (2020) |
6.10.2022 – in X-A2-103 | Raffaella Campaner (paper only) | Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry: What are we pluralists about, and why? (2014) |
13.10.2022 | Justin Garson (chapter only) |
Madness: A Philosophical Exploration (2022) - Introduction, Introductions to Parts I, II, and III |
27.10.2022 | Lara Keuck (talk) | Presentation of the project: Translating Validity in Psychiatric Research |
10.11.2022 | Justin Garson (chapter only) | Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, Part I |
24.11.2022 | Justin Garson (chapter only) | Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, chapters 11 and 12 |
15.12.2022 | James Turner (in person) | Paper: What is low mood all about? |
12.1.2023 | Justin Garson (chapter only) |
Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, chapters 14 and 15 |
26.1.2023 | Harriet Fagerberg (paper only) | Draft paper on the methodology of the disease debate |
2.2.2023 | Harriet Fagerberg (talk) | Presentation on somatic disorders as dysfunctions |
23.2.2023 |
Fabian Hundertmark (in person) | Partial Realization and Normality: Interpreting Jefferson's Account of Brain Dysfunctions |
16.3.2023 | Justin Garson & Jerome Wakefield (paper only) |
The Developmental Plasticity Challenge to Wakefield's View & Reply by Wakefield |
30.3.2023 | Justin Garson (in person) | Discussion with Justin on his book |
End of summer term 2022, we read Anneli Jefferson's new book, "Are mental disorders brain disorders?" (2022). She addresses whether mental disorders are brain disorders and what the consequences would be. In the last session, we had Anneli as a guest.
At the beginning of the summer term, we read "A metaphysics of psychopathology" by Peter Zachar (2015). In this book, Zachar addresses the question of what it means when mental disorders are called "real", "true", or "objective".
In the winter term 2021/2022, we discussed the book "Philosophy of Psychiatry" by Jonathan Tsou. Tsou addresses basic questions of the philosophy of psychiatry, such as whether there are mental illnesses (yes), what mental illnesses are (biological kinds with harmful effects), whether there are natural kinds in psychiatry (yes), whether the DSM allows valid psychiatric classification (no).
Afterward, we discussed the work of Dr. Sanja Dembić (HU Berlin), who argues that individuals have a mental disorder when they are incapable of responding to reasons in their actions, beliefs, and emotions and when this inability is harmful. In the last session, we had Dr. Sanja Dembić as a guest and discussed an unpublished paper with her.
In the summer term of 2021, we explored and discussed many different topics in the philosophy of psychiatry. For example, we dealt with definitions of "mental disorder", the biopsychosocial model, psychodelics, personality disorders, consciousness, autonomy and psychoanalysis.
At the end of the semester, we invited JProf. Lena Kästner (Univerisität des Saarlandes) to discuss her paper "Identifying Causes in Psychiatry".
My Project
I investigate the question of what mental disorders are. My goal is to establish a comprehensive theory that answers both the question of the basic ontological category, the question of the individuation of individual types of disorders, and the question of the specific properties of mental disorders. I assume that mental disorders are dispositions to think, feel, or act. Types of mental disorders are individuated by their manifestations, causes, causal basis, or combinations of these factors, and the types so individuated are mental disorders (e.g., as opposed to personality types, cognitive abilities, or intellectual virtues) because they are harmful, irrational deviations from statistical norms.
This research is carried out as part of the project “Complex Biological Dispositions: A Case Study in the Metaphysics of Biological Practice” (2020-2023) and is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It is a subproject in “Inductive Metaphysics” (FOR 2495).
For more information, click here.
In October 2021, I started working on my dissertation as a member of the graduate school 2073 on a topic in philosophy of psychiatry. Contemporary philosophy of science predominantly endorses some scientific pluralism as a default position. Research in psychiatry with its practical character serves as an exemplary field with respect to which I aim to give a positive, normative account of which pluralist stance to endorse relative to the objects of interests of research (theories, models, explanations, classifications, ontologies etc.), given its epistemic and non-epistemic aims.
I am a member of the graduate school Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research and a doctoral candidate at the Leibniz Universität Hannover.
In my dissertation, I investigate some of the trade-offs between endorsing methodological pluralism in psychiatric research and achieving coordination between the plurality of methods involved. I am particularly interested in how theoretical constructs used in psychiatric research are picked (and refined) in the light of the several disciplines that inform some of the current frameworks. More generally, I am interested in the prospects and challenges posed by developing different psychiatric taxonomies that serve different practical purposes.
I am a master's student in Philosophy of Science at Leibniz University Hannover. I find the Philosophy of Psychiatry fascinating and am especially interested in the following topics. What makes mental phenomena pathological? How do mental disorders intersect with other kinds of normativity (morality, rationality, and deviance)? And relatedly, how does psychiatry interrelate with ethics, epistemology/metaphysics, and criminology/law? How should personality disorders be conceptualized, and why do they seem to pose challenges for psychiatry (conceptually, classificatorily, ethically)?
I have recently completed my Ph.D. at the University of Sheffield, UK, titled “Low Mood: Evolution, Cognition, and Disorder,” and funded by the White Rose College of Arts and Humanities. As the title suggests, I am interested in a) why natural selection has resulted in humans and other animals having the capacity for low mood, b) how low mood affects cognition—specifically, if it does so in virtue of having intentional content, and c) at what point low mood becomes dysfunctional/disordered (i.e., at what point it becomes a pathological condition like depression).
I am an affiliated researcher at the University of Tübingen. My research sits at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Most recently, I have been working on developing a concept of ADHD that bridges the gap between the neurodiversity model and the medical disorder model, as well as a disjunctive concept of mental disorder that supports such an account. I also work as an ADHD and executive function coach.