We meet every two to three weeks to discuss classics, recent and our own work in the philosophy of psychiatry. We focus on issues within the philosophy of science as well as conceptual and metaphysical issues. The colloquium is attended by BA students, MA students, Ph.D. students, and faculty members. If you are interested in participating or would like to be kept up-to-date, please contact Fabian Hundertmark.
This semester we meet on Thursdays at 14:00. You may either join us in the X-building (usually) in room A4-113 or via Zoom:
Meeting ID: 694 5822 2719
In the winter term of 2022/2023, we will read Justin Garson's new book, Madness: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford, 2022). In a careful examination of texts ranging from antiquity to Darwinian medicine, the author contrasts two paradigms. According to the paradigm of madness-as-dysfunction, madness is viewed as disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other diseases, occurs when something in the mind or brain is not functioning as it should. Garson contrasts this prevailing view with a paradigm he calls “madness-as-strategy." According to this paradigm, madness is neither a disease nor a defect, but a designed trait.
At the end of the semester, we will have Justin as our guest to talk about his book.
|1.9.2022||Fabian Hundertmark||Presentation on functions, dysfunctions, and mental disorders|
|22.9.2022 – in X-A2-103||Sanneke de Haan||An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry (2020)|
|6.10.2022 – in X-A2-103||Vladimir Markovic||Paper on personality disorders|
Madness: A Philosophical Exploration - Introduction, Introductions to Parts I, II and III
|27.10.2022||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|3.11.2022||Lara Keuck||Presentation of the project: Translating Validity in Psychiatric Research|
|10.11.2022||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|24.11.2022||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|8.12.2022||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|12.1.2023||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|26.1.2023||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
|2.2.2023||Justin Garson||Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, tba|
At the beginning of the summer term, we read "A metaphysics of psychopathology" by Peter Zachar (2015). In this book, Zachar addresses the question of what it means when mental disorders are called "real", "true", or "objective".
In the winter term 2021/2022, we discussed the book "Philosophy of Psychiatry" by Jonathan Tsou. Tsou addresses basic questions of the philosophy of psychiatry, such as whether there are mental illnesses (yes), what mental illnesses are (biological kinds with harmful effects), whether there are natural kinds in psychiatry (yes), whether the DSM allows valid psychiatric classification (no).
Afterward, we discussed the work of Dr. Sanja Dembić (HU Berlin), who argues that individuals have a mental disorder when they are incapable of responding to reasons in their actions, beliefs, and emotions and when this inability is harmful. In the last session, we had Dr. Sanja Dembić as a guest and discussed an unpublished paper with her.
In the summer term of 2021, we explored and discussed many different topics in the philosophy of psychiatry. For example, we dealt with definitions of "mental disorder", the biopsychosocial model, psychodelics, personality disorders, consciousness, autonomy and psychoanalysis.
My project aims to develop a comprehensive answer to the question of what mental disorders are. My project is premised on two ideas. First, I believe that mental disorders are best understood in terms of modal properties (e.g., dispositions, capacities, abilities, or skills). Second, I distinguish three sub-questions that, in my view, have not yet been adequately distinguished. 1. To which ontological category do mental disorders belong? 2. What unites individual tokens of this ontological category into types (psychological kinds)? 3. What makes psychological kinds mental disorders?
This research is carried out as part of the project “Complex Biological Dispositions: A Case Study in the Metaphysics of Biological Practice” (2020-2023) and is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It is a subproject in “Inductive Metaphysics” (FOR 2495).
For more information, click here.
In October 2021, I started working on my dissertation as a member of the graduate school 2073 on a topic in philosophy of psychiatry. Contemporary philosophy of science predominantly endorses some scientific pluralism as a default position. Research in psychiatry with its practical character serves as an exemplary field with respect to which I aim to give a positive, normative account of which pluralist stance to endorse relative to the objects of interests of research (theories, models, explanations, classifications, ontologies etc.), given its epistemic and non-epistemic aims.
I am a member of the graduate school Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research and a doctoral candidate at the Leibniz Universität Hannover.
In my dissertation, I investigate some of the trade-offs between endorsing methodological pluralism in psychiatric research and achieving coordination between the plurality of methods involved. I am particularly interested in how theoretical constructs used in psychiatric research are picked (and refined) in the light of the several disciplines that inform some of the current frameworks. More generally, I am interested in the prospects and challenges posed by developing different psychiatric taxonomies that serve different practical purposes.
I am a master's student in Philosophy of Science at Leibniz University Hannover. I find the Philosophy of Psychiatry fascinating and am especially interested in the following topics. What makes mental phenomena pathological? How do mental disorders intersect with other kinds of normativity (morality, rationality, and deviance)? And relatedly, how does psychiatry interrelate with ethics, epistemology/metaphysics, and criminology/law? How should personality disorders be conceptualized, and why do they seem to pose challenges for psychiatry (conceptually, classificatorily, ethically)?